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Introduction
… [W]e are tired of chieaincy aairs! Why? March 2010, March, 2010, we 
are still glorifying the chieaincy institution, what is that institution? e most 
undemocratic institution, how does one become a chief? It is based on blood 
relations. One’s ancestor’s [sic] went to conquer this one and conquered that one. 
ey were slave-raiders and so on, and therefore one is a chief. at is the basis 
of selecting chiefs. No democracy in it at all! 
   
Ghanaian journalist Kwesi Pratt on a live FM radio show 
(transcript at theodikro.blogspot.com 23rd March 2010).
 
In the old Testament, Moses got the new Laws from the mountains and directly 
from the one and only God we cannot see but feel in our spirit, and among 
the laws or Commandments of God he made were: THOU SHALT NOT 
WORSHIP IDOLS. Nana, I know some of the Chiefs are Christians, and still 
do this blood over stone sacrice. Do you think that conicts with the new 
post Moses Ten commandments? I have been trying to nd out the root cause 
of our underdevelopment, and [...] I am convinced there is some kind of curse 
associated with certain behavior and acts of humans in any society. Not to list all 
of them but Idol worshipping is one of them, which is also listed in the Bible as 
against the ten commandments.
A posting in an internet discussion group  
(Ghana Leadership Forum 20th August 2011).
e two quotes above exemplify the conicting views expressed on the topic 
of traditional chieaincy in contemporary Ghana. Chiefs are nowadays 
a common subject of public discussions – about good governance, 
democracy, development, civil society, and the like – which address 
whether, and how, ‘traditional political institutions’ could co-exist with, or 
become a part of, modern government. Many have recently argued that a 
‘true’ or ‘direct’ democracy must be dependent on the consensus of local 
communities represented by their traditional leaders. In this scenario, the 
chiefs should also have a positive role in the socio-economic development 
of the country (see e.g. Gyapong 2006; Ray and Eizlini 2004; Wiredu 2000). 
e critics, on the other hand, maintain that customary authority based on 
hereditary succession runs counter to the values of electoral democracy, 
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drawing attention, perhaps, to the prevalent abuses of chiey power as well 
as recurring conicts over succession and land rights (see, e.g., Afrane 2000; 
Tsikata and Seini 2004; Ubink 2007). In this light, chieaincy is perceived 
as a secular political institution comparable with those of the modern 
administrative state. is debate is taking place among politicians, civil 
servants, journalists, scholars, and civil society activists. 
However, as the second quote indicates, there is also another signicant 
public debate going on in today’s Ghana about chieaincy that seems to 
have only a little to do with politics, one that is carried on mainly by the 
members of some Christian churches, particularly those that belong to 
the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement that has ourished in Ghana and 
elsewhere in Africa since the 1980s. ese debates emphasize the chief ’s role 
as a ritual leader who performs sacrices on behalf of his community. Since 
the divinities and rituals associated with traditional religion are considered 
unchristian and immoral, chieaincy too has assumed a negative character 
and is perceived as a ‘pagan institution’ or, as some Ghanaian Christians 
would put it, a form of ‘idol worship’. is religious discourse on chiefs 
has recently expanded its presence in the public sphere as the Pentecostal-
Charismatic churches have gained better access to audiovisual mass media 
(see, e.g., Meyer 1998a; 1998b; 2006). Although these discussions are very 
contemporary, increasingly taking place in broadcast and social media, 
they have a long history that stretches back to the era of colonial rule and 
missionary Christianity.
In this book I argue that closer examination of the debates concerning 
traditional chieaincy helps us better understand the processes of 
secularization in Ghana and other post-colonial societies, thereby bringing 
a standard topic of classical ethnography into more current and far-
reaching discussions about the idea of modernity itself. In a general sense, 
secularization could be dened as a process in modern society whereby 
divinity is separated from the ways in which human society is regulated and 
physical nature is understood to function (De Pina-Cabral 2001, 329; see 
Latour 1991, 32–35). More specically, this book focuses on two dierent 
but related aspects of secularization. First, studying the recent history of 
the chieaincy institution helps us to chart a structural transformation in 
which a colonized African society was divided into spheres of politics and 
religion. How were the dierent ideas, practices, and institutions of local 
worlds distributed between these two domains? What sorts of negotiations 
were entailed and how has this dichotomy been contested? Second, by 
examining the changes in the religious role of the chiefs we are able to 
address the question of the kind of religiosity that is acceptable in a modern 
secular Ghana. Which types of spiritual ideas, practices, and institutions 
are considered objectionable in terms of modern sensibilities and therefore 
excluded from the category of religion? Have the spiritual forces of the 
traditional cosmology or the Christian God been granted agency in political 
relations or are they treated as transcendent objects of individual beliefs? 
ere has been a growing interest in secularist ideologies and 
secularization in general among anthropologists in recent times (see, e.g., 
Asad 2003; Bowen 2010; Cannell 2010; Özyürek 2006), and scholars have 
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started to ask what exactly the anthropological perspective can oer to their 
study. Too oen secularization is accorded a taken-for-granted quality and 
consequently it is implicitly suggested that the history of Western modernity 
has been, and is being, repeated in other parts of the world. Hence, a call 
for “genuine comparative anthropology of secularisms” based on particular 
ethnographic and historical studies has been raised (Cannell 2010, 86). 
Hopefully, this book will have a part to play in that.
Kingship in the postcolony
e history of this book is closely linked to a particular era in African and 
global politics which coincides with my own research career on Ghana 
and the Asante people. In recent literature this post-Cold War period has 
been characterized by a ‘resurgence’ or even a ‘renaissance’ of traditional 
chieaincy in many parts of Africa – although certainly not everywhere. 
Consequently, many analysts have pondered why and how chieaincy has 
persisted through all the enormous political, economic, and social changes 
of the colonial and post-colonial periods, and the “resilience of chieaincy” 
has become something of a popular notion in Africanist anthropology, 
history, development studies, political science, legal studies, and other 
related disciplines (see, e.g., Englebert 2002; Ntsebeza 2005, 16–35; Ubink 
2008, 13–31; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and Van Dijk 1999). 
In the late 1990s when I decided to write my doctoral dissertation on 
Asante chieaincy I was fascinated by similar questions. As a person who 
had lived all his life in a modern, bureaucratic-state society I was amazed by 
the simple fact that chiefs still existed in Africa: this, I thought, demanded 
explanation. Accordingly, the very rst research proposal that I submitted to 
my supervisors was titled “Natural Attenuation?”, a critical allusion to Kwame 
Nkrumah’s (1964, 84) famous assertion made in the 1960s that chieaincy 
would disappear under the impact of “social progress”. Subsequent eldwork 
in 2000-01 gave me the impression that chieaincy really was as strong as 
ever and I thought that we might indeed be living a renaissance of a sort. 
A new king of Asante – the Asantehene – had just been elected and installed. 
He was a youngish man with an overseas business background who made 
bold, no-nonsense statements about putting an end to local disputes over 
traditional oces and engaging all his chiefs in work for development. 
During those early days of his reign he enjoyed great popularity not only in 
Asante but also elsewhere in the country. e media reported his activities 
and statements in an admiring tone, photos and paintings of him adorned 
the walls of shops and bars, crowds greeted him by chanting his nickname 
“King Solomon” when he moved through the city of Kumasi with his retinue 
of cars, and so on. Amidst all this, however, I became immersed in the social 
and cosmological principles that ordered the chiey hierarchies among the 
Asante and questions about resilience and resurgence were relegated to the 
background (see Kallinen 2004). Ultimately, it is doubtful if I wrote anything 
truly original about chieaincy’s relation to modernity at the time (see, e.g,. 
Kallinen 2006).
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Today, I am rather sceptical of the whole notion of resilience and this 
time around I believe I have something new to say about chieaincy in 
colonial and post-colonial eras and beyond. As noted above, the presence of 
traditional leaders in the political arena of African states in the 1990s – an 
epoch marked by the introduction of multi-party democracy and neoliberal 
economic reforms in many countries of the continent – quickly caught the 
attention of social scientists. Consequently, chiefs were also given a role in 
the grand theories about political processes in the region (see, e.g., Bayart 
1993; Herbst 2000; Mamdani 1996). What many of the studies of that era 
have in common is the assumption of a separate political sphere of society, 
where institutions, agents, or groups compete, co-operate, or co-exist. ese 
studies dene, even if implicitly, politics as that which relates to power, 
which is what both traditional chiefships and modern states are supposedly 
all about. Conversely, even a supercial glance at the classic ethnographies 
of African societies reveals that the kings and chiefs of the pre-colonial era 
were not ‘political’ leaders in the same sense as modern political theory 
suggests. ey were characterized as diviners, healers, priests, magicians, 
rain-makers, or controllers of witchcra, and the origins of their oces were 
traced to the spiritual realm (see, e.g., Forde 1991 [1954]; Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard 1969 [1940]). e contemporary political theorists who write about 
chiefs rarely address this spiritual quality of the chiey oce, not to mention 
that of the whole community over which the chiefs ruled. Of course, the 
dierences between the classics and present-day post-colonial theorization 
could be attributed to a number of factors and, indeed, the classics have 
received their share of criticism concerning their heavy emphasis on the 
unifying function of shared religious values (Asad 1973, 270–271; Fields 
1985, 64–66), their biased methodological choices (Stewart and Strathern 
2002, 19–20), commitment to “equilibrium models” of political systems 
(Bailey 1990 [1969], 12–18), and so forth. Nevertheless, despite these oen 
well-grounded critical points, it would be very dicult to deny that religion 
and ritual had a central place in African pre-colonial social formations. 
A comparable inconsistency was very much evident during my eldwork 
in the form of the two separate public discourses on chieaincy that are 
represented at the beginning of this chapter. On the one hand, I could, for 
example, read a letter to the editor in a newspaper about how the hereditary 
succession to chiefships should be abolished and chiefs should be voted 
to oce by the people; or I could listen to a phone-in radio show where 
a concerned listener was demanding greater transparency with regards the 
fees chiefs received from timber concessions or mining rights. But, on the 
other hand, I could also talk to members of chiey families who were ‘born-
again Christians’ and refused to become chiefs because they considered 
sacricing to the ancestors and gods ‘satanic’. Or I might hear stories about 
chiefs visiting the shrines of famous divinities, located possibly hundreds of 
kilometres away from their home towns, in order to seek out prophesies and 
protective medicines. It was almost as though the institution of chieaincy 
addressed by these two discourses was two distinct things functioning 
according to two dierent sets of principles. Observations such as these, 
coupled with the gaps in the scholarly literature, made me seriously think 
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that it might be more pertinent to look at the ruptures and breaks in the 
history of chieaincy rather than tracing continuities. ese ideas fully 
hit home aer completing another spell of eldwork in 2006 when it also 
became obvious that it was necessary to take a new look at the historical 
source materials. 
Yet what happened to the divinity of the kingships and chiefships in Africa 
still does not seem to be an important question for contemporary political 
theory. My contention is that this omission has le us poorly equipped to 
understand the nature of colonial and post-colonial-era developments. 
For instance, it has become more or less commonplace to argue that the 
post-colonial states have inherited the power structures of the colonial era 
or, more precisely, the central governments have sought to rule the rural 
populations by using local chiefs or ‘big men’ as their middlemen and clients, 
in the same vein as the European indirect rule system (see, e.g., Hansen 
and Stepputat 2005; 2006; Mamdani 1996; Piot 2010). I have no objections 
to this claim as such, but I nd it intriguing that the process of annexing 
sacred kingships and chiefships to secular political machinery is not usually 
problematized by the analysts. How are god-like gures transformed into 
political instruments and with what consequences? What sort of process is 
entailed in converting high priests into local-level bureaucrats? Instead of 
tackling these questions, there rather seems to be an underlying assumption 
that they were all ‘political’ institutions and thus somehow commensurable. 
Or conversely, what should we think when we read about the ways that 
common perceptions of modern political leaders are inuenced by ideas 
that used to be connected to sacred kingship in dierent parts of Africa 
(see, e.g., Ashforth 1998; Taylor 2004)? Religious ideas and ritual functions 
seem to have become separated from political institutions but, obviously, 
not entirely. It appears that in a relatively short time, the central institutions 
of African societies have transformed radically and this alteration is 
not primarily a question of political oscillation between democracy and 
autocracy, consensus and coercion, or transparency and secrecy. It rather has 
to do with the quality of the institutions and the structures of the societies, 
where they exist. If such a transformation has actually taken place, to what 
extent is it then fruitful to discuss African chieaincy in the twentieth and 
twenty-rst centuries within the rubric of resilience?
Since questions like these have been le largely untouched, the tropes of 
inescapable processes of rationalization and disenchantment are looming 
in the background as presuppositions about the nature of modernity. Such 
views cannot be taken for granted and hence it is time to look more closely 
into how the category of politics, in contradistinction to religion, came into 
being in colonial societies. What has this African secularization been like? 
Was it to some extent comparable to the shi that took place in the relations 
between the church and the state in Western Europe in the period between 
the sixth and eighteenth centuries? Has it been inevitable and is it leading 
toward similar ideological concerns and dilemmas about religion and politics 
that are prevalent in the contemporary West? As a recent observer points 
out, the exploration of these kinds of questions is still “either completely 
lacking in the literature or in a state of infancy” (Van Dijk 2015, 215). In 
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this book I illuminate this transformation by analyzing the processes of, and 
pressures for, secularization that developed with regards the sacred kingship 
and chiefship among the Asante. One should be very careful in making 
generalizations but I hope to establish that questions raised in the course of 
analysis are denitely worth asking in the contexts of cases from other parts 
of Africa and elsewhere in the former colonized world.
eoretical outlook
e ethnographic focus of the book is directed towards transformations 
in divine kingship and chiefship of the Asante people of central Ghana.1 
Analysis is primarily inspired by the work of Louis Dumont (especially 
1971; 1980; 1992 [1986]). One of his main interests lay in studying how 
holistic, or traditional, societies become individualistic, or modern, as 
a result of an internal process of transformation. As Jonathan Parry (1998, 
153) has pointed out, Dumont inherited from his teacher Marcel Mauss an 
interest in studying “the progressive fragmentation of an originally unied 
conceptual order”. Much like Mauss (1966 [1954]), who had pondered 
how modern economic exchanges and relationships had developed from 
the “total prestations” of “archaic societies”, Dumont was interested in how 
the domains of politics and the economy had become separated from the 
previously all-encompassing category of religion. In his work secularization, 
whether it concerned the dierentiation between kingly and priestly orders 
in India (Dumont 1980 [1966], 287–313), or church and state in Europe 
(Dumont 1992 [1986], 60–103), was a historical development – an evolution 
of a sort (Parry 1998, 151–153). Dumont (1992 [1986], 1–52; 60–72) 
traced the origins of Western secularism to Christian thinking prior to the 
emergence of the modern state and the Enlightenment. Similar genealogical 
accounts of the development of secularism have ensued more recently, most 
prominently Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007). In this book I also ask how 
traditional Asante society, as an undierentiated order, where the ‘political’ 
was not separated from the ‘religious’, came to be divided into spheres of 
politics and religion: an arrangement distinctive to the modern West. 
I further argue that missionary Christianity, an individualistic religion that 
posits great importance in ruptures and change, has had a signicant eect 
in the process (see Robbins 2007; 2012).
Drawing inspiration from Dumont and applying his approach to the 
Asante material does not come without problems. First, the developments in 
the colonial and post-colonial contexts of Africa are not like the transition 
from traditional to modern with which Dumont himself dealt. European 
1 e Asante people belong to a larger ethnic and language group called the Akan. 
e Akan people live in the coastal and forest areas of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. 
In Ghana they are the largest ethnic and language group constituting roughly 40% 
of the total population. e Akan language and its dialects are classied under the 
Tano language family, including Asante Twi, Fante, and Akuapem, which also have 
their own distinctive written forms.
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colonial expansion was the medium through which Western secularism 
became globalized. As José Casanova (2010, 273–274) puts it, non-Western 
societies “did not undergo a similar process of historical development 
but instead always confronted Western secular modernity from their rst 
encounter with European colonialism as ‘the other’”. In colonial Ghana the 
disintegration of the religious order had a sudden and aggressive nature 
and hence it cannot be discussed in terms of evolution, following Dumont. 
Second, binaries like traditional / modern, holistic / individualistic, and non-
Western / Western have proved problematic in many ways and no longer 
have much purchase in present-day anthropology. It is oen understood 
that the application of such binaries constitutes a form of “epistemic 
violence”, in which the categories and distinctions of local realities are forced 
into the binary mould of modernist social science, thereby removing the 
phenomena being studied from their actual social and historical contexts 
(see, e.g., Cliord 1986; Spivak 1988). However, it should be underlined 
that the conceptual pairs Dumont utilized in his analysis were not mutually 
exclusive, and both holistic and individualistic elements can be discerned 
in all cultures, even though dierently valued (Siikala 2014, 215–216). 
Hence, if we accept traditional and modern societies as ideal-typical models 
without assuming any necessary evolutionary or historical relationship 
between them, we will be able to have a more comprehensive view of the 
impacts of Christian conversion and secularist ideology in Asante. Starting 
from the holistic conguration of traditional society, wherein politics is not 
dened separately from religion, helps us to understand how in a specic 
place and historical instance certain ideas and practices came to constitute 
the secular. Aer all, modern categories were not simply duplicated in an 
African setting: what became understood as ‘political’ and what ‘religious’ 
was a result of complicated orderings and negotiations, where nothing could 
be taken for granted. To put it in more concrete terms, we are not merely 
discussing ‘changing beliefs’ or ‘church-state relations’ but an overarching 
transformation that touched not only belief and ritual but also such 
seemingly mundane issues as, for example, village living arrangements, 
forms of collective labour, or extraction of natural resources. I believe that 
the Dumontian perspective, which does not assume Western categories as 
a starting point, will help us to avoid the pitfalls of those approaches that take 
the ‘political’ nature of chieaincy as a given. Not surprisingly, Dumont’s 
theories have recently been used fruitfully in the analysis of cultural change 
in the context of globalization (see Robbins and Siikala 2014), and one goal 
of my study is to contribute to these discussions.
Although Dumont presented a critique of Western secularism, he was 
above all interested in the development and comparison of ideologies and 
did not comment on the political dimensions of secularization, for instance, 
with regards to colonialism. Yet Talal Asad (1993; 2003) has underlined 
secularist ideology as an important instrument of statecra and criticized 
those commentators who have emphasized its liberating and redemptive 
qualities. For instance, Taylor’s (1998, 38–53) claim that secularism is the 
only option if a pluralistic democratic state is to work has been emphatically 
opposed by Asad. When Taylor asserts that in order to avoid hierarchies and 
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conicts citizenship has to become the most important part of an individual’s 
identity (ibid., 43–44), Asad counters this by stating that secular citizenship 
is rather the way in which the modern state is able to create a “unifying 
experience” that transcends other identities based on religion, gender, or 
class. Hence, secularism is more about securing the undivided supremacy 
of the nation-state than about peaceful co-existence and toleration (Asad 
2003, 3–5). Following these insights, this book seeks to demonstrate the 
role of secularism in the creation of unied ‘native states’ or ‘tribes’ in the 
colonial period. Furthermore, it looks at how the chieaincy institution, 
stripped of its religious associations, has been turned into a symbol of 
a secular Ghanaian nation.
On the level of ideology secularization entails the ‘emancipation’ of 
the modern state, the economy, and science from the connes of religion, 
which does not mean simply that religious ideas are excluded from public 
discussions. e question is rather what sort of religious ideas and arguments 
are considered viable in this context (Asad 2003, 181–187; Casanova 2006). 
In modern states, people’s political identities might be religiously-based and 
their political choices might conform to a religious ethic, but God and other 
spiritual beings are regarded as otherworldly and they are not considered 
to have agency on the immanent level. us it could be said that modern 
societies support religions in which God is considered transcendent 
and rituals that aim to inuence God are seen as futile and misdirected. 
Whatever eects rituals may have depend solely on the human agency that 
they express and the psychological responses they induce (Keane 2013, 
163–164). Contemporary Ghanaian debates about chieaincy and ritual 
reveal that for many people the involvement of spirits in political aairs is 
an embodied fact, while the secularists classify such ideas as superstitions 
which do not belong to modern religion and even less to politics. Here 
I apply the concept of purication introduced by Bruno Latour (1991) and 
later developed by Webb Keane (2007). Purication is seen as the process 
that determines the types of agents and actions considered appropriate 
to modern society. In ‘puried’ religious thought spiritual beings have 
a recognized existence inside the ‘hearts’ or minds of people, but it is not 
acceptable to grant them agency in ‘real’ relations between people. In Ghana 
such views are eectively contradicted by religious groups, who see spiritual 
forces as the most powerful agents in social relations; consequently, ideas 
about separating religion from politics in the modernist sense are not of 
interest to them.
Book outline
e chapters of the book have been divided into three thematic parts, each 
with a short theoretical introduction. e rst part of the book builds up 
a picture of the undierentiated order of the pre-colonial Asante kingdom, 
in which the chiey and priestly functions of the rulers were not separated. 
Chapter 1 posits sacrices and marriage exchanges as the most important 
responsibilities of the chief, both of which were directed at establishing 
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and perpetuating relations between the living and the spirits of the dead 
ancestors. In Chapter 2 the founding of the kingdom and its authority 
structure are framed as results of sacrices oered to various gods by the 
Asante king and his chiefs. Both chapters illuminate how ideas and things 
that Western ideology would perceive as specically religious were all-
encompassing in Asante society. is is the starting point, and a necessary 
qualication, for understanding the secularization process with which the 
chapters of the second part of the book deal. Although this formulation 
of the pre-colonial order is my own, I am heavily indebted to the previous 
generations of anthropologists responsible for the classic ethnographic 
treatments of Asante chieaincy, most notably, R. S. Rattray, Meyer Fortes, 
K. A. Busia, and Alex Kyerematen. I would also add the work of legal scholar 
E. E. Kurankyi-Taylor to that list. e same applies to historians such as 
Ivor Wilks and T. C. McCaskie. Even if my account of the Asante past looks 
quite dierent from theirs, the importance of the knowledge and inspiration 
received from the previous generations of scholars must be recognized. 
e second part discusses how the unied order is being dissolved. e 
secularization process was initiated by the colonial administrators’ and 
missionary bodies’ aspiration to maintain Christian converts under the 
‘political’ authority of their non-Christian, ‘pagan’ chiefs. erefore, it was 
necessary to start dividing the society along ‘political’ and ‘religious’ lines so 
that only the former was a mandatory concern for all. Here we are able to see 
the kernel of modern citizenship, since the ‘religious’ opinion of individual 
people started to dene their relationship to their ‘political’ ruler. Chapter 
3 deals with this process and the various problems that accompanied it. 
Despite its improvised qualities, administrative secularization had its basis 
in Western social theories, most importantly evolutionism, and the leading 
British political ideologies of the time. Chapter 4 explores the dierent 
colonial-era theories of the Asante kingdom as a secular state, based on 
conquest, contract, and the rights of citizens. Chapter 5 discusses how 
the now-political chiefship was put into the service of the post-colonial 
independent nation state – both as an instrument of administration and 
a cultural symbol. It also considers why the new kind of secular, ‘politico-
cultural’ chieaincy has not been accepted by some contemporary Christian 
groups. Chapter 6 explores the most recent developments, in which 
chieaincy is escaping the grip of the state by forming alliances with global 
horizontal organizations. In accordance with neoliberal ideologies the chiefs 
are expected to work towards improving the functioning of the market 
economy, with a particular emphasis on their judicial role. ese projects 
also draw their legitimation from certain types of political theories about 
chieaincy. 
In the third part of the book I discuss the purication of the spheres 
of politics and religion in colonial and post-colonial Ghana. God, natural 
deities, witches, and other spiritual beings have been both considered and 
rejected as possible agents and this has led to prolonged negotiations about 
the accepted place of religious ideas in modern society. e cases discussed 
in Chapters 7 and 8 deal with attempted state control of witch-nding 
‘cults’, the eciency of ‘protective magic’ during political upheavals, and 
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Pentecostal Christian notions of demonic inuences in secular politics. Here 
the theoretical ideas of Keane and Latour are of central importance. e 
Conclusions section brings the themes of the book together by discussing 
the large-scale eects of the secular project in contemporary Ghanaian 
society.
Research is based on anthropological eldwork conducted in Ghana 
between 2000 and 2001, and 2005 and 2006, along several archival 
sources obtained from Ghana and the United Kingdom, and, of course, 
the voluminous anthropological and historical literature on Ghana and 
the Asante. e eld-notes are in the possession of the author and can be 
consulted with permission.

Divinity and exchange I

23
I n Dumont’s (1971) approach, analysis of the development of the idea of  modern politics started from the “whole conguration”, where politics is 
not dened separately from religious or social relations. In what he called 
holistic or traditional societies “the conguration of values has a hierarchical 
form where the all-embracing normative consideration which we usually 
call religion contains and limits whatever other social considerations are 
recognized” (ibid., 31). Politics is, therefore, either not seen as something 
separate from religion, or is subordinated to it. In such societies, states and 
rulers are intermediaries between God or a spirit world, and society, the 
latter consisting of collective elements such as estates, orders, or clans (see 
Dumont 1980, 65–67). 
An Asante chiefdom of the pre-colonial era, a polity that was composed 
of several matrilineages established on the basis of common descent from 
a known female ancestor, can be described in these terms, while an Asante 
person was considered a whole person or a human being through his or her 
membership in the lineage. e matrilineage was understood to comprise 
not only its living members but also the unborn and the dead ancestors, 
the greatest of whom were those of chiey lineage because they were 
considered the original ‘holders’ of the territory where the chiefdom was 
located. e oce of chief held a central position, since it stood between 
the living, who were considered the existing guardians of the chiefdom, and 
the ancestral spirits who had absolute power over their descendants. e 
ancestors were understood to use their powers to help the living in their 
worldly undertakings, but wrongful deeds by the living brought shame on 
the ancestors, who did not hesitate to punish their transgressions. us the 
prosperity and welfare of the living was believed to depend directly on good 
relations with the ancestors. Because of the fragility of this connection it was 
vital that the oce vested in the chiey lineage was occupied by a person 
who was a matrilineal descendant of the founding ancestor of the lineage and 
thus close enough to the ancestors to communicate with them via sacrice. 
In addition to the spirits of the dead, the chief also made sacrices to nature 
spirits and charms in order to guarantee the well-being and success of his 
people. e kingdom of Asante was a union of several chiefdoms, and the 
king, the Asantehene, performed similar ritual duties to his royal ancestors 
and the gods on behalf of the kingdom. 
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It would, however, be incorrect to say that the Asante chiefs were only 
ritual rulers, ceremonial gureheads, or symbols. On the contrary, the chief 
had many functions that we could describe as political, legal, military, or 
economic. For instance, he presided over a decision-making council of 
elders and a judicial court, he commanded an army, and he also allocated 
farmland to his subjects. Nonetheless, what must be emphasized here is that 
all these functions were derived from the chief ’s connection to the spirit 
world. To take an example, he did not distribute farmland because the land 
belonged to him; yet neither did the land belong to the community who 
might then have vested the right of allocation in the chief. He did so because 
the land belonged to the ancestors and he was their representative or, 
more accurately, their reincarnation among the living. Hence, all the other 
functions of the chief were hierarchically subordinate to the value of his 
religious functions. is, in fact, should be considered typical for societies 
with kingships and chiefships, as noted by Dumont (1980, 293):
In most of the societies in which kingship is found, it is a magico-religious as 
well as political function. is is commonplace. In Ancient Egyptian or Sumerian 
kingship, or in the kingship of the Chinese empire for instance, the supreme 
religious functions were vested in the Sovereign, he was the Priest par excellence 
and those who were called the priests were only ritual specialists subordinate to 
him.
Views of this type have encountered criticism. Nicholas Dirks (1996; 2001), 
for instance, has argued that the very idea of an encompassing religious 
order has its origins in the colonial situation and its representations, and, 
consequently, the Indian society Dumont had studied in greatest depth was 
“literally created by colonialism” (Dirks 1996, xxvii). According to Dirks, 
British colonial rule in India was based on the idea that its social world was 
organized according to religious principles, that is, the caste system, with only 
oppressive and epiphenomenal political institutions and no civil society to 
speak of. is conception of ‘religious’ India was rst canonized in the works 
of colonial ethnographers and later found its way into academic anthropology, 
oering an emphasis that served to de-legitimize existing Indian political 
formations and justify the colonial project. Furthermore, Dirks connects 
Dumont’s work to a long line of so-called Orientalist scholarship (see Said 
1978) on non-Western societies which Tomoko Masuzawa (2005) has traced 
back to the nineteenth-century division of labour among the dierent social 
sciences. At the time, modern secularized Western societies were studied 
by separate disciplines (political science, economics, and theology), each 
specializing in their own social spheres, of which religion was only one. 
Oriental studies and anthropology, on the other hand, studied non-modern 
societies that were presumed to be “thoroughly in the grip of religion, as 
all aspects of life were supposedly determined and dictated by an archaic 
metaphysics of the magical and the supernatural” (ibid., 16) and hence 
lagging behind in terms of progress. e assumed predominance of 
religion was, therefore, the decisive characteristic that set so-called tribal 
societies as well as ancient civilizations apart from the modern West. Since 
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non-Western societies were dened as ‘timeless’ or ‘declining’ in this sense, 
they could not truly be agents of history, and therefore responsibility for 
their ‘development’ would have to rest on the shoulders of Western colonial 
powers, thereby providing scientic justication for Western colonialism. 
I am not competent to comment on the accuracy of the Dumontian 
view on India, but the criticism concerning the Orientalistic character of 
his work has to be taken seriously. Aer all, it is vital that the adoption 
of his approach does not lead to enforcing old ideas of Africa as “trapped 
in the past through religious constructions” (Green 2007, 39). However, 
I consider labelling Dumont an Orientalist to be a misunderstanding of his 
comparative project, and here I follow those who have previously addressed 
the criticism toward him (e.g. Rio and Smedal 2009; Kapferer 2010). Above 
all, it should not be overlooked that Dumont was as much a student of 
the West as he was of India and that these two projects were inseparable. 
For instance, Dumont’s treatise on the caste system, Homo Hierarchicus 
(1980), begins with a critical examination of the Western conception of the 
individual as a basic building block of society, and hierarchy as a system 
of graded authority, highlighting that these concepts are far from universal 
and are, in fact, tied to a particular time and place; most importantly, he 
arrives at this conclusion from the viewpoint of his Indian material. us, 
not content with comparisons limited to the categories of one society, he 
strives to analyze the West by using Indian categories: a type of “radical and 
relentless comparativism” that is oen mentioned as Dumont’s strength 
(Rio and Smedal 2009, 15). is study emulates Dumont’s approach by 
showing how Western concepts such as politics, religion, citizenship, or civil 
society are inadequate for discussing pre-colonial Asante chieaincy and 
the transformations that followed the colonial occupation and Christian 
conversion. is is achieved by using the concepts and cultural logic of 
Asante society itself. Hence, following Dumont, the objective has been to 
examine the voluminous ethnographic and historical record of religion and 
ritual in Asante and use it in interrogating our own ideas about religion and 
society rather than dismissing it as ‘colonial representations’ or ‘othering’ 
(ibid., 24). 
Discussing pre-colonial Asante as a holistic or traditional society does not 
imply a synchronic view of culture and society, where historical processes 
and the agency of individuals are excluded. What it highlights, however, 
is that the analysis of the thoughts and actions of people must always be 
lodged in “cultural denitions of personal and social value, rather than in 
externally dened criteria” (Ortner 1981, 361; italics in the original). Political 
history, however rich in its analysis of historical processes and sensitive to 
nuances and variation, always has the risk of becoming encapsulated within 
a synchronicity of a dierent order: namely, a cosmology in which human 
desire for power and prot is the universal constant (Sahlins 2004, 16). 
In the case of Asante, the historians have very impressively described and 
analyzed the lives and careers of some pre-colonial oceholders, and more 
generally, the mechanism and strategies of personal advancement, especially 
in relation to generating wealth in land, people, and gold. Similarly, the role 
of the state as both the enabler and disabler of these processes has been 
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discussed comprehensively (see, e.g., McCaskie 1995, 49–73; Wilks 1993, 
127–167). is may easily lead us to think of pre-colonial Asante as a society 
where great power and great wealth as such created great prestige. However, 
as the two initial chapters of the book conrm, power and wealth always had 
a reference point outside the realm of living human beings. In the Asante 
ideology they were not ends in themselves. Hence, for instance, the great 
accumulators of wealth in the pre-colonial period strived to transform 
their riches to a title of a ‘big man’ (ɔbirɛmpɔn, pl. abirɛmpɔn), which was 
a ritual status granted by the Asantehene and a great amplication to one’s 
ancestral name (McCaskie 1995, 42–49). Similarly, in the colonial period 
the ‘newly rich’ commoners, who had resented and protested against the 
chiey rule of the pre-colonial period, used their money and inuence 
to become enstooled as chiefs (McCaskie 1986a, 7–8). us the powerful 
men of dierent eras, operating in dierent institutional settings, sought 
to ‘immortalize’ themselves in similar ways by joining the ranks of the 
ancestors. 
As is evident from the above, the two chapters that follow do not seek to 
document the ‘real politics’ of pre-colonial Asante. e chronological scope 
ranges from the foundation of the kingdom at the turn of the eighteenth 
century to its destruction in the late nineteenth century. At relevant points 
the account refers to the major ways the political history of the pre-colonial 
kingdom has been previously periodized in terms of greater or lesser 
centralization of power or hereditary versus ‘meritocratic’ principles in 
access to high oces and titles. e main emphasis, however, is always on 
the value system that had to be drawn upon in order to legitimate these 
types of operations involving political or economic power. In Chapter 1 
oering sacrices to ancestral spirits and contracting marriages are singled 
out as the most important functions of the chiefs. e chief was rst and 
foremost a priestly gure who made sacrices to the spirits of his departed 
ancestors, who watched over the aairs of the living. Ultimately, chiey 
marriages served the same purpose as the sacrices – they were exchanges 
that sought to enhance, perpetuate, and diuse the greatness of the 
ancestors. rough his own and his ospring’s marriages a chief was able 
to secure the reincarnation of the dead chiefs among the living and pass on 
important ancestral names. Chapter 2 discusses how the modern distinction 
between politics and ritual easily steers one to suppose that politics are prior 
to ritual and thus give only a symbolic or ‘sacralising’ role to the latter; when 
considering the ideologies of societies with an undierentiated structure, 
however, it has to be understood that the sequence is exactly the opposite. 
From the point of view of the people of pre-colonial Asante, their kingdom 
and its complex gradation of rights were the result of the performance of 
an antecedent series of major human sacrices. To summarize, states like 
this transcend themselves: they always exist for an external, higher purpose 
(Dumont 1992 [1986], 84).
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1.  The great ancestors
Blood, spirit, destiny, and spiritual backing
A study of Asante chiefship must begin with a discussion of indigenous 
Asante notions of human essence: namely, the conception that a person 
was made of ‘blood’, mogya, which was inherited matrilineally, and ‘spirit’ 
(ntɔrɔ) which was transmitted patrilineally. Without both, acknowledged 
maternity and paternity, a person was not seen to be complete (Fortes 1963, 
59–60). In addition to these two, individuals also had a ‘soul’(kra) which 
aected their ‘destiny’ (nkrabea) in life, and a ‘spiritual backing’ (sunsum) 
which could be ‘tall’ or ‘short’, that is to say, more or less potent, depending 
on the experience and knowledge of the person in question. However, kra 
and sunsum were not acquired through liation, but directly from spiritual 
sources.2 
Matriliation conferred membership in a local matrilineal descent group 
(abusua, pl. mmusua) the members of which traced descent from a common 
ancestress. It was also based on the notion of shared blood which can only 
be transmitted by women. is perception was exemplied by a well-known 
proverb: abusua baako, mogya baako, one lineage, one blood.3 e lineages 
belonged to exogamous matriclans, also called abusua or abusua kɛseɛ, 
big lineage.4 e clans were not localized units and they included member 
lineages from all the Akan chiefdoms. All persons belonging to the same 
clan, irrespective of their place of residence, were considered to be related by 
2 Similarities and linkages between the constitutive elements make this quadriparti-
tion problematic and hence it should not be considered a denitive model of the 
Asante conception of personhood. Both Fortes (1969, 198–199) and Rattray (1959 
[1927], 153–155) as well as many contemporary writers (e.g., Gyekye 1987, 85–102) 
have pondered on this matter. 
3 is notion is still strong even today and well exemplied by one of Gracia Clark’s 
(1994, 98) informants, who maintained that abandoning the lineage would mean 
that “I would have to open my wrists and drain out all my blood rst”.
4 e number and names of Akan matriclans vary in dierent accounts (see Wilks 
1993, 80). Contemporary Asante usually mention the following eight: Oyoko, 
Bretuo, Asene, Aduana, Ekuona, Asona, Agona, and Asakyiri.
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blood, or more specically, to be descendants of a common ancestress (Fortes 
1969, 158–162).5 Assisted by a female head (obaa panin), the matrilineage 
had a male head (abusua panin) who exercised authority over the internal 
matters of the lineage, but in that capacity he was largely dependent on the 
support of the elders of the lineage. ese matters were mostly concerned 
with spheres referred to by Fortes as domestic, such as marriage, divorce, 
property relations, and the like (ibid., 163–165). e lineage also formed 
a link to chiey authority since the decisive criterion for residency in 
a chiefdom was “membership, by right of birth, of one’s mother’s matrilineal 
lineage” (ibid., 145–146), while “all transactions of a political or juridical 
nature” were conducted through the lineage heads (ibid., 163). e most 
important corporate possession of the lineage was the stool (akonnua, pl. 
nkonnua), that is, the oce vested in it (ibid., 165).
Rights to oces, land, and property were transmitted through the line 
of matrilineal descent. According to Fortes it was a “xed principle of 
Ashanti6 social structure” that at death every person had to have an heir and 
successor. What was actually inherited was status, “anchored in a person, 
labelled by kinship terms, and represented in material possessions which can 
be passed on” (ibid., 173). is idea is more or less identical to the notion of 
positional succession.7 Men were in most cases succeeded by their nephews 
and brothers, and women by their daughters and sisters. e basic unit of 
inheritance was the minimal lineage (ɔyafunu koro), which Fortes called the 
“nuclear and paradigmatic descent unit” within the larger maximal lineage. 
5 ere was no constituted ranking order of matriclans. eir relationship should 
rather be seen as complementary in terms of their mythical contributions to society 
and the oces vested in their lineages. For instance, the ancestors of the Asakyiri 
clan are considered to be the rst people who built houses, while the ancestors of 
the Aduana clan were the rst ones to put out res. Similarly, although the fact 
that the oce of the Asantehene is vested in a certain lineage of the Oyoko clan 
is a source of pride for every Oyoko person and lineage in the country, there are 
important and powerful oces vested in other clans as well, whose members are 
equally proud of them. Nowadays, many people, at least of the older generations, 
still know which stools are vested in the lineages of their clans and take interest in 
their aairs.
6 Ashanti is an anglicized version of Asante (see Arhin 1983, 47) adopted by the 
colonial administration and still appearing in many ocial names, titles, maps, 
etc. It was also the term most commonly used in the scholarly literature before the 
1970s. Furthermore, there are various versions of many place names and personal 
names due to dierences between indigenous Asante and English spellings, for 
example, Kumase – Kumasi, Nkoransa – Nkoranza, Prempe – Prempeh.
7 is parallel with Central African materials, such as Audrey Richards’ (e.g. 1962 
[1950]) work on the Bemba of Zambia, was recognized by Fortes (1969, 173) 
himself. Elsewhere Fortes (1975 [1962]) discusses both kinship statuses and oces 
as instances of “corporation sole” as dened by H. S. Maine (1861). As Marilyn 
Strathern (1985, 199) has pointed out that the notion of kinship roles as “miniature 
oces” bestowed with rights and obligations regarding people and property is
characteristic of West African (and presumably Central African) societies. Hence
status devolution, or what she calls a holder/heir model, is not necessarily a good
analytical metaphor for discussing kinship in other societies.
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e household (ɛe, pl. ae), which could also include wives of male lineage 
members and their children, was usually built around a minimal lineage 
(ibid., 169–175), while relationships within the lineage were regulated “by 
law and sanctioned by the deied jural authority projected in ancestor 
worship” (Fortes 1963, 60).
Patriliation, in contrast, conferred membership in a ntᴐrᴐ division, 
which did not constitute a social group like the matrilineage, but rather 
a ritual category, members of which shared a specic weekday for rituals 
connected to ntᴐrᴐ, certain avoidances and names, and a formal salutation;8 
there were nine divisions which were divided further into several subdivisions 
(McCaskie 1995, 170–173). In terms of shared bodily substances, ntᴐrᴐ was 
considered to be transmitted by semen in sexual intercourse, and also by 
saliva, which was put into an infant’s mouth by his / her father or paternal 
grandfather in a name-giving ceremony. Whether the ntɔrɔ divisions were 
exogamous has been matter of dispute: Fortes (1969, 198) claims that the 
boundaries of the category of unmarriageable patrilateral relatives are 
dened by demonstrable genealogical connections and not by shared ntɔrɔ 
as such, whereas Rattray (1955 [1923], 45) states the opposite.9 I will return 
to this question below when I discuss the considerable importance of both 
abusua and ntɔrɔ in the inheritance and distribution of so-called great 
ancestral names. 
As the references to Fortes imply, older structural-functionalist theory 
tended to see mogya and ntᴐrᴐ as qualities of individuals on the basis of 
which they formed certain important social groups and categories. However, 
in line with more recent anthropological discussions on African conceptions 
of personhood, especially those inuenced by Melanesian studies, one could 
argue that the Asante idea of person was “relational” or “composite” (see, 
e.g., Englund 1996; Geissler and Prince 2010; Piot 1999; Shaw 2000). As
will be made evident below, people were in many ways seen to be a product
of the marriages of not only their own parents but also of their ancestors.
Hence, persons came into being through exchange.10 However, I would here
rather stress Dumont’s (1980, 1–20) notion of holism: abusua and ntᴐrᴐ were
not groups formed by individuals, but wholes that had a prior existence. In
the Asante ideology these wholes could be then divided in order to ‘make’
persons and therefore the idea of an individual person was possible only in
reference to these categories.
8 According to McCaskie (1995, 170), the most important ntɔrɔ rituals were the 
“blessing of the mouth” with water and  the “washing” of one’s kra. Some ntɔrɔ 
rituals were recorded by Rattray (1955 [1923], 50–54).
9 e fact that the beliefs and practices associated with ntɔrɔ were already dying out 
in Fortes’ time has made it dicult to study it (Fortes 1962 [1950], 265). Nowadays, 
most people do not know to which ntɔrɔ division they belong and some are not 
even familiar with the concept. However, the ntɔrɔ aliation remains an important 
matter for the chiefs and royals who continue to perform the rituals connected to it.
10 In fact, the Asante notion of person was one of the many ethnographical examples 
mentioned by Mauss (1985 [1938], 12) in his famous essay on the concept of person, 
which was an important precursor to the current discussions about relational / 
composite personhood (see Englund 1996, 275).
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e black stools
e term chiefdom (ɔman, pl. aman) refers to towns and villages which 
were made up of matrilineages of diverse clan origin. One of the component 
lineages was the ruling lineage, or royal lineage, of the chiefdom, whose 
position was based on ancestral occupation of the land.11 e oces of 
the chief (ɔhene, pl. ahene) and the queen mother (ɔhemaa, pl. ahemaa) 
were vested in that lineage. e other component lineages comprised the 
descendants of those groups and individuals who had arrived later to the 
locality and had been given permission to settle there by the ruling lineage, 
or had been conquered in war. ey were represented by divisional chiefs 
or lineage heads who had sworn an oath of allegiance (soaye) to the chief, 
and together they formed a council of elders. e relationships between the 
oces within a chiefdom were expressed in a “military idiom”: the army of
a chiefdom was made up of “lineage contingents grouped in companies,
each under a captain who, in peace time, served as a councillor” (Fortes
1969, 150). Military service was expressly a lineage obligation. All able-
bodied men of a lineage formed a single ghting unit, which was led by their 
lineage head and each was allocated an area of operations: for instance, the
members of a particular lineage formed the main body, Adonten, of the eld
army, and accordingly the head of the lineage was titled Adontenhene, the
commander of the main body.12 All units were subordinate to the paramount 
chief, and he was the supreme commander of the whole army.
e chiey stool, as an instantiation of the ancestors, ‘owned’ the soil 
(asase), whereas the members of the so-called commoner lineages had the 
right to ‘eat on the soil’ (didi asase so), meaning that they could have their 
homes and farms on the land, and also hunt, sh, and make use of any 
collectable products of the forest. In return the chief was entitled to a part 
of the crop during the annual harvest festival and to a xed share of the 
catch of the hunters and shermen as well as of other products of the forest. 
Customarily, he had the right to levy a wide range of taxes and mobilize his 
subjects for war or communal tasks (Fortes 1969, 139–150). 
Kurankyi-Taylor (1951, 18) called the Asante lineage a perpetual 
corporation, meaning that it consisted not only of its living members but 
also of the dead and unborn. In this scheme of things, the oce of the chief 
held a nodal position since it stood between the living who were considered 
the guardians of “the fortunes and aairs of the whole body corporate” 
(ibid., 172) and the ancestors (asamanfoɔ) who had absolute power over 
11 According to Alex Kyerematen (1971, 17–19) in Asante traditional accounts the 
ancestral occupation is established through discovery, gi, purchase, or military 
conquest. 
12 In addition to the military title, a lineage head or a divisional chief could be called 
aer the original name of the group that he represented, which was derived from its 
clan identity or place of residence or origin (see Dunn and Robertson 1973, 23–24, 
180–184). For instance, the Nifahene of Nkoranza, the commander of the right 
wing, and his people occupy a place called Seseman and hence he is most oen 
called the Sesemanhene.
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the former. As noted above, the ancestors were considered to be benevolent 
towards their successors, but shameful deeds by the living that disgraced 
the ancestors invited punishment (ibid., 191–192). Hence, the kinship 
relation between the ancestors and the living was not severed by death and 
the descendants of the dead chiefs were perceived as the most appropriate 
persons among the living to approach the ancestral spirits with oerings 
and petitions (Busia 1968 [1951], 23–37). As Fortes (1963, 59) put it, the 
Asante matrilineages were committed to being “of pure freeborn descent” 
because “their entire social existence hinges on their prerogatives of 
hereditary oce and rank; and these would be jeopardized if the established 
laws of kinship, descent, inheritance and succession were set aside in the 
slightest particular”. In other words, the imperative of keeping the lineage, 
from which the chiefs were elected, a closed group ultimately arose from the 
relationship between the living and the ancestors, which had its nexus in the 
oce and its occupant.
e principal occasion for ancestral sacrice was the Adae ritual that
took place twice during every ‘month’ of the Asante calendar, that is to say, 
in every successive period of forty-two days (adaduanan).13 In Adae the 
chief would oer sheep, alcohol, and cooked food to the ancestral spirits 
and ask them to let his “town prosper” (Rattray 1955 [1923], 92–108). In the 
course of the ritual the oerings would be placed on the stools of the dead 
chiefs, which functioned as shrines for the ancestral spirits: 
Aer the death of a wise ruler, if it be desired to perpetuate his or her name 
and memory, the late owner’s ‘white’ stool is ‘smoked’ or blackened by being 
smeared all over with soot, mixed with yolk of egg. It then becomes a black stool 
(apunnua), and is deposited in the stool house (akonnua dan), and becomes 
a treasured heirloom (agyapadie) of that clan. e stool, which during the 
life-time of its possessor was so intimately bound (literally and metaphorically 
speaking) with its owner’s sunsum or soul thus becomes aer death a shrine into 
which the departed spirit may again be called upon to enter on certain special 
occasions […] that it may receive that adulation and those gis that were dear to it 
in life, and so be induced to continue to use its new and greater spiritual inuence 
in the interest of those over whom it formerly ruled when upon earth. (Ibid., 92)
In addition to calendar rituals like Adae, the ancestors could be contacted 
in times of need (see, e.g., Wilks 1993, 232–234). All in all, the safety and 
closeness of the ancestral stools was of utmost importance to the chief: 
during a war, for instance, the blackened stools were carried to the eld 
and consulted during battle. In the face of defeat, it was explicitly the 
responsibility of the chief and his elders to defend the shrines to the bitter 
end and, in the worst case, to commit suicide by blowing themselves up 
along with the stools (Rattray 1929, 122–123).
13 e rst early-nineteenth-century European descriptions of Adae are by T. E. 
Bowdich (1966 [1819]), who visited Kumasi in 1817. e fullest accounts are 
by Rattray (1955 [1923]), who recorded several Adae rituals in the 1920s. See 
McCaskie (1980a, 190–192) for a discussion of the importance of Adae in the 
Asante calendar.
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Encompassed election
e methods of electing a new chief varied in detail from one chiefdom 
to another (see Rattray 1929), but some general characteristics were 
shared by most. e principal oceholders of the chiefdom functioned as 
‘kingmakers’ and made the nal decision in the matter. Basically, they were 
the same persons who formed the council of divisional chiefs or elders and 
who were also able to depose, or ‘destool’, a chief if he had violated the oath 
of allegiance he had sworn to his elders or transgressed any of the taboos of 
his oce (Busia 1968 [1951], 21–23). In the election process some members 
appear to have been more important than others, so that their concurrence 
was necessary in order to hold a valid election. When the paramount oce 
in the chiefdom fell vacant, the rst duty of the kingmakers was to approach 
the queen mother to ask her “to nominate one of the members of the Royal 
family whom she discretionally considers suitable for installation” (PRAAD 
ARG 6/2/28a). e queen mother herself was elected and installed by the 
chief and his elders, and she hailed from the same matrilineage as the chief 
but did not have to be in any exact relationship to him (such as mother or 
sister). At this point, any man who was able to make a reasonable claim to the 
oce could oer himself as a candidate by presenting himself to the queen 
mother through the medium of an appropriate dignitary. Aer weighing up 
the available candidates and nominating one of them, the queen mother and 
the elders of the ruling lineage would “then inform them [the kingmakers] 
through the linguists [chief ’s orators] of her nomination and address them of 
“Bantamah Kings Cemetery” (TNA CO 1069/31). The skeletons of the dead Asante 
kings were stored in a mausoleum where they were attended by female custodians 
knowns as “the wives of the ghosts” (Rattray 1959 [1927], 188–119). The Asantehene 
also performed yearly sacrifices at the mausoleum (McCaskie 1995, 159–160). The 
building was eventually destroyed by British troops in 1896 (Wilks 1993, 242).
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his conduct and capability” (ibid.). e kingmakers would then consider the 
nominee brought forward by the queen mother and either accept or reject 
him. In the former case he was introduced to the public and his training 
could begin; in the latter, the queen mother was asked to appoint another 
candidate. A number of candidates could be introduced and rejected before 
nal approval. Only aer the chief-elect had been ritually installed, the 
blackened ancestral stools and other paraphernalia of oce connecting him 
to his ancestors were presented to him. During the transitional period they 
were in the custody of caretakers (wirempefoᴐ) who were not eligible for 
succession (Fortes 1967, 17–18). 
e focal point of the installation ceremony was the oath of allegiance. 
e oath was reciprocal: the lineage elders swore it collectively to the chief 
and received it from him collectively. For example, in the chiefdom of 
Nkoranza the elders took the following oath to the chief, the Nkoranzahene:
How my ancestors served yours likewise will I serve you; If I do not help you 
in any way I violate Boakye, Kwasiada and Yawda. (PRAAD ARG 1/2/12/10a)
e chief, in his turn, answered:
I swear Kwasiada, Yawda, and Boakye that I will follow the example of my 
ancestors and obey what my elders will tell me. (Ibid.)
Here Boakye, Kwasiada, and Yawda are ‘names of oaths’ referring to certain 
historical disasters that had befallen the Nkoranza stool. In an oath a person 
made the welfare and stability of the community conditional on his / her / 
others’ actions by referencing some specic misfortune in the past, although 
the verbal content of oaths diered from one chiefdom to another. In a 
number of them specic responsibilities were mentioned; for example, the 
chief could swear not to wage war against his sub-chiefs, not to seduce the 
wives of his subjects, or not to run away in battle (Rattray 1929, 165–166). 
Sometimes the content could be rather abstract, with the elders pledging, 
for instance, to respond to their chief ’s call whether they were summoned 
during the day or at night (ibid., 86–87). Generally speaking, the oaths did 
not enumerate the rights and obligations of the parties concerned, but rather 
re-conrmed the tie or union formed by the ancestors. However, despite this 
seeming abstractness, the people involved took the oaths very literally. As 
one of my informants armed: “If you have sworn that you will respond to 
his [the chief ’s] call, you have to do so. It is not a matter to be taken lightly! 
I think it’s only in case of sickness that you don’t have to respond. Otherwise 
there is no excuse.” A violation of oath was considered both “a politico-jural 
delict and act of sacrilege” which fell under the jurisdiction of the chief or 
the king (Fortes 1969, 153–155). Furthermore, although the relationship 
was dyadic, it formed a link in a chain of similar relationships. As the elders 
pledged allegiance to their chief, so did the chief to his overlord. At the 
top end of the chain was the king, the Asantehene, and, at the lowest, the 
chiefs of the most inferior rank like the village headmen (adekurofoɔ, sing. 
odekuro) and their elders.
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It could be said that the transfer of power among the Asante combined 
both prescriptive and elective elements. On the one hand, there was a group 
of people known as the royals who were all, given the certain restrictions of 
sex and age, genealogically qualied to occupy the oce vested in the ruling 
lineage.14 On the other, a candidate put forward by the ruling group had 
to be suitable, not only in terms of genealogy, but in other respects as well. 
According to Busia (1968 [1951], 9) the qualities required from a candidate 
were “intelligence (adwempa), humility (ahobrɛ-ase), generosity (ne yam 
ye), manliness (abooduru), and physical tness (dɛm biara nni ne ho)”. 
While, from a Western perspective, these may sound like individualistic 
attainments, the degree to which a candidate was considered to possess 
these qualities depended partly on his name or his membership in one of 
the ntɔrɔ divisions. In addition, the candidate had to have support among 
the kingmakers in advance, and in order to secure that he had to have 
access to economic resources, since the use of money in ‘lobbying’ was a 
central feature of the election process (Wilks 1993, 136–139). Nonetheless, 
despite the complexity of demands made on a candidate, it is safe to say 
that an accepted genealogical relation to the royal ancestors was the primary 
charter for the chiey oce; without it the other qualities would not have 
been taken into consideration. But even in terms of common descent there 
were dierences in eligibility. Some segments of the ruling lineage, in certain 
cases all but one, could be considered non-eligible because of their status 
as ‘latecomers’; that is, groups of people absorbed into the original lineage 
aer the founding of the oce (Fortes 1969, 146–147). In some chiefdoms 
the oce rotated among the eligible segments of the lineage, sometimes 
referred to as ‘branches’ or ‘gates’, whereas in others all eligible segments 
could contest it. As a result of these practices, the candidate elected could 
be quite distantly related to the ex-ruler, both in terms of collateral kin 
as well as ascending and succeeding generations. Moreover, if a suitable 
candidate could not be found, the search had to be extended to the group 
of ‘non-eligibles’ of the same lineage or even to the collateral lineages of 
the same clan. us, theoretically speaking, all clan members were potential 
oceholders. Interestingly enough, the Twi word ɔdehyeɛ can mean both 
a ‘royal’ and ‘freeborn person’: a lineage or clan member of full standing. 
On a more practical level, the Asante themselves have always made a very 
clear distinction between ‘true royals’ whom the actual incumbency of oce 
concerns, and ‘commoners’ who are not directly involved. “ere is a stool 
in the family of every Akan [person], but it is only the royals that can have 
it,” as one of my informants conrmed. Similarly, Fortes (1969, 162) pointed 
out that “[t]he notion that every true member of a clan is eligible to succeed 
to any of the oces vested in its branches is understood to be a ction”; 
but he too realized that there were certain situations where the rules of 
succession had to be altered:
14 Among the Asante there were no strict rules of primogeniture: “[b]rother may 
succeed brother; nephew, uncle; grandson grandfather; and the younger may be 
chosen before the elder” (Rattray 1929, 85).
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ere are well-authenticated cases in most chiefdoms of lineages becoming 
extinct or being disfranchised for treason, and oces held by them being 
awarded by the chief to a member of a collateral lineage or even to a son of the 
last holder and thus to a dierent lineage. e principle [of matrilineal succession 
within the lineage] is not thereby invalidated. It rests on the postulate [...] that 
lineage vested oce is tied to the sanctioned ancestral stools and that a person who 
is not eligible by demonstrable descent to oer sacrice and libation to them in his 
own right cannot have ancestral sanction for occupying the oce bequeathed by 
them. (Ibid.; italics added)
Although the electoral procedure certainly had a strong representational 
aspect to it, it has to be emphasized that the whole process was encompassed 
by religious value. e ability to oer sacrices to his predecessors’ spirits 
was clearly the decisive criterion for the occupant of the chiey oce and 
the tie between him and his people was ultimately conditioned by a sanction 
from the spirit world. 
Ancestral sanction
e key to understanding the authority of the chiefs, lineage heads, and 
elders is the notion of disgrace (aniwu). Both Rattray and Fortes established 
that the Asante legal system recognised two kinds of oences: namely, the 
“household cases” and the “tribal sins”. e former related to rules governing 
persons and property, preferably arbitrated by the lineage elders, whereas 
the latter necessarily fell under the jurisdiction of chiefs’ courts (Fortes 1969, 
155–157). e “tribal sins”, which I will call taboos (akyiwadeɛ, lit. ‘a thing 
one turns his / her back to’), were considered to be forbidden by the ancestors 
and / or the deities of the community. Every community had its own taboos, 
and it was the responsibility of the ruler to enforce them, while some taboos, 
such as clan exogamy, involved the whole kingdom. e most dreadful were 
the “violations of the sanctity of the Asantehene’s Golden Stool and oences 
against the majesty of the king” (ibid., 156). It is important to understand that 
akyiwadeɛ does not correspond to the modern notion of crime, since taboo 
penetrated all kinds of normative categories and was ultimately tied to the 
relationship between humans and their ancestors and gods. If transgressions 
were le unpunished by the authorities, the retribution of the spirits would 
not only have fallen on the transgressor him / herself but also on the 
community as a whole. Such consequences were believed to be disastrous. 
As Kurankyi-Taylor (1951, 39–40) has put it, “the land would cease to bear 
fruit, the animals in the bush would sicken and die, the tribe would decrease 
in numbers and in power and it would be overwhelmed by its enemies”. 
When people committed an oence they did not only bring disgrace 
upon themselves but also upon the community.15 In this context community 
15 is idea is expressed in a number of proverbs, for example, onipa bɔne te manmu 
a ne nkoa ne nnipa nyinaa, “one evil doer in the community makes slaves of us all” 
(Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 158).
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could be understood in various ways: for example, as the matrilineal descent 
group, the chiefdom, or in some cases even the patrilineal ntᴐrᴐ ritual 
division (ibid., 158, 197). As I have already noted, human communities 
were seen to exist on three dierent levels: those respectively occupied by 
the dead, the living, and the unborn. e disgrace caused by the living was 
seen to extend to all of these levels, and since it was also shared by all, it 
was in everyone’s interest to do everything possible to avoid it. Whatever 
discontents or frictions there might have been inside the community, it 
was crucial not to let them turn into public matters, thereby exposing the 
whole community to the ridicule and judgement of others. As Kurankyi-
Taylor noted, “[i]t was considered a disgrace if a grouping or community 
was unable to settle disputes among its members without the intervention 
of any outsiders” (ibid., 66), and gradual recognition of this “collectivist 
feeling” was an important part of growing up into a good person (onipa 
pa). Ultimately, the whole community (of whatever type or size) was 
responsible for the upbringing and good behaviour of its members (ibid., 
152, 181). However, this was not purely a matter of collective conscience: 
the chiey courts also enforced the principle of collective responsibility. 
roughout Asante history there are instances where the subordinates, 
friends, relatives, and even superiors of the oender have been held 
accountable for his / her oence (e.g. McCaskie 1984, 172–173). 16 In the 
most severe cases the existence and self-reproducing powers of the entire 
community were at stake. Rattray (1959 [1927], 87), for example, described 
the punishment for adultery with a wife of the Asantehene as follows: “Not 
only (it is alleged) were the woman and her paramour killed […], but the 
mother, father, and maternal uncle of both parties also suered death, 
while all the remaining families of both had to undergo the ceremony 
known as ‘drinking the gods’, and to swear that they had not connived at 
the oence”.17 Accordingly, any senior person or oceholder related to the 
transgressor would ‘beg’ (sre) for leniency on his / her behalf (see Kallinen 
2004, 100–115).
Furthermore, in addition to those spiritual agencies that had decreed 
the taboos and sanctioned them, oenders were also at risk of receiving 
punishment from their own ancestors whom they had disgraced. It was 
believed that some violations were so shaming that the ancestors would 
rather exterminate the whole community through their sanctions, which 
16 is is true even today. For instance, a dispute over some missing stool regalia 
occurred between the Tredehene and his elders, who belong to an ‘administrative 
group’ called Kronti fekuo in Kumasi, e case was not correctly reported to the 
Asantehene in the Kumasi Traditional Council and, as a result, all the chiefs of the 
Kronti fekuo, including their head, the Bantamahene, were ordered to slaughter 
a sheep each (Asante Tribune Sept. 12 – Sept. 18, 2000).
17 In “drinking the gods” or “drinking fetish” (nom ɔbosom) people guaranteed their 
promises by drinking water in which some “shrine objects” had been soaked, thus 
making themselves vulnerable to a particular deity, which was then able to punish 
them if the promise were not kept (Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 188).
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manifested themselves as the “evil fortune” (mmusuo) of the living, than 
bear the disgrace (Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 192). e extinction of the living 
members of the community meant the end of the community on all three 
levels since the living members could not give birth to ‘unborn’ children in 
whom the ancestral spirits could reincarnate. ose unable to reincarnate 
were “forever compelled to live in the Asaman forest in the cold dark 
shadows”, while those ancestors able to reincarnate lived in happiness and 
prosperity.18 In conclusion, it can be said that the community, whatever is 
meant by it in each case, was subject to punishment for the oence of its 
members, whether from spiritual or human agency (ibid., 181–182). 
Chiey marriage
In the above, I have argued that sacricing to ancestral spirits was the 
principal function of the chief through which he mediated between the living 
and dead members of his lineage. It was his duty to convey the petitions of 
his people to the ancestor and give them the expiatory oerings that would 
appease the wrath caused by disgrace. e other important mediating 
function can be discovered from the dierent types of marriage exchanges 
practiced by the chiefs. 
In general, the decisive formality that established a legal marriage 
(aware) was the giving of tiri nsa (lit. ‘head drink’), which consisted of 
liquor and / or a sum of money. It was handed over by the head of the 
husband’s lineage to the head of the bride’s lineage, aer which it was 
distributed between the bride’s father and members of both lineages 
witnessing the transaction. e husband could also personally distribute 
some customary gis to the bride, her parents, uncle, lineage elder, 
and sometimes to certain deities and charms. e payment of tiri nsa 
guaranteed the husband exclusive sexual rights over his wife, legal paternity 
of the children born in that marriage, and rights to essential domestic and 
economic services. Conversely, the man was obliged to provide his wife 
and their children with food and clothing (and also housing in case of 
patrilocal or neolocal marriages). He had to take care of her in case of 
illness, be able to satisfy her sexually, and take responsibility for her debts. 
Constant failure to full marital duties on the part of either husband or 
wife provided grounds for divorce, which both parties were entitled to 
demand. In case of divorce, tiri nsa was returned to the husband’s lineage, 
but other customary gis presented by the husband were not returnable 
(Fortes 1962 [1950], 280–281).
e lineage was not a self-contained unit and thus it could not establish 
a society by itself. e notion of incest (mogyadeɛ and atwebenee), which 
18 Asaman or Asamandow was the “land of the ghosts” or “spirit world” occupied 
by the ancestors. e ideas concerning its location and nature vary greatly (e.g., 
McCaskie 1995, 306–307). 
38
1. The great ancestors 
was listed among the akyiwadeɛ, compelled a person to marry outside his 
/ her own lineage group.19 ose unmarried men and women who were 
forbidden as sexual partners were also prohibited as spouses, a dictum that 
was particularly important in the case of members of the same matrilineage. 
Strictly speaking, the prohibition extended to the matriclan throughout 
Asante and to all the other Akan peoples sharing the same clan system. On 
the paternal side marriage was prohibited with any “patrilineal descendant” 
of one’s great-grandfather (ibid., 278–279). Polygyny was accepted, and 
customarily it was an obligation for chiefs and priests. In the case of ordinary 
men, the husband needed his wife’s (or wives’) approval before taking a new 
spouse, though their real and classicatory sisters in the same lineage were 
prohibited (Fortes 1963, 63).
In genealogical terms, the most desirable spouse was a real or classicatory 
cross-cousin from either side. is did not necessarily reect the preference 
of the couple but rather that of the senior men, the mother’s brothers and 
fathers, who traditionally had the nal say in marriage contracts (Fortes 
1969, 213). e members of the parental generation defended these unions 
on various grounds, but very oen the reasons had to do with expediency in 
distributing and transmitting property and wealth within the matrilineage 
(Fortes 1962 [1950], 281–282). For instance, in the case of matrilateral 
cross-cousin marriage, a man could ensure that his daughter had a decent 
husband in his nephew and, since the latter was possibly also his successor, 
the inheritance he le would indirectly benet his daughter as well. Similarly, 
a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage gave a father the assurance that his son 
had a good wife in his niece and that when he gave material gis to his 
son he was not neglecting his sister’s children because the gis would be at 
least partly shared by his niece, now also a daughter-in-law. ese benets 
concerned the two marriage forms generally, but for the chiefs they were 
of extraordinary importance in securing the possibility of reincarnation for 
the past chiefs as well as distributing some of their greatness to the other 
component lineages of the chiefdom.  
Keeping the great names: marriage and reincarnation
In addition to the practicalities oen connected to it, there is one aspect 
of cross-cousin marriages that has fascinated many anthropologists. is 
debate was launched by Rattray who had tried to explain “cross-cousin 
marriage and its particular relationship to the social organization of the 
19 e term mogyadeɛ refers simply to sexual intercourse with a ‘blood relative’, i.e., 
those of the same abusua. e term atwebenee is more problematic since it entails 
sexual relations with patrilateral relatives but also with the spouses of certain 
persons with whom one has close social relationships (including both relatives 
and non-relatives), and hence, as Rattray (1929, 304–306) noted, in many cases it 
has more to do with adultery than incest. More recently, this distinction has been 
discussed by Françoise Héritier (1999, 160–170). 
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Ashanti, by metaphysical beliefs” (Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949], 111).20 Rattray’s 
proposal was based on the observation that people were thought to be able 
to reincarnate through a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Quite simply, 
when a man’s son (sharing his ntɔrɔ) married his niece (sharing his mogya 
or abusua through his sister), their children would bear exactly the same 
inherited components of blood and spirit as the paternal grandfather. In these 
instances the grandson was a potential reincarnation (kra pa, lit. ‘good soul’) 
of the grandfather (see Figure 1.1). Aer his death the grandfather became 
an ancestor, and it was believed that he could be born again in those of his 
descendants who combined both matrilineal and patrilineal elements of his 
person.21 Exactly how, when, and how many times the actual reincarnation 
is thought to occur is a complicated question, and dierent interpretations 
have been proposed which are based on a variety of ideas concerning the 
qualities and interrelationship of mogya, ntᴐrᴐ, kra, and sunsum (e.g., 
Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 172). Based on discussions with contemporary 
Asante, I have come to the understanding that the possibility of rebirth 
was not limited to the paternal grandfather and grandson relationship. 
It might take place in later generations as well, provided that there was a 
conformity of mogya and ntɔrɔ between the person and the ancestor whom 
he personied.22 Only this particular form of marriage creates ospring in 
the grandchildren’s generation who are ideal for reincarnation. 
Rattray asserted that the same idea of reincarnation also lay behind 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, even though contemporary evidence did 
not support his claim. e whole argument was based on his hypothesis that 
a dual organization had previously existed in Asante, a hypothesis which 
he developed on the strength of certain oral traditions claiming that all 
communities had started as pairs of men and women who lived in isolation 
and hence did not intermarry with any other group or place. In the long run 
these groups kept on growing until there were “a great many people who 
20 e other major anthropological debate is whether the Asante have a double 
descent system. It has been reviewed by others (e.g., Goody 1969, 106–111) and 
I do not see any reason to take it up here.
21 I cannot see any reason why these same principles should not have been applied to 
women as well, and hence in Figure 1.1 granddaughter Aa could be a reincarnation 
of her maternal grandmother Aa. But since senior men contracted the cross-cousin 
marriages which were seen predominantly as the business of male oceholders, 
I am referring here only to men. Nevertheless, I disagree with Luc de Heusch (1981, 
69–70) who suggests that ntɔrɔ constitutes a case of “the regime of masculine sex 
aliation” and thus does not concern women. Although ntɔrɔ was transmitted only 
by men, it was not transmitted only to men. Women inherited it from their fathers 
just as the men did and they also needed it in order to exist as ‘whole persons’.
22 For instance, the present Asantehene Osei Tutu II is oen said to be the reincarnation 
of the rst Asantehene Osei Tutu. I have heard numerous stories that testify to the 
change in kingly persona whereby people who knew the king “as a young man” 
were surprised to meet him “as a completely dierent kind of man” aer he had 
been installed to oce. In this case, there are ten generations between the ancestor 
and his reincarnation, and hence the status as a reincarnation of the rst king is not 
seen to result directly from any single marriage, but rather from a new relationship 
to the ancestor established in the installation rituals.
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belonged to one or other of the two clans, and one or other of the two ntoro” 
(Rattray 1959 [1927], 328).23 Accordingly, as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969 
[1949], 107) puts it, a double dichotomy of the social group was established. 
In such a case, if similar rules of exogamy prevailed,24 there would not be 
any dierence concerning the ‘direction’ of marriages; both patrilateral 
and matrilateral cross-cousin marriages would produce male and female 
‘duplicates’ of (some of) the grandparents.25 Finally, the groups started to 
23 According to Rattray (1929, 66–67), the Asante matriclans were formerly divided 
into two intermarrying moieties that later merged into each other, and the name 
of one or the other moiety had come to represent the clan as a whole. us, 
for instance, the Bretuo clan was originally “a twin clan”, supposedly named 
Bretuo ne Tena, “Bretuo and Tena”, signifying its dual character. e relatedness 
between the Bretuo and Tena is still acknowledged; e.g., the Okwawuhene, a non-
Asante paramount chief from the Tena clan, is considered to be a brother to the 
Mamponhene, who is Bretuo.
24 It has to be kept in mind that Rattray considered the ntɔrɔ divisions to be exogamous 
and that same view was also adopted by his critics.
25 In Figure 1.1 a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage between son Ab and daughter 
Ca would not create a possible reincarnation of anyone in the previous generation. 
However, in a dual organization, this would happen. If grand-uncle Aa had married 
his brother-in-law Bb’s sister, his nephew Ab’s matrilateral cross-cousin marriage 
with his daughter (in that case Ba) would produce ‘duplicates’ of grandfather Bb 
and his sister (Aa’s wife). Hence, the dierence between patrilateral and matrilateral 
marriages would merely depend on one’s point of view. 
Aa Aa
Bb Aa
AbAb
Aa Cc
CaCa
Figure 1.1 Inheritance of abusua and ntɔrɔ in patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. A, B, 
and C signify membership in an exogamous matrilineal descent group (abusua) and a, 
b, and c signify membership in a patrilineal ritual division (ntɔrɔ). Grandfather Aa and 
his reincarnation, grandson Aa, are marked with dotted line.
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expand and found other groups to marry, which led to the disintegration 
of the dual organization and the locally-bound, isolated, intermarrying 
descent groups were incorporated into a single exogamous group, members 
of which started to marry into new, previously unknown groups (Rattray 
1959 [1927], 328). Aer that point, Rattray (ibid., 330–331) insisted, there 
has been no “true dual organization”, and this has resulted in a “curious 
anomaly”, where the abusua and ntᴐrᴐ “can come back independently of 
any special combination”, except when a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage 
is arranged by two parties. 
Rattray’s critics, namely Brenda Seligman (1925) and later Lévi-Strauss 
(1969 [1949]), did not pay much attention to his evolutionary hypothesis, 
and concluded that “the dialectic of the ntoro and of the abusua would entail 
the marriage of bilateral cross-cousins only if each category comprised 
two and only two exogamous groups”, but this was not the case among the 
contemporary Asante, who had “an indenite number of clans and ntoro”. 
Hence, “the metaphysical necessity of reincarnation through alternate 
generations” could only be met by the patrilateral type of marriage (Lévi-
Strauss 1969 [1949], 111–112). So, for Rattray, matrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage remained some kind of survival from times immemorial while 
for other anthropologists it constituted a dilemma which had to be solved 
by using other approaches (Heusch 1981, 68–70). Whether the dual 
organization described by Rattray really existed in pre-historic Asante is not 
important here. What concerns us are the ways in which these two forms of 
marriage allocated the so-called great names which connected individuals 
and descent groups to noble ancestry both matrilineally and patrilineally.
e Asante themselves have expressed the signicance of patrilateral 
cross-cousin marriage through naming. A child was named by a man who 
belonged to the same ntɔrɔ division, usually his / her father or grandfather; 
in the case of a boy, he might have been named aer his father, father’s 
brother, grandfather, and so on. In general, the names used were those of his 
patrilineal ancestors and are thus considered to have belonged to the ntɔrɔ 
division (or sub-division) in question. Some were known as great names 
(aboadenfoᴐ, sing. aboadeni) which had belonged to chiefs, war heroes, great 
accumulators of wealth, and other prominent persons in the past, although 
naming children aer them was not merely a way of commemorating their 
great deeds. e “admirable characteristics displayed by such persons 
were understood as accreted properties of the ntɔrɔ” and they might be 
reincarnated in their patrilineal descendants (McCaskie 1995, 172). 
When Rattray (1959 [1927], 324) enquired about the justication for 
patrilateral marriage from his informants he was told that “[i]f my niece 
does not marry my son, but marries a man not of my ntou (ntoro), then 
I cannot call any of her children aer myself or my ancestors”. To put it 
in another way, if a man wished to name his successor, that is, his male 
matrilineal descendant, aer himself or his patrilineal ancestors, it required 
that they both shared the same ntɔrɔ, which was possible only between a 
grandfather and grandson produced by a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. 
rough such a marriage the predecessor could pass on his status, oce, 
and property, and also his name: the admirable qualities of his ntᴐrᴐ. 
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Furthermore, he could be secure that he himself would be reincarnated in 
his successor. Hence, it follows that the patrilateral cross-cousin marriage 
was the primary technique by which patrilineally inherited great names 
could be given to matrilineal descendants and thus kept in the matrilineages. 
To put it more guratively, it was a way of directing ows of matrilineal and 
patrilineal ancestral greatness along the same channel. 
e reason given for making cross-cousin marriages may now be analysed in 
detail. e majority give as the reason for these marriages the desire ‘to bring 
back certain names’. When the family group was centre of the social world, the 
uncle, who was its head, wanted his name to be perpetuated; later the uncle 
became the chief, and still later the king, and names came more than ever to 
mean a link with the aristocracy. A clan [i.e., matrilineage] is therefore not 
anxious to lose any names, and […] family arrangements are necessary to ensure 
that no loss takes place. (Rattray 1959 [1927], 323)
erefore, it was not only that the great names of a particular ntɔrɔ division 
made the division itself noble,26 but (some of) these names also became 
associated with lineages, since famous lineage ancestors once carried 
them and were able to pass them on to their matrilineal descendants. In 
terms of succession to an oce, a candidate’s name and his ntᴐrᴐ aliation 
dierentiated him from the rest of the candidates, who might have been 
equally eligible in terms of matriliny. In this sense, therefore, the names 
were things withdrawn from the sphere of exchange because they armed 
the dierences of identity between groups and individuals within groups, 
meanwhile connecting individuals to their origins. For example, a candidate 
to the oce of the Asantehene had to be a member of a particular lineage of 
the Oyoko clan, preferably carrying the name of one of the former rulers, 
and thus belonging to the same ntɔrɔ division.27 Nonetheless, the name 
or membership in a ‘famous’ ntɔrɔ division did not in itself give similar 
guarantees of candidacy as did full membership in the matrilineage, while 
candidates with ‘modest’ names might have had other virtues valued more 
by the electors (McCaskie 1995, 172–173). Similarly, the great names 
were not considered great merely because they were associated with great 
ancestry. Every man had the potential to make his own name great. In fact, 
as a very prominent oceholder once put it, a “man was born to make 
name” and it was a huge misfortune if a man came to realize that “aer 
his death his name might go into oblivion” (cited in Wilks 1975, 462). 
A pertinent historical example is provided by Asantehene Kwaku Dua Panin, 
26 ere was no constituted rank order of the ntɔrɔ divisions, but precedence was 
claimed by referring to the great names of the past oceholders who had belonged 
to the same division (McCaskie 1995, 170–172).
27 For instance, the late Asantehene Opoku Ware II, who passed away in 1999, 
belonged to the Asafodeɛ subdivision of Bosommuru ntɔrɔ and the ‘greatest name’ 
mentioned in his case is the second Asantehene Opoku Ware, to whom he is 
patrilineally connected through Akyempemhene Adusei Kra, Dwansahene Opoku 
Tano, Gyakyehene Kwadwo Adusei, Bepoahene Amankwa Boko, Kwame Adusei of 
Gyakye, and Gyakye Abontemdomhene Kwadwo Adusei (Wilks 1995, 4).
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who was installed in 1834, and who was considered to have a ‘commoner’s 
name’, accordingly one not t for a king; but his supporters argued that he 
had a great name “in his own right”, notably because of his bravery in the 
battle of Katamanso against the British in 1826 (McCaskie 1995, 189; see 
also McCaskie 2000a, 24–26). Aer making his name and ntɔrɔ great in this 
way, Kwaku Dua made every eort to pass both his name and the oce of 
the Asantehene to one of his grandchildren by arranging marriages between 
his favourite sons and eligible royal women (ibid., 198). Kwaku Dua had 
hundreds of children, and only a select few were to marry royal women, 
but eventually two of his grandsons were installed as kings, namely Kwaku 
Dua Kuma and Kwaku Dua III, who later became better known as Akwasi 
Agyeman Prempeh (McCaskie 1980b, 199–200).
On the whole, it appears the royals practised patrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage indierently. ere were no strict rules according to which the sons 
of chiefs (or kings) had to marry royal women. In his study of the marriages of 
the Asante queen mothers, Rattray constantly ran into “incorrect marriages” 
or “mésalliances” that introduced new ntɔrɔ elements and ancestral names 
to the royal lineage. He discovered that only three out of the nine queen 
mothers whose conjugal relations he had studied had entered into a “correct 
marriage” (Rattray 1959 [1927], 321–325). is “spoiling” of ntɔrɔ, as 
Rattray called it, did not result from failed marriage plans, but merely from 
the fact that royal women were not obliged to marry their matrilateral cross-
cousins and so produce reincarnations of past kings as perfect rulers-to-
be. Hence, the chiey lineages never really had any “caste-like aspect”, as 
Edmund Leach (1968 [1962], 25) erroneously assumed. For instance, T. E. 
Bowdich, an ocer of the British African Company, who led an expedition 
to Asante in 1817, wrote that
[t]he sisters of the King may marry or intrigue with whom they please, provided 
he be an eminently strong or personable man; that the heirs of the stool may be, 
at least, personably superior to the generality of their countrymen. (Bowdich 
1966 [1817], 254)
Instead of following prescriptive marriage rules, the unions of royal women 
oen served ‘political’ ends so that they were meant to conrm alliances 
between polities (Wilks 1975, 327–344). For example, aer the rst 
Asantehene Osei Tutu had incorporated the chiefdom of Amakom to the 
capital Kumasi and killed Amakomhene Akosa Yiadom, the successor of 
the latter married Osei Tutu’s niece Asantehemaa Nyako Kusi Amoa and 
was thus able to establish an important anal (and later patrilateral) link to 
his new overlord’s lineage. In this case the husband and wife were certainly 
not cross-cousins and, what is more important, this arrangement was 
unique. When I discussed it with Amakomhene Akosa Yiadom II in 2001 
he made it very clear that such marriage has not become customary and, 
correspondingly, he could not remember that any of the Amakom royals 
had ever married from the Asantehene’s lineage since then. However, the 
second Asantehene, Opoku Ware, was a product of this marriage and it was 
through this single transaction that the names of the Asafodeɛ subdivision 
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of Bosommuru ntɔrɔ were introduced to the ruling lineage of Kumasi, have 
been retained there ever since, and are considered to be among the noblest 
names in Asante. 
As is evident in the above, patrilateral cross-cousin marriages were 
particularly important to the kings and chiefs. rough such unions they 
were able to perpetuate their reign beyond their own demise, while “oce 
holders, and the Asantehene above all, were looked to atavistically in 
relation to their” great names (McCaskie 1995, 172). Patrilateral marriage as 
a chiey marriage served also as a starting point for Heusch’s explanation 
for matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. He claimed that the two types of 
marriage “stem from two dierent ideologies and can certainly not be put 
on the same footing”. According to him they were practiced on dierent 
“social levels”. e patrilateral type was practiced by “princely families” and 
the matrilateral by “ordinary folk” (Heusch 1981, 69). e former revolved 
around reincarnation, while the concept of ntɔrɔ was “quite alien” to the 
latter, which was rather associated with residence rules, or in the Asante 
case, with a variety of such rules. By referring to Lévi-Strauss’ (1969 [1949], 
441) notion of disharmonic and harmonic regimes, Heusch (1981, 70) 
deduced that Asante as a matrilineal society had a “uctuating residential 
regime that hesitates between virilocality and uxorilocality”. Similarly, due 
to the uncertainty of the residence rules, the system oscillated “between the 
disjunction of husband and wife and that of the siblings” (ibid., 69). Heusch 
suggested that through a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage the Asante were 
able to stabilize their residential system, because in such cases post-marital 
residence becomes as xed as possible (ibid., 69–70): the nephew lived with 
his uncle (now also a father-in-law) and siblings, as was expected, and the 
daughter was not likely to live elsewhere since two important men in her life, 
her husband and father, lived in the same place. In patrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage this type of preservation of the conjugal cell was not probable, 
since the husband would have had to leave his own lineage kin and move 
to his wife’s and father’s house, which was not very likely. Or, conversely, 
the wife would have had to leave her uncle with the much-valued paternal 
grandchildren. is view is also conrmed by the fact that the standard 
answer provided by Rattray’s (1959 [1927], 322) informants, when he asked 
about the advantages of one’s nephew marrying one’s daughter, was “because 
it will keep my daughters in my house”. To my mind, this explanation adds 
relatively little to that already given by Fortes, according to which cross-
cousin marriages were practised in order to balance the pressures arising 
from dierent elds of kinship. I do not see anything incorrect in Fortes’ or 
Heusch’s views on the functions of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, but 
I think their explanations as a whole remain half-nished. A fuller picture 
starts to emerge when attention is turned to the actual matrilateral marriages 
of the chiefs. Contrary to Heusch’s theory, there is evidence suggesting that 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage was very important for chiefs and that 
ntɔrɔ had everything to do with it. 
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Maybe because of Fortes’ rejection of marital exchange as an integrative 
social mechanism, anthropologists have not really discussed the political 
signicance of marriage alliances in Asante. Even one of Fortes’ staunchest 
critics, Leach (1968 [1962], 24–25), claimed that among the Asante, “there 
are no ‘relations of perpetual anity’ which can serve to express enduring 
political relations of superordination and subordination”. However, in 
this he was wide of the mark, having reached this conclusion by a rather 
selective reading of Rattray. On the contrary, marriage alliances were linked 
to ‘political’ relations in Asante and, moreover, one can make a relatively 
clear distinction between those marriages that created alliances and those 
that expressed and perpetuated them. 
In the above, I referred to the marriage between the chief of Amakom and 
the niece of Asantehene Osei Tutu as a tie that cemented the incorporation 
of the chiefdom of Amakom to Kumasi. Most oen, when the Asante 
discuss such marriages, it is the Asantehene who married a woman from 
an allied or subordinate group. Accordingly, the successive Asantehene 
have married from the member chiefdoms of the Asante kingdom and 
other Akan and non-Akan tributaries in order to strengthen the alliance 
between the polities, and in some cases it is said that the chief or the 
whole polity in question was a wife to the Asantehene. Usually, it is only 
the anal link once established that is preserved and commemorated in 
oral traditions, ritual, speech, and such things, while the alliance itself was 
not perpetuated by similar marriages in the succeeding generations. Such 
a marriage belonged to the category of adehyeɛ aware, a union between two 
persons of freeborn descent,28 something Rattray (1929, 24) described as 
“the highest or most desirable form of marriage”.29 It was exactly marriages 
of this type that created alliances between groups. e term adehyeɛ aware 
was not restricted to marriages between chiefdoms, or to chiefs as such, 
and normally it referred to a conventional marriage between two freeborn 
persons, the distinction being that for chiefs it served ‘political’ ends. 
Marshall Sahlins (1985, 48) calls such chiey ties “founding marriages”, 
which are characteristic of the system of positional succession. e statuses 
of husband and wife are inherited by the successors of the two oceholders 
that originally contracted the marriage that formed the alliance between 
the ruling groups. In these cases a single aristocratic marriage outweighs 
a multitude of commoner marriages, which are not considered signicant 
in forming political alliances. As Sahlins points out, structures of this kind 
are not statistical; they are not expressions of “the empirical frequencies of 
interactions” (ibid.). is distinction is signicant in the Asante case. 
28 is is in opposition to persons who are descended from slaves.
29 Rattray (1929, 22–32) lists six dierent forms of marriage among the Asante. e 
two forms that I discuss in this passage I consider to be the ‘politically’ signicant 
ones. 
46
1. The great ancestors 
e second form of marriage is known as ayete aware.30 e most 
important thing that distinguished ayete marriage from adehyeɛ marriage 
was that in the latter case the tie was seen to exist between the man and the 
wife and their respective lineages, but in the former only between the chiey 
oce and a wife-giving commoner lineage. To put it simply, the women in 
the ayete marriages, the ‘stool wives’ as they were called, were not married to 
the chief but to his oce, which, of course, was vested in the ruling lineage. 
Accordingly, when the chief died, his successor inherited the ‘stool wives’; 
concomitantly, when a chief was deposed, he only stayed married to his 
‘personal’ wives, whereas the ‘stool wives’ stayed married to the oce. But 
most importantly, when a ‘stool wife’ died, or the chief divorced her, her 
lineage had to replace her with a new woman. is possibility of sororate 
was, in addition to marrying twin girls (Fortes 1962 [1950], 279), a form 
of marriage that was considered incestuous for ordinary men but not for 
the chiefs (Rattray 1929, 27). In 1946, when the Ashanti Confederacy 
Council was reviewing the colonial legislation concerning ‘stool wives’, the 
relationship was dened as follows:
e bond is between the Stool and the House;31 for example the original aseda 
[i.e., bride wealth] sealing the marriage need not be repeated; the new wife 
is merely continuing an existing marriage, not making a new one. […] e 
obligation of the House is to see that the Stool has, as wife, a woman of the House. 
If the individual wife of the moment for any reason vacates her place, the House 
must, on demand, put another individual in that place. (PRAAD ARG 1/2/30/5a)
Basically, ayete marriage started as a conventional marriage, but it was 
perpetuated aer the death of either of the parties involved. In a way, since 
the exchange of bride wealth did not reoccur, it was seen as a single marriage 
and not a series of successive marriages. However, not all chiey marriages 
resulted in this arrangement. As for the question of how and when an ayete 
relationship was actually constituted, the Confederacy Council did not have 
a denite answer. e memorandum states that 
[t]he mere fact that a Chief has married one woman from a House does not 
entitle him to a replacement on her death; but if he makes the request, and it 
is complied with, and if this happens several times over the years; it becomes 
recognised that ‘there is ayete in that House’. e bond apparently arises in this 
way, and not by one denite agreement or transaction; but there seems to be no 
uncertainty in a given case as to whether there is ayete in the House or not. (Ibid.) 
30 e word ayete comes from ɔyere, a wife + te, to patch, ll a gap, replace (PRAAD 
ARG 1/2/30/5a).
31 e use of the term House is slightly confusing here, particularly since it is later in 
the document dened as family “in the local sense” (PRAAD ARG 1/2/30/5a). As 
noted above, marriages were contracts between matrilineages and not households. 
Most probably the authors refer to the ‘clan house’, the headquarters of a locally 
anchored lineage.
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Hence one could say that adehyeɛ marriages could create alliances 
between the ruling lineage and other component lineages of the chiefdom 
in the rst instance, whereas ayete marriages came to express those alliances 
between lineages at a later point.32 
In the ayete relationship the chiey lineage was turned into a wife-taking 
group and the commoner lineages into wife-giving groups and this is exactly 
where it becomes visible how ayete marriage relates to matrilateral cross-
cousin marriage and ntɔrɔ. First of all, as Figure 1.2 clearly shows, when the 
32 Nowadays, as chiey marriages are becoming increasingly monogamous, the ayete 
relationships have undergone certain adjustments, but they are, nonetheless, still 
upheld. Aer the death of a former ‘stool wife’, the lineage in question will choose 
a woman from its ranks who will continue as ‘the chief ’s wife’. ese ‘stool wives’ 
do not perform marital duties in the same way as in an ordinary marriage, but 
they still have some specic obligations; for instance, they represent their lineages 
on ceremonial occasions with the ‘real’ wife of the chief, and they are not allowed 
to take a ‘real’ husband without the permission of the chief. If such permission is 
granted and the woman gets married to another man, the lineage still has to ll 
the vacancy with one of its unmarried female members. Even quite recently, chiefs 
have been known to use their prerogative to ban their ‘stool wives’ from entering 
a conventional marriage.
W3
C2
C1 W1
S1W2
C3 S2 S3
Figure 1.2 The ‘stool marriage’ as a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. C1, C2, and, 
C3 are successive chiefs. W1, W2, and W3 are their respective wives who are also their 
mother’s brother’s daughters. S1, S2, and S3 are sons and grandsons of chiefs. The dotted 
line separates the ruling lineage from the wife-giving lineage.
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initial marriage between the chief and a woman from a commoner lineage 
was perpetuated by the succeeding generations the spouses were bound to 
be cross-cousins (real or classicatory). Hence, when an adehyeɛ marriage 
became an ayete marriage it also became a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. 
Of course, in reality the unions did not always take place tidily between 
rst cousins as in Figure 1.2, nor did the nephews automatically follow 
their uncles to the throne, but the basic principle of positional succession 
employed here was always the same. In the Asante terminological system 
a male ego could call all his collateral female relatives from his mother’s 
brother’s daughter’s lineage by the same term and they were all marriageable. 
Obviously, it has to be taken into account that the ‘stool wives’ inherited 
from the previous ruler might have belonged to ascending generations and 
therefore not considered cross-cousins as such. However, according to the 
Confederacy Council’s view, there were ways of dealing with this problem. 
e [age] gap usually occurs through death; but if the Stool becomes vacant there 
may be great disparity between the old wife and the new chief. Either party may 
not wish her to continue as a Stool wife, in which case she may be divorced in the 
ordinary way, and a new wife put in her place. (PRAAD ARG 1/2/30/5a)
Nevertheless, the cross-cousin status and the age dierence were of secondary 
importance when one merely considers the ‘stool wives’ as representatives 
of their own lineages who upheld the tie between the chiey oce and the 
subordinate group – although the age of the wives was important in terms 
of the children that these marriages were to produce in abundance. is had 
to do with the idea that the stool had to have as many sons (ahenemma, sing. 
ɔheneba) and grandsons (ahenenana, sing. ɔhenenana) as possible. 
ey [the Asante] say that sons are the support of their fathers. Chiefs, in 
particular, stress this. e more sons and sons’ sons a chief has, the more secure 
does he feel. As their social standing depends on him and as they have no rights 
to his oce, they will support him in all circumstances. ey are the most 
trusted followers, and important chiefs appoint their own and their brothers’ 
sons and sons’ sons […] as titled councillors to attend closely on them. (Fortes 
1962 [1950], 269) 
e oces of such “titled councillors” were known as mmamma dwa, sons’ 
and grandsons’ stools, which were not vested in matrilineages, but were 
lled “by appointment or at least conrmation” on the part of the superior 
oceholder who (or whose ancestor) had created the oce in question 
(Fortes 1969, 202). Sometimes these oces were reserved specically for 
the chief ’s own immediate ospring, but sometimes they were awarded to 
non-relatives and passed on in a pseudo-patrilineal line to brothers, sons, 
and grandsons of the rst occupant.33 However, as a result of the matrilateral 
33 Occasionally, these oces have also been called ntɔrɔ stools (e.g., PRAAD ARG 
1/2/30/3a), which implies that the patrilineal dimension is not merely based on 
matters of practicality, such as getting uncompromised support and loyalty, but that 
it has spiritual signicance.
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marriages, the patrilineal line of oceholders may be in conformity with 
matrilineal succession. 
e oce of the Akomforehene of Kumasi is a good example of that. 
e rst Akomforehene Boakye Atonsa was a son of Asantehene Kwaku 
Dua Panin and his wife, Nana Adwoa Adowaa, who belonged to a certain 
lineage of the Asona clan. Originating from this union an ayete relationship 
was established between the Asantehene’s oce and Adowaa’s lineage and 
the oce of the Akomforehene was created for their son. Up till now, ve 
kings (and some royals of the Asantehene’s lineage) have married from the 
Akomforehene’s lineage and had several children. As a result of this, as the 
late Akomforehene Boakye Atonsa II told me, “almost all the royals of the 
Akomfore stool are [real or classicatory] great, great grandchildren of 
the past Otumfuo”.34 When I asked about the succession to the Akomfore 
stool, the answer was that it is matrilineal, but “the children of the Golden 
Stool” are in a favoured position in comparison to the other royals. Hence, 
matrilateral ‘stool marriage’ ensured that the ruler could appoint his own 
patrilineal ospring as his councillors without compromising the principles 
of matrilineal descent. e male children from ‘stool marriages’ were thus 
eligible both matrilineally and patrilineally. is is also a point that should be 
taken into account when reading the works of the historians, who have oen 
treated the ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘patrimonial’, (pseudo-) patrilineal succession as 
antithetical to the ‘aristocratic’, matrilineal succession. Hence, the so-called 
Kwadwoan revolution of the late eighteenth century, which Wilks (1966; 
1975, 465–476) suggests gave birth to an “administrative class” based on 
royal appointment, was not necessarily at odds with the dominant kinship 
ideology. In addition to oces, it was also customary for the Asantehene to 
allocate land in Kumasi to his favourite wives and their matrilineages. ey 
were not only allowed to settle there, but the lands became the corporate 
property of the wives’ lineages and sometimes attached to the oces created 
for the sons (e.g., Berry 2001, 89, 126–127). 
As noted above, matrilateral cross-cousin marriage did not produce 
possible reincarnations of the grandparental generation and hence, 
supercially, it might look like outright ‘spoiling’ of ntɔrɔ. However, it has 
to be understood that the objective of ‘stool marriage’ was not the keeping 
of great names as in the patrilateral type, but rather their distribution. In 
fact, the handing over of names was one of the reasons why the commoner 
lineages were eager to give wives to the chiefs. is becomes unmistakably 
clear from a letter to the Ashanti Confederacy Council written by a chief, 
Atipinhene Boakye Dankwa, who complained that the ayete system was 
becoming too much of an economic burden for the chiefs. In 1946, when the 
letter was written, the Atipinhene claimed that the cost of living had reached 
such a point that the chiefs were unable to maintain their many wives and 
children and thus some of the latter were in danger of becoming “ruans 
and jail-birds”. However, in the past such problems had not existed.
34 Otumfuo or Otumfoɔ, “the powerful one”, is the most commonly used appellation 
of the Asantehene. 
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But let us remember that in those past days, a Chief did not equally clothe and 
maintain all his wives. eir maintenance lay on the bare shoulders of their own 
relatives […] Moreover, in the past, Chiefs’ sons were not trained in any work. 
When they married, their wives were mostly fed by their own relatives, because 
they were contented with the high names which were given to their children. 
(PRAAD ARG 1/2/30/5b; italics added) 
Not only were the chiefs exempt from bride wealth in the case of successive 
‘stool wives’, but they and their sons were also exempt from those economic 
responsibilities that were usually considered an essential part of the 
foundation of the whole institution of marriage. ese responsibilities were 
seen to have been covered by the chiey names passed on to the children, who 
belonged to the wife-giving lineage. By distributing them to the commoner 
lineages it became possible for the chiefs to maintain a large number of wives. 
us, through marriage the chiefs were able to share their ‘greatness’ in the 
form of names and receive in return the possibility of conceiving more sons. 
It is also important to notice how this relates to the totality of exchanges 
between the ruling lineage and the commoner lineages. Tribute, services, 
and rights to women moved up to the chief, while rights to land, oces, 
and names moved down to the commoners. is was the backbone of the 
system of mutual reciprocities and obligations that connected the chiefs to 
the people in Asante ideology.
From this it follows that the great names were also valuable things that 
could be exchanged, an observation that opens up a totally new avenue for 
the comparison of patrilateral and matrilateral cross-cousin marriages. 
As there was no ‘true dual organization’ in Asante and people were free 
to marry from a number of lineages belonging to dierent clans and also 
from a variety of ntɔrɔ divisions, it was impossible to keep the great names 
exclusively in a single matrilineal descent group. As Rattray (1959 [1927], 
330) noted, “[a] man may therefore to-day be compelled to bear a name 
which previously was possessed by a man of some clan [i.e., matrilineage] 
quite dierent from his own”. However, as became apparent above, the 
names were important for the identity of the groups and their members, 
and through the idea of reincarnation they quite literally connected them 
to another, originary time, when the ancestors had made their names great 
through their great deeds. us they could not be given away entirely; they 
had to be kept to some extent. Here one runs into something that resembles 
the seemingly paradoxical idea of “keeping-while-giving” developed by 
Annette Weiner (1992). e two forms of ideal marriage were responses to 
this paradox. Hence, in case of chiefs who possessed the great names, the two 
forms stood in a peculiar relation of both complementarity and sequence. 
e matrilateral cross-cousin marriages, which distributed the great names, 
were practised by chiefs themselves, whereas the patrilateral cross-cousin 
marriages, which kept the great names within the lineages, were practised 
by the sons of chiefs. e rst type give them away, but the second “get them 
back”, as the Asante themselves have put it (Rattray 1959 [1927], 321–322). 
I have discussed the marriage system at considerable length here in 
order to demonstrate its importance to the overall argument. At the outset 
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I stated that the pre-colonial chief had two functions above everything else: 
giving sacrices to the spirit world and marrying to conceive children. Both 
are exchanges ultimately aimed at the maintenance of relations between 
the living and the dead. Everything else that the chiefs did – fought wars, 
litigated, bought and sold slaves, cleared lands, traded in gold, and so on 
– were seen to serve these same purposes of enhancing and perpetuating the 
greatness of one’s ancestors and their oce.
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T he city of Kumasi was the seat of the Asantehene and thus the centre of  power of the ancient kingdom. e paramount chiefs of the ‘provincial’ 
chiefdoms took an ancestral oath of allegiance to the Asantehene directly and 
their ‘sub-chiefs’ did it through their overlords. e chains of allegiance that 
linked the chiefs to the common centre were crosscut by relations of kinship, 
marriage, and friendship between the dierent stools, the nature of which 
were decreed by complicated principles of seniority (see Kallinen 2004, 69–
134). e structure of the capital city of the kingdom was somewhat dierent 
from the common type described in the last chapter. While the Kumasi army 
was also divided into task-oriented ghting units, the basic dierence lay in 
the fact that in Kumasi each unit was composed of several oces (and their 
subjects) of diverse lineage and clan origins. In fact, such a unit comprised 
a group of chiefdoms, each of which was organized internally according to 
the traditional model. Consequently, a member of a group was theoretically 
capable of waging war either as a component of his own group (and the 
Kumasi army) or separately as an independent chiefdom. Such an aggregate 
was called fekuo (pl. afekuo) meaning “a group of persons sharing something 
in common” (McCaskie 1980b, 190). e afekuo were created by successive 
Asantehene, and ties of friendship and / or kinship held them together. 
As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the oath of allegiance did not 
specify all the rights and obligations a chief had in relation to his people or 
his superiors. erefore, determining which chiefs were of the same ‘rank’ is 
a very complex matter. Kinship and marriage relations, rights to use certain 
ceremonial objects, exemptions from certain obligations, and heroic titles 
were all grounds for building a claim to a higher position in relation to some 
other chief serving the same overlord. is chapter discusses the foundation 
of the kingdom and the principles according to which the authority of the 
king over his chiefs was dened. e objective is not to create a comprehensive 
account of such principles, let alone establish some sort of ‘correct’ order 
of the chiefs; rather, I merely aim to illuminate some important structural 
considerations. In the introduction to this book, following Dumont, 
I dened pre-colonial Asante as a society with an undierentiated structure, 
where the religious domain was all-encompassing. In Western ideology 
the political domain has been separated from religion and not only has it 
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subsequently become autonomous, but it has also became dominant in the 
sense that society is ordered according to its principles, while religion is 
considered a private matter for individuals (Dumont 1980, 311–313). e 
primacy of politics (and later the economy) in Western ideology oen deters 
our understanding of dierent kinds of ideologies. As a result, in the classic 
anthropological studies of divine kingship, the divinity of the ruler and the 
rituals he performed were oen separated from the political sphere and 
seen as a part of a cultural superstructure which only reected the more 
fundamental social order (McKinnon 2000, 41–42). is corresponds 
with the conventional view of religion and politics on the part of modern, 
secularist social science which is that in the ancient past the political, that is, 
secular, ambitions of men gave birth to oppressive superstitions (Asad 2003, 
192–193) and the task of the analyst is to reveal the political underneath 
the religious veneer. However, we should realize that in the Asante ideology 
such layering did not exist and the political was ordered by the religious. 
us in the following I explain how the foundation of the Asante kingdom 
and the distribution of rights and privileges to the dierent chiefs was a 
ritual process: a direct consequence of sacricial exchanges. is will also 
help us to grasp the enormous dierence between the pre-colonial and 
colonial conceptions of chieaincy and kingship in Asante.  
Sacralizing political structures?
Analysts of Asante society usually attribute the superiority of the 
Asantehene’s oce to its “aura of mystical preeminence”, which is derived 
from its connection to the Golden Stool (Sika Dwa Ko, lit. ‘Friday’s Golden 
Stool’) (Fortes 1969, 142). e histories concerning the birth of the kingdom 
and emergence of the stool are widely known and they may be summarized 
as follows.35 
e chiefdom of Kwaman (later renamed Kumasi) was held as a tributary 
state by the kingdom of Denkyira, a southern neighbour of Asante. 
A young Kwaman royal, Osei Tutu, had been sent as a hostage to the court 
of Denkyira. While in Denkyira, Osei Tutu stole gold and other valuables 
belonging to the court and also attempted to kill the Denkyirahene through 
magic, managing to escape back to Kwaman with pursuit on his heels. His 
uncle, Obiri Yeboa, who was the chief of Kwaman at the time, was shocked 
by his unruly behaviour and sent him to the kingdom of Takyiman to seek 
shelter from the revenge of the Denkyirahene. In Takyiman Osei Tutu took 
the queen mother as his lover and, while sleeping together, killed her, 
beheaded her, stole her gold, and ed home. Enraged, Obiri Yeboa warned 
Osei Tutu not to disappoint him for a third time, and the wayward nephew 
was sent as a nal resort to seek refuge in the chiefdom of Akwamu east 
35 e classical account is by Rattray (1955 [1923], 288–290), who has also recorded 
a second, somewhat dierent version (Rattray 1929, 276–277). e earliest written 
history is by Basel missionary Reverend N. V. Asare, who recorded it in 1903–1904 
(McCaskie 2000b, 62–63).
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of Asante. While Osei Tutu was in Akwamu, Obiri Yeboa decided to wage 
war on the neighbouring people of Domaa. e Kwaman army attacked 
the enemy in a single group without covering their sides or rear, were 
consequently defeated, and Obiri Yeboa was captured and killed.36 In the 
meantime, while in Akwamu, Osei Tutu had made a close study of their 
military organization. When the news of his uncle’s death reached him, 
Osei Tutu decided to hurry back to Kwaman and accept the oce of his late 
uncle which he had been oered. Komfo Anokye, a priest to whom he had 
been introduced in Akwamu, accompanied him. On his way he performed 
several feats of valour. In Kwaman he vowed revenge on Domaahene Domaa 
Kusi, his uncle’s killer. He started preparing for war by arranging the army 
into dierent groups, each having a separate function. Finally, he led his 
army to the battleeld, drove the Domaa away from their lands, and killed 
Domaa Kusi (McCaskie 1992, 238–241; Wilks 1993, 103–106).
Aer Osei Tutu had returned from exile and the neighbouring Domaa 
had been defeated, it was time to direct attention to Denkyira, which still 
held Kwaman and other chiefdoms of the region under its sway. During the 
reign of Denkyirahene Ntim Gyakari, the level of tribute became intolerable, 
and the chiefdoms serving Denkyira decided to take up arms with Osei Tutu 
as their leader. is coalition has oen been called Asante Aman Nnum, 
‘the ve Asante states’, although there is no general agreement on the exact 
number or names of the original members.37 Subsequently, Denkyira was 
defeated aer a decisive victory in the battle of Feyiase around 1701, and the 
military alliance was transformed into a political union called Asanteman, 
the Asante state. Osei Tutu, the head of the coalition, became the Asantehene, 
the king of Asante. Right before the decisive battle, the priest Anokye 
informed the Asante chiefs that “he had a special mission from Onyame, the 
God of the Sky” (Rattray 1955 [1923], 288–289). A big meeting was held in 
Kumasi, where Anokye “brought down from the sky, in a black cloud, and 
amid rumblings, and in air thick with white dust, a wooden stool with three 
supports and partly covered with gold” (ibid., 290). Anokye told the chiefs 
that the stool contained the sunsum, the spiritual backing, of the Asante 
nation, and Osei Tutu was to become its rst custodian and thus the chosen 
head of the newly formed state. At the same time Anokye also decreed the 
taboos of the stool and stated that if they were violated Asanteman would 
“sicken and lose its vitality and power” (ibid.).38 Hence, by guarding the 
Golden Stool, the Asantehene also protected the ‘character’ or ‘health’ of the 
36 I was told by Domaahene Agyeaman Badu II in 2001 that the skull of Obiri Yeboa 
is still kept in the main palace at Domaa. During their annual ‘yam festival’ the 
Domaahene places his foot on the skull, thus commemorating the victory over the 
historical enemy. Likewise, the skull of Domaahene Domaa Kusi, the slayer of Obiri 
Yeboa, was deposited in Kumasi, and used in a similar manner during the Odwira 
festival (McCaskie 1995, 214).
37 Rattray has compiled at least ve dierent lists (see RAI MS 107: 1: 1679; Rattray 
1929, 73, 99, 132, 235).
38 See Kurankyi-Taylor (1951, 44) for the list of taboos “surrounding and protecting 
the Golden Stool”.
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state. Regular sacrices were made to it in order to preserve and enhance its 
spiritual powers (see, e.g., Akyeampong and Obeng 1995, 495–496).
ese events were paired with the destruction of old stools. e stool 
history of Hia has it that:
In order to eradicate o the existence of the memory of all the irregularities, the 
defeats and discomtures that the other enemy nations had previously inicted 
upon Ashanti, especially, in the war that took place between the Ashanti and 
Dormas [...], fought in Ashanti during the reign of the Asantehene Nana Obiri 
Yeboa Manwu, Komfo Anokye, with the consent of the Asantehene Nana Osei 
Tutu and the Asanteman, buried all the then existing black Stools being then 
occupied by all Native Rulers in Ashanti in a deep trench-hole dug in the ground 
at a place near the present Kumasi Central Hospital upon which, Komfu Anokye 
placed and planted an Ashanti State Sword which is still there to this day.39
 In substitution for the said buried Stools, Komfuo Anokye caused new Black 
Stools to be made for all chiefs in Ashanti at that time, and on every one of the 
Stools, he nailed “Dadikro” (i.e. Ashanti native made) nails, signifying that, those 
were the very rst and original Stools in Ashanti solely being occupied by chiefs 
whose ocial appellations should thenceforth be known as “ABREMPON” 
[i.e., big men]. (MAG IAS/AS 154)
e combination of these two events can be read as a realization of 
(some formulations of) the idea of divine kingship, where the problem of 
segmentary or particularistic interests is overcome by elevating leadership to 
“a mystical plane” (see, e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1962, 66–86). e segmentary 
interests, materialized in the form of the blackened ancestral stools of the 
chiey lineages, are buried underground and their ‘tomb’ is sealed with a 
state sword, removal of which is vetoed by a taboo. A superior, golden stool 
is received from the Sky God, which is said to contain the spiritual core of 
the emergent polity. Similarly, new, ‘rst’ stools are made for the lineages, 
which commemorate a new beginning under the Golden Stool. A leader of 
a temporary alliance is made into a hereditary king by appointing him as 
custodian of the stool. 
e most important ritual occasion, when the Golden Stool was 
celebrated, together with a ‘magical charm’ (suman) known as Apafram, was 
Odwira, a harvest festival originally dedicated to the ritual consumption 
of new-season yams. us the general timing of the festival followed the 
horticultural cycle marking the closure and beginning of a ‘year’ (afe). During 
Odwira all of the paramount chiefs travelled to the state capital and renewed 
their oaths of allegiance to the Asantehene; usually, meetings of the assembly 
of chiefs (Asantemanhyiamu) also coincided with Odwira (McCaskie 1995, 
39 Tradition has it that if the sword is removed it will mean “the collapse of the Asante 
Empire”. ere are several recent stories about failed attempts to do so; it is said, for 
example, that during the 1950s, when the hospital was built, a building contractor 
tried to remove it with bulldozers and other such machinery. en, in 1964, when 
the world heavyweight boxing champion Mohammed Ali visited Ghana, he also 
gave it a try, but in vain (see Kwame Ofori n.d., 7). 
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144–146). e ritual highpoint of the festival took place on ‘Apafram Sunday’, 
when the Asantehene made sacrices to the Apafram charm in front of the 
skulls of the dead enemy chiefs, and made a plea to it that if there is “[a]ny 
king who does not like to serve me, let me get the chance of killing him and 
put his head into you” (Wilks 1993, 116). On the following day the chiefs 
“returned each to their own country, there to continue and complete” the 
Odwira by ritually “purifying” their own ancestral stools, the shrines of the 
local deities, and the regalia of their oces (Rattray 1959 [1927], 137). In 
1933 one paramount chief described the origins and later developments of 
Odwira in a following manner:
 
Before all the chiefs who took part in this campaign [against Denkyira] could 
scatter to their several seats [they] were told by Komfu-Anokyi that the skull 
of Ntim Jakari would be kept at Kumasi to be worshiped yearly. is was the 
beginning of the “Odwira” custom or “Apafram” at Kumasi at which all members 
of the Confederacy were present…
 is occasional meeting at Kumasi for the observance of the “Odwira” custom 
was the beginning of what was later to be subordinated to the Kumasi Stool, and 
since that time Kumasi had ever continued to be the central meeting place of the 
Ashanti Chiefs. From the foregoing it would be seen that the meeting at Kumasi 
was decreed by Komfo Anokyi aer the fall of Denkyira. (PRRAC 1984, 88) 
 
“The Golden Stool with its immediate caretaker” (TNA CO 1069/44). The wooden 
structure and golden decorations of the stool suffered severely while it was kept hidden 
from the British occupation authorities 1896–1926 (see Rattray 1935; McCaskie 2000b). 
In the photo, taken in 1935, the repaired stool is on display. 
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Hence, one is inclined to follow anthropological conventional wisdom 
and say that the unity of the new state had its ritual expression in Odwira, 
where its core symbols were venerated and which superseded those rituals 
associated with the ancestral spirits and / or local deities of the component 
chiefdoms. is, of course, would be closely related to more general 
processes when religion becomes divided into public ‘state religion’, and 
private ‘family religion’. For instance, Michael Jackson (1977, 133–134) has 
suggested that when political groups are not coextensive with the pattern 
of descent grouping, there also occurs a shi in ritual orientation: ancestor 
cults, which are thus considered segmentary, will be signicant only at the 
level of domestic organization, whereas group rituals of larger scale become 
centred on “desocialised categories”, such as high-gods. Jackson claims that 
in states like Asante “ancestor cults were ritual foci for kinship groups but 
pantheons of gods and nature divinities dominated the religious system at 
the higher levels of community organisation” (ibid., 135). 
As is evident from the references above, there is a substantial body of 
literature, both anthropological and historical, on the history and meaning 
of both the Golden Stool and Odwira. Despite the obvious merits of some 
of these studies, however, used alone they risk producing a simplied 
picture of religion and polity in Asante. Specically, the discussions seem to 
revolve around the centralization of government, reduced to state / society 
or kingship / chiefship dichotomies, and how its hierarchical structure is 
‘sacralized’, enforced, and reproduced in ritual, yet the ideas of the pre-
colonial Asante did not conform with such notions: for them the ritual 
preceded the political and thus the kingdom was perceived as a product of 
the former.
‘Emergence through gi’
e order of precedence of the fekuo heads of Kumasi has been the subject of 
constant dispute (e.g., Rattray 1959 [1927], 86–87, 90–92). What seems to be 
endorsed by most is that the oce of Krontihene is the senior among them, 
and in the absence of the Asantehene he presides over the administration of 
the capital. us the Asantehene oen refers to him with terms like ‘my right 
hand man’ or ‘my second in command’. e seat of the Krontihene is located 
in the village of Bantama, now one of the central districts of Kumasi, and 
hence its holder is in most cases called the Bantamahene. Despite its high 
status, the Bantama stool is not an ancestral stool, but rather a mmamma 
dwa, an oce that is not lled according to matrilineal succession. e rst 
occupant of the oce, a man called Amankwatia, was of slave origin and 
therefore not eligible for any hereditary oce (Wilks 1993, 244). As recalled 
by Bantamahene Kwame Kyem in 1924, Amankwatia worked as a servant 
and a stool carrier for Osei Tutu when he was appointed the Krontihene of 
Kwaman / Kumasi forces in the war against Domaa:
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[W]ar followed and Amankwatia who had had Osei-Tutu’s favour to be created as 
his principal stool carrier was asked to go and ght King Domina Kusi [Domaahene 
Domaa Kusi] as a result of an injunction from Komfo Anokye. Komfo Anokye as 
a prophet asked King Osei-Tutu to give him with 7 men who would be created 
Asafohene; these 7 men were supplied as follows:- Osafo, Ofram, Akyerapong 
Kwasi, Gyedu, Brofo Apau, Amponsa-Akusaa, Twafoobaah.40 ese are the 7 
Kurontie [Kronti] Asafohene whom Komfo Anokye made for Amankwatia to 
ght against Domina Kusi. […] King Osei-Tutu as a token of remembrance and 
of good service presented to Amankwatia all the lands stretching from Bantama 
to Komon [?]. All the lands stretching from Bantama to Komonano are for 
Bantamahene. King Osei-Tutu dashed [i.e., gave] all these lands to Amankwatia 
[…] and created him […] as his Colonel… (PRAAD ARG 3/2/38a) 
Aer helping Osei Tutu in the Domaa war, Amankwatia was awarded 
a chiey title and land. In addition to this, he was ‘given’ seven chiefs, who 
fought alongside him as ‘friends’. ereaer they formed a fekuo group, in 
which the Bantamahene held the senior position. is tradition exemplies 
what Kyerematen (1971, 17) has called the emergence of a new chiefdom 
“through gi”. According to his research, based on traditional accounts of the 
origins of dierent Asante chiefdoms, it was the practice of the Asantehene 
to award oces and land to persons “who had distinguished themselves 
in battle or had rendered some signicant political service” (ibid., 18). 
Hence Kyerematen appears to be suggesting that hierarchy is established by 
political means.
However, other traditions reveal something very interesting about the 
nature of Amankwatia’s services to his overlord; rstly, it is said that Osei 
Tutu was accompanied by Amankwatia into exile in Akwamu. On Osei 
Tutu’s return home to succeed his uncle and revenge his death, yet before 
he could be installed as a chief or attack the Domaa, his rst duty was to 
celebrate his uncle’s funeral: one which almost proved fatal to his trusted 
friend Amankwatia:
According to the custom those days, Nana Osei Tutu was to present a person 
with dignity to accompany his uncle to the land of the dead, but since he 
had been away from home for years, he knew no such person than his friend 
Amankwaatia. erefore on his arrival he smeared red clay for the oer,41 but the 
Asafohene [another Kumasi chief] sent one of his servants to be smeared with 
red clay instead of Amankwaatia […] When Nana Osei Tutu was enstooled as 
Kumasehene he decided to create a stool for his friend Amankwaatia who had 
helped him so much in life and had even given himself for the sacrice. (Kwadwo 
2000, 32) 
In Asante thought the spirit world was seen to parallel the lived world as the 
hierarchies that prevailed among the living were also considered to prevail 
40 ese are the names of the chiefs, also known as ‘the seven gunners’ (atuo nson), 
who originally constituted the Kronti fekuo of Kumasi. See Wilks (1993, 245–246) 
for an alternative composition.
41 Red clay is a sign of mourning. Victims prepared for human sacrice were daubed 
with red clay (Rattray 1959 [1927], 214).
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among the ancestors. Hence, a dead chief was still a chief: “he occupied the 
same status and role, and had the same needs and requirements – wives, 
servants, cloths, gold, food” as he had had in his this-worldly existence 
(McCaskie 1989, 428). In order to provide for some of these needs human 
sacrices had to be performed, and in the past they formed a signicant part 
of the royal funerals. It was the obligation of the surviving relatives to see 
that the sacrices were carried out properly, thereby enabling the departed 
spirit of the deceased to continue his life in the spirit world. Otherwise, the 
ancestors would have been disgraced and have withdrawn their support, 
and the crucial connection between the living and the dead mediated by the 
ruler would be at risk of collapsing (ibid.).
Consequently, in this specic tradition, Osei Tutu had to establish 
a relationship with his ancestors through sacrice so that he could fully 
function as a chief. A human sacrice was needed for that, and Amankwatia 
oered himself, meaning that the service he provided was not ‘political’, but 
rather ‘ritual’. Accidentally, Amankwatia was saved, but he was rewarded for 
his readiness, becoming a chief himself. Clearly, this is not merely a system 
of services and awards. It is rather a network of exchanges that connected the 
ancestral spirits, the chief, and his subject. ere was also a similar network 
between the gods, the Asantehene, and his chiefs. 
Chiey sacrice
e Asantehene performed those rituals for which he was exclusively 
qualied by his oce (e.g., veneration of the Golden Stool). He also provided 
for other rituals (e.g., by sending objects to be sacriced elsewhere), and 
maintained his own spiritual potency (e.g., by observing the taboos of 
his oce, descent group, and ntɔrɔ division). Nevertheless, his role was 
essentially dierent from that of a priest (ɔkᴐmfo, pl. akᴐmfoɔ), who became 
possessed by the deities, and thus rendered up his / her body as a ‘terminal’ 
for the spirit world. 
In the aairs of state chiefs made sacrices to three categories of spirits: 
the ancestral spirits, deities called abosom (sing. ɔbosom), and charms 
(asuman, sing. suman), all of which were seen as potential sources of 
power.42 Here I am primarily interested in the second category. e abosom 
had their origins in ‘nature’, that is, in the forests and bodies of water, but 
since they had come to live with people, they were expected to be open to 
consultation,43 and thus it would have been highly irresponsible on the part 
42 See Gilbert (1989) for the problems involved with classications of this type.
43 McCaskie (1995, 118) emphasizes the ambiguous nature of the abosom by stating 
that “[t]he expectation that they might prove cooperative and consoling when 
petitioned to assist in human aairs was tempered by recognition of their origin in 
an antagonism to culture”. Although the abosom are considered to be unpredictable 
and potentially dangerous, some of them are seen to have made a conscious 
decision to live with humans and thus to become associated with a particular group 
of people. Conversely, there are those abosom who have decided to stay in ‘the bush’, 
of whose existence people do not usually know. 
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of the chief to engage himself and his subjects in any important activities 
without resorting to divination. Particularly in crucial matters, such as war, 
a chief had to ask for guidance from the abosom through a priest and, as 
many traditions testify, the priests were “punished by death in the olden 
days when they told lies to the King on consultation” (MAG IAS/AS 194).
In the Denkyira war Osei Tutu and his allies did not make an exception 
in this respect. In order to ensure nal victory over their oppressors they 
turned to the priest, Komfo Anokye. According to one tradition:   
Okomfo Anokye when consulted assured them that they would be victorious 
provided some men would give themselves up for sacrices. ree men would 
be needed for sacrice. One would be buried alive. His hands would appear at 
the surface of the earth and two brass pans full of war medicine mixed in water 
would be put in the two palms for the warriors to bath before they le for the war 
front. e second volunteer would be butchered to death and his esh thrown 
away for vultures to take to Denkyira land. Wherever any piece of the esh would 
fall the men of the place would lose their bravery and become cowards. e third 
volunteer should be a Paramount chief. He would be armed and he would be in 
front of the marching soldiers. He was not to re a shot even if he met an enemy. 
He should look on for the enemy to shoot him. (Kwadwo 1994, 7–8)
e three chiefs who volunteered to give their lives were Asenso Kofo, 
the chief of Adwumakase Kese, Edwesohene Diko Pim, and Kumawuhene 
Tweneboa Kodia.44 Variations of the same theme can be found elsewhere. 
A tradition from Kwaso recounts that a royal “who was a le-handed person 
should be sacriced to the gods of the nation to guarantee victory in all 
the ensuing wars to establish the Dynasty”. In addition to this, seven chiefs 
from the Aduana clan, known as “the bearers of the seven Fetish Pots”, were 
“killed to further appease the gods” (PRAAD ARG 2/2/105a). Similarly, 
traditions of Mampon mention that Mamponhene Boahen Anantuo took 
command of the Asante army in Feyiase instead of Osei Tutu himself 
because Komfo Anokye had prophesized that whoever led the troops into 
battle would not live longer than seven days aer the war. Subsequently, 
Boahen Anantuo was badly wounded and died three days aer the guns 
had fallen silent (Kwadwo 1994, 84). ese are the most widely known 
stories of chiey self-sacrice preceding the crucial battle, but there are 
other similar accounts. 
e most interesting element common to all the traditions is the exchange 
nature of proceedings. Before sacricing his life for the sake of the others, 
Asenso Kofo requested that from then on no one from his town should ever 
44 e name Tweneboa Kodia is synonymous with self-sacrice even among 
contemporary Asante. For example, in 2000 a local newspaper published an article 
in which the writer urged readers not to think of the cost when the development of 
modern infrastructure was at stake. e article was titled “e Spirit of Tweneboah 
Kodua must be re-incarnated” (Asante Tribune, Aug.1 – Aug. 7, 2000).  
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be executed.45 Edwesohene Diko Pim was promised that no person of the 
Asona matriclan, to which he belonged, would ever be condemned to death, 
and Kumawuhene Tweneboa Kodia asked the same for the inhabitants of 
his own chiefdom (Kwadwo 1994, 8).46 According to the traditions from 
Kwaso, the successors of the seven chiefs from the Aduana matriclan 
became recognized as paramount chiefs, and all their descendants were 
spared execution (PRAAD ARG 2/2/105a). Mamponhene Boahen Anantuo 
demanded that his chiefdom should have a senior position over other 
chiefdoms of the same rank. us his successors became the custodians of 
the Silver Stool (Sika Dwa Pɛtɛ), and in the absence of the Asantehene it is 
the Mamponhene who presides over the aairs of the kingdom (Kwadwo 
1994, 8). To put it briey, in the sacrices preceding the nal battle the order 
of seniority of chiey oces was constituted, and certain chiefs, members of 
certain descent groups, and subjects of certain chiefs were assigned certain 
privileges.
Performing human sacrice in order to guarantee success in warfare was 
commonly practised among the Asante (Akyeampong and Obeng 1995, 
498–501). Usually the victims were prisoners or slaves who were obtained 
and kept partly for sacricial purposes, but in this case those sacriced 
were chiefs whose duty it was to sacrice in order to make the state prosper. 
Obviously, Osei Tutu could not oer himself to be sacriced, since he had 
already been chosen as the future ruler of the Asanteman by Komfo Anokye, 
who was the intermediary between the human realm and the gods. To 
employ the terminology introduced by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss 
(1968 [1898], 19–49), Osei Tutu could not be the victim since he had been 
chosen to be the sacrier by Komfo Anokye, the sacricer. Nevertheless, 
some of his allies volunteered to sacrice themselves if he would give them 
something in return, and in the absence of a better term I call that something 
‘jural rights’. By involving himself in exchange with both gods and humans 
Osei Tutu was nally able to “establish his dynasty”.
Spirits as exchange partners
In Akan cosmology the world was created by Onyame, the superior being, 
who had also impregnated it with his own power (tumi, ‘ability to change 
things’). Onyame has been described as a “withdrawn god”, who instantly 
distanced himself from this-worldly aairs aer he had completed his 
45 “Executions” usually refer to both judicial executions of criminals as well as 
mortuary slayings in which the (slave) victims were expected to accompany the 
ancestors into the spirit world. Wilks (1993, 215–217) claims that in the nineteenth 
century human beings were no longer used as oerings to abosom, but other 
sources state the opposite (e.g., Akyeampong and Obeng 1995, 498–501). 
46 Even nowadays, some of the Kumawu people have three horizontal scars on the 
le corner of their mouths. I am told that this is a sign showing the executioners 
(abrafoɔ) that they are protected by the ancient contract made by Tweneboa Kodia 
and Osei Tutu.
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works of creation (McCaskie 1995, 105).47 He was the source of all power, 
but anybody with proper knowledge of the means of access was considered 
able to obtain some of that power (Akyeampong and Obeng 1995, 483–
484). Among those were Onyame’s children and grandchildren: the abosom. 
Together they all formed “a spiritual family”, as one of my informants called 
it. Although the abosom were seen as essentially mobile, capable of leaving 
and returning at will, they had their own places of origins, and they can be 
classied accordingly:
1. Asuo (rivers): deities that originate from water, most oen rivers. e 
biggest subdivision of these abosom is called Tano (or Taa), which 
refers to the Tano River in central Ghana. Many of the gods that the 
Asante consider ‘ancient’ (tete) belong to this subdivision.
2. Mframa (winds): deities that originate from the air or sky.
3. Abo (rocks, stones): deities originating from the forest. ey are 
considered to have a close relationship with ‘dwarfs’ (mmoatia) and 
some of my informants actually equate the two.48
eir superiority to humans was based on their immortality and their 
extraordinary powers: they were capable of “striking you dead”, as I have 
oen been told. ere were signicant dierences in their powers as well 
as their character: some were known as ‘war gods’, and some as ‘witch-
hunters’; others were known as ‘gentlemen’, or ‘rascals’. Human beings could 
form relationships with the abosom; for example, a group of people who 
had settled in a place already inhabited by a god were indebted to him / 
her as the original ‘owner’ of the land, and were thus committed to obey 
the rules he / she formulated. ese became evident in the rst encounter 
between the deity and the human community or, at the latest, when 
a permanent, formal tie between the two had been established. For instance, 
in the village of Dandwa, located in Nkoranza, the local deity, called Asuo 
Akruma (also known as Kwaku Akruma or Dandwa Akruma), was living 
in a nearby river long before the rst human settlers arrived there. At that 
time, I am told, monkeys instead of human beings served him. ey brought 
him food and kept the dwelling of the deity (a cave behind a waterfall) clean. 
e founder and rst headman of the village was a man called Adu Abo, 
who was originally a servant of the paramount chief of Nkoranza. One 
of his duties was to hunt elephants for his master, and during one of his 
hunting expeditions he noticed something out of the ordinary. One of the 
descendants of Adu Abo described the events in the following way:
47 See Rattray (1916, 20–21) for a tradition explaining how and why Onyame le the 
earth. 
48 Descriptions given by McCaskie (1995, 108–110) and Jane Parish (2000, 489) dier 
from mine in some details, but the basic idea of three dierent places is common 
to all.
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Our ancestors were hunters. e Nkoranzahene sent them here to hunt elephants. 
ey sent their quarries to him directly. One time they stopped here to rest. 
Nana49 [Adu Abo] was thirsty. He told his people to go and get water for him to 
drink. ey took a brass cup and went to the river to fetch water. But as soon 
as the cup touched the surface of the water, the water turned brown. ey went 
back and reported this to Nana. He said: “Why don’t you use a calabash instead of 
a brass cup”. ey took a calabash and went back to the river. is time nothing 
happened, and the water was pure and refreshing. Later some women went to 
the river to fetch water. Some of the women were having their menstrual periods. 
When they touched the water, the river stopped owing and there was no more 
water coming down from the waterfall. It looked like the whole river was going 
to run dry. is was reported to Nana and he said: “ere must be a god here”. 
He reported this to the Nkoranzahene, who said that they should settle there and 
serve the god. 
Later the deity possessed one of the settlers, and that person became his 
rst priest.50 rough the priest the villagers learned the taboos of the god 
which are, in addition to brass vessels and menstruation, dogs, goats, and 
farming on Wednesdays. Conversely, it became known that the deity liked 
sheep and palm wine, and hence these items were given to him in sacrices. 
Even in 2000, when I conducted eldwork in the village, the taboos were still 
carefully observed. Dogs and goats, which are characteristic of Ghanaian 
villages in general, were totally absent in Dandwa. On a Wednesday one was 
certain to meet all the villagers at their houses, because no one would even 
think of farming on such a ‘bad day’ (da bɔne). Even the quite considerable 
Christian and Muslim populations of the village, who did not usually take 
active part in the rituals connected to Asuo Akruma, observed the taboos 
strictly, because, as the traditionalists said, “they know that they are living 
on his land, and if they break the rules, he will punish them severely”.
However, the relationship between humans and the abosom was never 
one-sided. Human communities did not entertain the abosom simply out 
of fear, as exemplied by a ritual recitation that was performed during the 
consecration of a new shrine of a deity called Taa Kwesi. It was recorded by 
Rattray (1955 [1923], 148–149), and I quote it at length:
When we call you upon darkness, when we call upon you in the sunlight, and say, 
“Do such a thing for us”, you will do so. 
 And the laws that we are decreeing for you, you, this god of ours, are these – if 
in our time, or in our children’s, and our grandchildren’s time a king should arise 
from somewhere, and come to us, and say he is going to war, when he tells you, 
49 ‘Grandparent’, a respectful appellation used when referring to elders, oceholders, 
ancestors, and deities.
50 Or maybe ‘priestess’ would be more appropriate here since, according to Akruma’s 
specic instructions, he should always be served by females. e term ɔkɔmfo refers 
to both male and female ritual specialists. is instruction does not contradict the 
notion of menstrual blood as one of Akruma’s taboos, since I was told that the 
priestesses will stop menstruating immediately aer they have come in contact with 
the deity.
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and you well know that should he go to the ght he will not gain the victory, you 
must tell us so; and should you know that he will go and conquer, then also state 
that truth.
 And yet again, if a man be ill in the night, or in the daytime, and we raise you 
alo and place upon the head [refers to a consultation through a priest], and we 
inquire of you saying, “Is So-and-so about to die?”, let the cause of the misfortune 
which you tell him has come upon him be the real cause of the evil and not lies.
 To-day, we all in this town, all our elders, and all our children, have consulted 
together and agreed without dissent among us, we have all united and with one 
accord decided to establish your shrine, you, Ta Kwesi, upon this, a sacred Friday.
 We have taken a sheep, and a fowl, we have taken wine, we are about to give 
them to you that you may reside in this town and preserve its life. From this 
day, and so on to any future day, you must not y and leave us. […] To-day you 
become a god for the chief, to-day you have become a god for our spirit ancestors. 
Perhaps upon some to-morrow the Ashanti King may come and say, “My child 
So-and-so (or it may be an elder) is sick”, and ask you to go with him, or may be 
he will send a messenger here for you; in such a case you may go and we will not 
think that you are eeing from us.
Here it was the people who were setting the rules of conduct for the god and 
not vice versa. Taa Kwesi was being explicitly told that he should inform 
the people about the outcome of any possible war and also reveal the true 
cause of death if somebody in the community was about to die. Even the 
movements of the god had been restricted, with one exception: when he 
was summoned by the king. Nevertheless, he was asked to preserve the life 
of the town, not because he had originated it (or anything else), but because 
he was presumed to possess the power to do so. Similarly, the inhabitants 
of Dandwa expected Asuo Akruma to help the village by making “barren 
women give birth” and catching thieves.
At the climax of the invocation that concludes a sacrice, an Asante 
priest literally shouted at the god, questioning whether he / she was 
even able to do the things that had been requested. Gods certainly were 
mightier than men, but it did not necessarily mean that the less powerful 
were eternally indebted to the more powerful. More likely, the gods were 
among those who established and controlled a system of exchanges when 
power was being distributed. As Rattray (1955 [1923], 146) once put it, they 
initially came to earth “in order that they might receive benets from, and 
confer them upon, mankind”. To my mind, the most important thing is 
that aer the relationship between the human community and deities was 
fully established, the latter became strongly associated with a specic group 
of people; for example, their shrines were oen the corporate property of 
a particular oce of chief or elder. Although Onyame, as the original source 
of all power, could be dened as belonging to an ‘extra-social’ or ‘desocial’ 
category (see Jackson 1977, 134–135), the abosom were considered by the 
Asante as exchange partners and thus very social, even though not in the 
same sense as humans.
I do not know precisely which gods were referenced in the traditional 
accounts which mention “gods of the nations” who demanded the sacrices 
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of the chiefs.51 e Golden Stool, containing the spiritual backing of 
Asanteman, was said to derive its powers from Onyame, but ultimately 
this statement was valid for anything / anybody powerful. Onyame had 
no temples or priests of his own and he was not involved with sacricial 
exchanges similar to those conducted with the abosom.52 Communication 
with Onyame and his powers took place through the abosom, and from other 
instances we know that deities called ‘state gods’ were specically abosom. 
But still, the tumi used in executing the contracts was seen to be the same 
power that had been used in the creation of things. e abosom seem to 
have been able to perform exchange involving power, just like humans were 
able to exchange the creations of divine powers (people, animals, foodstus, 
etc.) with other humans. Similarly, human leaders transformed the power 
obtained from the spirit world into authority and redistributed it to their 
followers: by creating subordinate political oces, for example, as was the 
case when Osei Tutu granted a chiey title to his servant Amankwatia. In 
exchange, subordinates assisted their superiors in dealing with the spirit 
world, just as Amankwatia was ready to follow Obiri Yeboa to the land of 
the dead, and were thus linked into to the chain of exchanges that cross the 
border between the spirit world and the people. 
e process described above resonates in many ways with the idea of 
reciprocity as “a starting mechanism” in forming relations of authority, 
a term that was originally used to describe how a person achieves a position 
of leadership through generosity (Sahlins 1972, 204–210). In Osei Tutu’s 
sacrice the victims were already hereditary chiefs, but by giving a gi to 
their followers they connect them to an order of a greater divine scale. In 
exchange for their lives the chiefs, or rather their own and their subjects’ 
descendants, were given jural rights.53 In the case of exemption from 
51 I am told that the god Komfo Anokye served was called Boabuduro. e shrine of 
Boabuduro is still active in Agona, Anokye’s home chiefdom, and my informants 
tell me that it is “the god of the Asene clan in Agona”. However, Komfo Anokye, like 
other priests, could have served several deities, and Boabuduro is not mentioned 
by name in any of the traditions that I know that concern the sacrices preceding 
the Denkyira war.
52 Rattray (1955 [1923], 141–144) speaks of, and has actually published a photograph 
of, an alleged priest and temple of Onyame, but there is no other reference to 
anything similar elsewhere (see McCaskie 1995, 382).
53 One particularly interesting tradition is from Dwansa. Customarily, the Dwansahene 
was responsible for carrying the gunpowder of the Asantehene’s army. Before the 
Denkyira war Komfo Anokye prophesized that the carrier of the gunpowder would 
certainly become barren, but still the Dwansahene “preferred to be sterile rather 
than lose the dignity of the Nation”. In exchange for his sacrice the Dwansahene 
was given the elephant tail (the insignia of the ‘big men’), a shield (a symbol of 
chieaincy, much like the stool), and a “golden calabash” (MAG IAS/AS 61). It 
is important to note that here the ‘human sacrice’ involves the unborn instead 
of the living. What is even more remarkable is that those sacriced are the future 
patrilineal ospring of the Dwansahene (or the matrilineal descendants of his 
wives), but the title and regalia received are attached to his oce, which is vested 
in his own matrilineage.
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executions, the essence of the jural rights received was that no such exchange 
should ever be conducted in the future. us the right is the negation of the 
sacrice. It is the uniqueness of the whole event which is important; it could 
not be repeated, nor was it re-enacted. e priest, in this case the sacricer, 
did not become the general intermediary between the chiefs and spirits as 
he did not assume the most important ritual duties connected to the chiey 
oce, namely the ancestral sacrices. He rather remains the ritual specialist 
under the chief (see Dumont 1980, 293).
Sacrice and politics
As stated above, in the classic anthropological accounts of divine kingship 
the religious aspects were usually separated from the political and 
considered as symbolic superstructure. In his classic re-study of the Shilluk 
kingship, for example, Evans-Pritchard treated regicide, the killing of 
the king who had lost his divine powers, as a political problem. In order 
to question James Frazer’s theories on institutionalized ritual regicide, he 
claimed that among the Shilluk regicides did not really exist. It was rather 
a case of political assassination or armed rebellion. In an alleged regicide, 
the segmentary interests inherent in society have resurfaced, and the king 
as a person becomes once again associated with the particular segment of 
society from which he originates and not the divinity outside the society. 
During and aer the violent elimination of the king, the kingship still 
remains divine, and a new person will be selected to ll it. So, when the 
king is considered to have lost his divine powers, in actuality, he has lost his 
overall support (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 84–85). In this calculation support 
is the independent and divinity the dependent variable: that is to say, less 
support leads to less divinity and not vice versa. Later approaches have led 
to a better understanding of how the two cannot be separated and arranged 
into clear-cut relations of dependency. For instance, Valerio Valeri has 
discussed the relationship between sacrices performed by Hawaiian kings 
and the so-called succession wars they fought and, interestingly, it seems 
that the logic of sacrice dictated the logic of the power struggle. Ritual and 
‘pragmatic’ or ‘political’ actions were not separated into two autonomous 
social domains – they were parts of the same social totality – but, in their 
‘ritual parts’, actions were linked to the divine model of society and thus 
its attainment could be anticipated or conrmed (Valeri 1985, 153–154). 
According to Valeri, “the king is recognized as divine by virtue of the 
successful performance of certain sacricial ritual”, but his ability to do that 
depended on certain ‘political’ actions (ibid., 153). Namely, every king was 
considered a conquering king in the sense that he had defeated all the other 
contenders to the throne and was ready to defend it by force. us victory 
in a succession war that results in one of the contenders becoming a divine 
king also implies the demise of others:
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But these rivals were not simply killed; they are sacriced, hence incorporated 
into the god, reduced to him. Moreover, they are not only enemies, but also 
close relatives of the victor. Hence they are his doubles. us, by sacricing them 
the victor is indirectly incorporated into god, given a divine status. In sum, he 
becomes a divine king. (Ibid., 161) 
Consequently, the fratricidal nature of the Hawaiian kingly sacrice 
is very important. By substituting himself in sacrice with the closest 
possible ‘imitation’ of himself, the king gives the best possible oering and 
thus becomes capable of entertaining a closer relationship with the gods. 
At the same time, on the level of ‘politics’, he rids himself of challengers. 
Fundamentally, it is the act of sacrice that makes the ghting and killing 
seem comprehensible.
Could Osei Tutu’s sacrices be regarded as a ritual context providing 
for the elimination of possible rivals and transgressors? Certainly, none of 
the chiefs who are listed in the traditions as having been sacriced were 
legitimate contenders to Osei Tutu’s oce. In all of the accounts which 
I have encountered, only two of the sacriced chiefs were mentioned as 
somehow related to him. e rst was a “half-brother”, a chief of a town 
called Bonwere. In exchange, his descendants were exempted from the 
death penalty and also given the right to use a specic type of regalia 
usually reserved for Kumasi royals (Rattray 1929, 277). Nonetheless, the 
Bonwerehene was only a “half-brother”, not a member of the same clan, and 
consequently not eligible for the oce of the Asantehene. e second was a 
junior brother of the Kuntanasehene, whose lineage was given a subordinate 
oce in the capital in return for his oering himself as a sacrice (PRAAD 
ARG 3/2/64a). e ruling lineage of Kuntanase did belong to the same 
clan as Osei Tutu’s lineage, but to the opposite Dako moiety, and thus its 
members were highly unlikely ever to be considered eligible. However, in 
other instances royals were allegedly sacriced. Missionaries who witnessed 
a funeral of a royal in Kumasi in 1873 reported that the “King himself killed 
some members of the royal house” (Ramseyer and Kühne 1875, 236–237).54 
Considering the Denkyira war, I do not think it is possible to see any 
underlying political logic that will ‘explain’ the sacrices. It is rather that 
the sacricial nature of the actions of the chiefs made them meaningful and 
important. 
It is already evident that in Asante ideology, “power transcends human 
agency”, as Sara Berry (2001, 1) has put it. Although originating from the 
spiritual realm, power is, in principle, accessible to all, but in practice access 
to it is restricted by limited knowledge and means. is partly explains 
the high value given to esoteric knowledge in Asante society, namely the 
admiration accorded people who “know secrets” (Akyeampong and Obeng 
54 Haphazard killings committed by the sons and grandsons of the Asantehene were 
part of the primary funeral of the Asantehene, but royals were expressly forbidden 
as victims. Persons who were sacriced in order to accompany the deceased in the 
spirit world were mainly royal wives and servants (McCaskie 1989, 432–443).
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1995, 483–484). However, this notion of general accessibility to power 
has represented a constant threat to the rulers as it means that their own 
powers must be protected from the witchcra and other malevolent forces 
used by their opponents. It is remarkable that during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, when the power of the Kumasi central government was 
waning, the internal rebellions that took place were oen ritual movements 
(see Maier 1981; McCaskie 1981; 1986b, 332–333). I return to this notion, 
which has exhibited considerable longevity, in the nal chapter of the book 
in order to discuss its relevance in the contemporary political setting.
Secularization II
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O ne of Dumont’s major contributions to social theory has been his  detailed examination of how holistic, or traditional, societies become 
individualistic, or modern, as a result of an internal process of transformation. 
He has documented the successive dierentiation of the political category 
and the expansion of the modern state from the dawn of the papal state 
to the English, American, and French revolutions by referencing relevant 
developments in religious doctrine, philosophy, and law. It is not necessary 
to review these processes in detail here, although a brief summary of the 
most important characteristics of the modern state assists in understanding 
the ideological transformation of the Asante chieaincy under colonial rule.
According to Dumont, modern societies may be distinguished from 
traditional societies by a displacement of the main value stress from the social 
whole to the individual, who is regarded as an embodiment of humanity at 
large; thus power, rights, and property are seen as attributes of the individual. 
e relationship between man and God is an individual matter and therefore 
religion has lost its all-embracing quality and has become one among other 
considerations. In this scheme of things, politics addresses the question of 
how these individuals, with similar needs, objectives, and powers organize 
themselves and associate with each other. States emerge through contracts 
made by individuals in their capacity as citizens and consequently rulers 
only represent the ruled, and the power of the state is nothing more than 
the powers of its members delegated to another level. Hence, the state does 
not transcend itself; it exists only for itself and not for any ‘higher cause’ 
such as ancestral spirits or gods. Consequently it does not need any external 
reference point to explain its own existence (Dumont 1971; 1992 [1986], 
60–103). e other type of secularization that Dumont (1980) studied had 
to do with the division of ritual functions between the king and priests in 
India. ere the king exercised political power and performed certain ritual 
duties, but the most important religious functions had been transferred 
to the priests. Since in India purity and higher status were not based on 
power, it followed that the Brahman priests, who had no secular power, were 
considered superior to the kings, although, as Dumont points out, “in fact 
priesthood submits to power” (ibid., 71–72). In his view the Indian situation 
was a sort of intermediate form between an undierentiated order, like that 
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in pre-colonial Asante, and the modern European development described 
above (ibid., 292–294, 311–313).
In Chapters 3 and 4, I discuss how similar divisions and categories 
were introduced to colonial Asante by European Christian missionaries 
and colonial administrators as they sought to redene the relationship 
between African ‘natives’ and their ruler, exploring the emergence of both 
folk and academic theories about chieaincy and kingship as political 
institutions which were based on these principles. However, the Asante 
experience is strikingly dierent from those Dumont himself has discussed. 
While Dumont studied gradual, long-term processes of ideological and 
institutional transformation, in the case of Asante chiefship everything 
happened abruptly. e demarcation between political and religious spheres 
in colonial Asante was established by administrative order in response to an 
acute crisis: Asante Christian converts had refused to follow their ‘pagan’ 
chiefs and were moving out of their natal villages to form new communities 
centred on mission houses. is was seen as a potential threat to the indirect 
rule system in which the colonial administration used local chiefs as their 
middlemen. e administrators assumed that a full-blown conict could 
be averted if the political and religious functions of the chiefs were jurally 
separated, working from the principle that converts could still regard their 
chiefs as legitimate ‘political authorities’ without compromising their 
Christian faith. Concurrently, the idea of individual citizens with private 
consciences as the basic building blocks of the state started to emerge. 
From that point on, chieaincy has been discussed increasingly in terms 
of modern politics. us the structural dierentiation between religion 
and politics in this case should be perceived more as a rupture than an 
endpoint of a long-term process: one is rather witnessing a unied order 
getting hacked to pieces than its gradual fragmentation. And yet, I believe 
that Dumont’s notion of structure proves a very helpful methodological tool 
in analyzing these revolutionary changes. By adopting his idea of religion 
as the “all-embracing normative consideration” in a holistic society one is 
better equipped to understand the vast problems that the religious role of 
the chief posed to the converts, and the radical denial of traditional society 
that was to be their response. 
I propose that understanding the signicance of this ‘secularist revolution’ 
opens a new way of looking at colonial era chieaincy. Previously the impact 
of colonialism on chieaincy has been approached largely from a political 
perspective. Some studies have stressed how the colonial administration 
bolstered “traditional authority and aristocratic privilege” at the expense 
of the common man and the educated intelligentsia (Tordo 1965, 382–
386). Others have observed how aspiring ‘entrepreneurs’ repressed by 
the pre-colonial state were able to establish themselves as a new political 
and economic elite in colonial society under the auspices of the European 
administration (see, e.g., Arhin 1986; 1995; McCaskie 1986). ere are also 
those who have examined how the Asantehene and Kumasi chiefs sought 
to revive their nineteenth-century prerogatives over land and subjects in 
the peripheries within the institutional framework of indirect rule (see, e.g., 
Triulzi 1972; McCaskie 1984, 185–186; see also Berry 2001, 35–55). What 
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all these approaches have in common is that the dynamics of the colonial 
era, its breaks and continuities, are understood as intensications and 
suppressions of certain political tendencies or as changes in power relations 
between dierent actors and groups. is is also visible in general treatments 
of African history and politics, where Asante has been used as an example of 
a pre-colonial polity with strong democratic and decentralizing properties, 
which were later abolished by the indirect rule system (see Mamdani 1996, 
47–48), or as an emergent liberal capitalist state, whose development was 
arrested by colonialism (see Davidson 1992, 52–73). However, I would 
argue that because of the heavy emphasis on politics we have failed to see the 
most thoroughgoing transformation, that is, the secularization taking place 
concurrently. To be fair, Christian conversion has not been totally neglected 
by earlier studies on Asante chieaincy, but there has been an inclination to 
see it primarily as an instrument that worked towards political ends. More 
specically, it is understood that Christianity initially and primarily appealed 
to those Asante who were “neither particularly prosperous nor particularly 
free subjects of existing religious and political power” (Dunn and Robertson 
1973, 125). is characterization has been applied to entire social categories: 
for example, former slaves, or specic groups or individuals such as local 
rivals to incumbent chiefs, to whom Christianity oered a channel of 
protest or a way out of an disadvantageous position (ibid., 123–124, 135). 
e motives for conversion and the social demographics of Christians are, 
of course, important matters but, in my opinion, the most crucial issue is 
to understand how the accommodation of Christian religion eectively 
redened the institution of chieaincy. In view of that, it also must be asked 
what there was in Christianity that instigated this transformation.  
At the same time as Christian converts were struggling over their 
religious rights in rural Asante, African nationalist thinkers and government 
anthropologists were creating their own models of the Asante state that 
rested on assumptions about the polity as an association of rights-bearing 
citizens. In these models the origins of the Asante polity was traced to 
a human imperative to bring order to chaos rather than to sacricial 
exchanges with gods and ancestors. Historically, the Asante state was seen to 
be based on a contract between people rather than with spirits. e priestly 
role of the chief was devalued and relegated to the background in favour 
of him being considered rst and foremost a political representative of his 
people. eories like these also provided ideological legitimation for the 
colonial government’s reorganizations of Asante kingship and chieaincy. 
When discussing administrative secularization and political models, 
however, there is a risk of emphasizing the repressive nature of colonial state 
power and downplaying the agency of the colonial subjects. In this regard I 
prefer to emulate those anthropological and historical studies of indirect rule 
that have called attention to the ways in which the Africans themselves were 
also able to exert inuence in the colonial system (e.g., Allman and Tashjian 
2000; Berry 1993; 2001; McCaskie 1986). In their eorts to re-organize 
‘native states’ colonial administrators were interested in the correct meaning 
and application of ‘native customs’ and in this respect they were dependent 
on information provided by the colonial subjects, local testimonies that were 
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oen contradictory and led to prolonged debates about authenticity. e 
opportunity to participate in these debates oered the Africans a channel to 
aect decision-making processes, although not, it must be acknowledged, 
on an equal footing (Berry 1993, 7–20). Consequently, the study at hand 
focuses on colonial-era debates about the meanings of such concepts as 
politics, religion, and fetishism, in which administrators, missionaries, 
chiefs, converts, intellectuals, and ‘traditionalists’ took part from the 
viewpoints of their respective positions.
e idea of chieaincy as a secular political institution was a creation 
of the colonial period and it formed the basis for later developments; thus 
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the development of chieaincy in the post-
colonial era and beyond. When Ghana gained its status as an independent 
nation-state, Asante chieaincy found itself at odds with the new post-
colonial administration, as its ‘liberal model’ was renounced by the leist 
politicians who maintained that chieaincy could have a future only 
as an administrative instrument of the modern government and / or as 
a nationalistic cultural symbol. However, since the end of the Cold War 
and the weakening of nation states, Asante chiefs have found new avenues 
for legitimation as ‘civil society leaders’ – a role endorsed by horizontal 
institutions like the World Bank. is has meant a return to colonial-era 
ideologies of chieaincy as a democratic, consensus-based institution. 
It is now being evaluated according to the standards of good governance, 
transparency, accessibility, human rights, and the like. us chieaincy’s 
political role has not remained only local; it has also been undergoing 
processes connected with becoming an element of global governance. 
When considering these trajectories, it is important to understand 
when, how, and why chieaincy became perceived as a political institution 
in the rst place. Interestingly, despite the considerable ‘modernization’ of 
chieaincy, problems concerning the religious basis of the institution have 
not disappeared. On the contrary, new Christian movements, especially 
of the Pentecostal-Charismatic variant, have challenged both the realm of 
secular politics and traditional Ghanaian culture as ungodly.
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T he study of Christian missions has been a major eld of innovation in  the anthropology of colonialism since the 1980s (Pels 1997, 171–172; 
Meyer 2004a, 450–451), of which probably the most renowned study has 
been conducted by Jean and John Comaro (1991; 1997) on the work of the 
British Nonconformist Protestant missionaries among the southern Tswana 
peoples in South Africa from the 1820s to the early twentieth century. In 
their thus-far two-volume study the Comaros maintain that the “European 
colonization of Africa was oen less a directly coercive conquest than 
a persuasive attempt to colonize consciousness” (Comaro and Comaro 
1991, 313). By this the authors do not mean that conversion to Christianity 
was a simple matter: quite the contrary, it is asserted that for a long time the 
Tswana remained unconvinced by, or indierent to, the religious message 
being preached by the missionaries. What the missionaries did achieve, 
however, was to plant a seed of modern capitalist culture in Tswana society, 
thereby preparing the ground for things to come. Ultimately they were 
successful, despite the scepticism, counterarguments, and innovations of the 
Tswana (ibid., 309–314). 
One of the issues over which the missionaries and the Tswana, especially 
the chiefs, struggled was the denition of the domain of the ‘political’. On 
their arrival in South Africa the missionaries had no intention of challenging 
the chiefs as “the local temporal authorities” or what they thought were their 
“secular powers”. Soon, however, this political neutrality proved to be an 
illusion that had rested on the distinction between religion and politics 
which was well-established in their own society. e Tswana chieaincy did 
not t this mould as the chiefs not only regulated political and economic 
life, they were also heads of the “ancestral cult” and leaders of communal 
rituals (ibid., 154–155, 255–261). Hence, when the missionaries demanded 
“religious freedoms” – asking, for example, that the chiefs excused their 
Christian subjects from taking part in initiation ceremonies – they were 
directly defying chiey authority and beckoning the Christian Tswana 
away from the traditional community. e missionaries had envisioned 
a society with distinct spheres of religion and politics based on freedom 
of conscience, but in reality their actions resulted in strife between the 
mission and the chiefship (ibid., 260–264). Although the chiefs oen saw 
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Christianity as a threat – the missionary had become “another chief in 
town” as one ruler put it – they oen wanted to make use of its rhetoric and 
rites and turn the missionaries into their political agents in their contacts 
with settler colonialists. In these dealings they had to become cognizant 
of a new political language that relied on modern ideas such as ethnicity 
and nationality (Comaro and Comaro 1991, 265–308; 1997, 89–93). 
e Comaros (1991, 264) conclude that missionary activities had “set in 
motion a process with very mixed, contradictory implications”. 
ere are many similarities between the Tswana case and developments 
in Asante. e rst missionaries in Asante also vowed not to interfere with 
‘politics’, but soon found themselves at odds with the chiefs. is led to 
prolonged discussions about the relationship between the ‘religious’ and 
‘political’ spheres in a society where such a distinction had hitherto been 
alien. On the other hand, however, missionary work among the Asante took 
place in very dierent circumstances when compared to the South African 
experience described above. By the time the missionaries managed to secure 
a permanent local footing, Asante was already an occupied and colonized 
country whose administrators had taken charge of regulating the religious 
life of the indigenous inhabitants. e use of orders, judgements, and 
interventions by force were always a possibility, meaning that what came 
to constitute the secular in colonial Asante was based on commands from 
above. Nonetheless, this did not make the situation any less complicated 
or contradictory. In this chapter I rst discuss some characteristics of 
missionary Christianity and Christian religion in general that I think are 
important for understanding what took place in the mission houses, chiey 
palaces, and villages of the early twentieth century. is is followed by a brief 
history of missionary work in Asante and a discussion of fetishism, as the 
missionaries called the local cosmology, focusing especially on those aspects 
that made it dicult for Christian converts to continue living their lives 
in the ‘pagan’ communities ruled by chiefs. Here the Dumontian notion 
of traditional religion as an all-encompassing category will be of great 
importance. I then move on to describe the conicts between Christians and 
the chiefs and also the resulting interventions by the colonial administration. 
e chapter concludes with an analysis of a ‘missionary model’ of Asante 
society, wherein ‘citizens’ of dierent religious convictions could supposedly 
live together under their ‘secular’ chiefs. 
Missionary Christianity as a modern religion
In addition to well-deserved admiration, the Comaros’ analysis of the 
impacts of missionary work has also invited criticism. ere are two critical 
positions that I think are important in terms of the argument I put forward 
in this chapter. Generally speaking, both have to do with the Comaros’ 
(1991, 310) idea of the missionaries as “the media of modernity” and “the 
human vehicles of a hegemonic worldview”. e matter is very important, 
since I also connect the arrival of the Christian missions to the emergence of 
modern political conceptions. e rst criticism concerns the role of religion 
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in the transformation of those societies where Christian missionaries 
have worked, whereas the second questions the idea of the missionary as 
an exemplary representative of modern secular society. Reviewing these 
criticisms leads me to consider some important qualities of Christianity and 
the African missionary project that will hopefully help us to understand the 
history of secularization in Asante. 
Joel Robbins (2007) has argued that in the Comaros’ treatment the 
inuence of the missionary project on Tswana society is linked almost 
exclusively to the cultural logic of Western capitalist society, while religion 
itself, “Christianity, as a system of meanings with a logic of its own” (ibid., 
7), is seen as relatively unimportant. Robbins relates this to a more general 
tendency in anthropology to view cultural change as a slow process that 
tends to conserve the past, meanwhile downplaying the signicance of 
ruptural change that people who identify themselves as Christian converts, 
for instance, oen underline in their biographical accounts and ‘confessions’. 
Still, becoming and being Christian, a choice which explicitly set people apart 
from the rest of the society and their own pasts, are meaningful concepts 
to the converts themselves, and therefore Christian conversion should be 
an object of serious study (ibid., 9–16). I think this is also an important 
question in relation to the case I am pursuing here. Robbins has argued that 
Christianity in general is a religion that focuses on radical change, although 
dierent variations of Christianity emphasize dierent aspects of it. e idea 
of change is at the heart of the Christian doctrine since most believers tend 
to think about their religion as historically established by Jesus’ birth, life, 
death, and resurrection and how this constituted a decisive break in relation 
to Judaism. Furthermore, some Christian groups highlight the necessity of 
personal conversion or the magnitude of the coming millennium (Robbins 
2012, 12–15). 
In addition to perceptions of time, the notion of rupture is also present 
on the social level in the form of Christian individualism. In Christian 
thought the individual is “ultimately the bearer of potentially the highest 
value – that of salvation” and hence one is always to a greater or lesser degree 
disembedded from social relations, although the sort of social relations 
that are considered detrimental and how one is expected keep a distance 
from them do, of course, vary (ibid., 18–19; see Dumont 1992 [1986], 23–
59). In the context of conversion, avoiding pre-conversion ‘pagan’ society 
and its ‘demonic’ inuences is a crucial issue. In my opinion, the early 
Christians’ resentment towards their chiefs should be approached from 
this perspective. When the colonial administration in Asante made a ruling 
about the separation of the ‘political’ and ‘religious’ functions of the chiefs 
it was an institutional reaction to something that was perceived as a crisis 
of chieaincy. In my view the abruptness and severity of this crisis has to be 
understood in relation to the rupture that the converts experienced when 
they came to the conclusion that their social surroundings were permeated, 
at least potentially, by immoral persons, practices, objects, and places. 
“Anything and everything about fetishes was regarded profane, ungodly, 
a sin, and was therefore to be shunned like a plague”, as a son of a convert 
family explained when recalling the attitude of the early Christians (Kyei 
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2001, 46). Hence, as I demonstrate in greater detail below, the cultural logic 
of Christianity had a very important role in this ‘political’ crisis. 
John Peel (2000, 2–7) has expressed similar concerns as Robbins with 
regards the importance of religion in the Comaros’ model. More generally, 
he has criticized the ways in which the missionary endeavour is too 
simplistically blended with “other grand narratives”. According to Peel, the 
adoption of capitalist ideology, scientic rationalism, and other strands of 
modern European culture in Africa should not be seen as automatic by-
products of the missionary project. Although Evangelical Christianity was 
born in the intellectual atmosphere of the Enlightenment, and the modern 
idea of civilization had religious roots, the premises and aims of missionary 
work – the sinfulness of human nature and the salvation of souls – were 
markedly dierent from secular projects that put their trust in human reason 
and the fortunes of this world. Many Christians had “become progressively 
estranged from the dominant culture” of their own societies (ibid., 5), to 
the extent that they thought that their own countrymen were also badly in 
need of a reformation.55 Hence, it should be understood that the religious 
message of the missionaries was not tied to the culture of modern capitalism 
in any taken-for-granted way. “[T]he redemptive sacrice of Christ [...] does 
not imply double-entry book keeping or vice versa”, as Peel himself puts it 
(ibid.; italics in the original). 
Yet it was important for the missionary project in Africa to align itself with 
the ‘civilizing mission’ ideology of the colonial project and thus at least give 
an impression of shared objectives. is required that the missionaries could 
eectively take part in a secularist discourse about religion. By the nineteenth 
century, religious denominations were regarded as forms of voluntary 
associations that were separate from states and the world of politics and 
power in general. Churches were expected to have an eect on social change 
indirectly by furthering the moral education of individual citizens who, 
on their part, contributed to the welfare of the nation that they comprised. 
Christian missions that aimed at the transformation of foreign societies were 
thus considered a part of a larger social project (van Rooden 1997, 80–83). 
So, when the missionaries stated that they intended to bring whole nations 
from darkness into light, as one writer of a missionary magazine described it 
(e Friend of Africa, August 1841, 157), they emphasized the view that the 
religious conviction of individuals would provide a basis for major secular 
developments. e missionaries saw the human soul as the original source 
of all social ills and, therefore, the prerequisite for civilizing African society 
55 The missionaries used expressions like “so-called Christian England” and 
characterized their fellow citizens as “at least nominally, Christian men” (see 
East 1844, 244), when they wanted to emphasize that the ‘civilizing’ of Africa 
could not be a secular process conducted by administrators, merchants, and 
educators. e Christian anti-slavery movement, which in many ways preceded the 
missionary movement (Peel 2000, 7–8), exemplied this philosophy as it blamed 
both Europeans and Africans – whose greediness had created the slave trade and 
kept it extensive and ourishing – for the “evils of slavery” (see e.g. Buxton 1840, 
69–70). 
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was the reformation of the individual. Civilisation could not be achieved by 
the implementation of any ‘human policy’. For instance, one could change 
the laws of a ‘heathen country’ so that they would be in agreement with high 
moral principles, but in the long run society would not improve because 
laws could always be abused by the wickedness, love of gain, or passions of 
humans (East 1844, 238). Similarly, economic progress brought on by the 
introduction of new technologies, improved trade relations, or more eective 
extraction of natural resources, could not take place before the people were 
liberated from their superstitions concerning nature, time, geography, and 
such things. As John Beecham (1841, 339–340), the secretary of Wesleyan 
Missionary Society, wrote about the future of Asante:
Is an improved system of agriculture to be introduced? e visible representatives 
of the gods of the people are growing upon the very spot where the experiment 
is to be attempted. Are the natives to be taught to work the invaluable mines, 
with which their country abounds? It will be found that the hills which contain 
the precious treasures are the imaginary residences of the national deities, and 
that superstition will deprecate the sacrilegious touch. Are the advantages of 
an improved commerce to be recommended? Yes; but the intervention of the 
numerous “unlucky days,” and the time necessary for the consultation of the 
heathen oracles, before any important business can be undertaken, will retard, 
and oen entirely defeat the best-concerted arrangements. […] It may, therefore, 
be considered as certain, that, whatever may be done by other means, in the way 
of facilitating the introduction of the Gospel, the work of civilisation will not be 
advanced to any considerable extent, until the superstitious spell by which the 
people are bound shall be broken by Christianity. 
Here a true Christian conviction was seen as the only way to civilization: 
“No man can become a Christian in the true sense of the term, however 
savage he may have been before, without becoming a civilised man” (East 
1844, 243). Hence, for the missionaries, a true Christian conviction was the 
kernel of civilization from which all other benets sprung. Nevertheless, 
if necessary, the missionaries were prepared to discuss Christianity from 
a secular position, using, for instance, the register of economic rationality. 
To put it bluntly, Christianity was vital in terms of salvation, but it was also 
protable, although to compare Christian religion with the fetishism of the 
Asante from the ‘neutral’ vantage point of the economy is certainly a very 
modern stance and, I would assume, inconceivable for the clergymen of 
earlier eras. It exemplies what Taylor (2007, 12) has called “a disengaged 
standpoint”, in which one is able to see oneself “as occupying one standpoint 
among a range of possible ones”, something which is characteristic of 
modern secularism.
Early contact
In the pre-Enlightenment era, conquest and conversion had been fellow 
travellers: from the expansion of the Christian Roman Empire originating in 
the early fourth century, to the conquest of America by the Roman Catholic 
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kings of Spain and Portugal, the conversion of ‘pagan peoples’ to Christianity 
had been a part of a state policy. Later, however, the major colonial powers 
in Africa promoted Christianity only indirectly and sometimes even 
discouraged it (Peel 1978, 445–446). Protestant missionary work as an 
ongoing and consistent activity emerged only at the end of the eighteenth 
century and, as indicated above, it was detached from the political projects 
of the states (van Rooden 1997, 66–67). Furthermore, unlike their Catholic 
predecessors, the nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries who arrived 
in Asante were not interested in converting ‘pagan kingdoms’ through their 
kings (see Addo-Fenning 2003, 193–198). e unit of salvation was the 
individual soul, not the whole polity, and conversion as well as civilization 
was thought to happen from bottom to top. 
e establishment of Christian missionary work in Asante preceded 
the British occupation, but the missions were not able to consolidate their 
position there before the full imposition of colonial rule at the turn of the 
twentieth century. e Asante had already come in contact with Christianity 
during the eighteenth century through the Dutch (Debrunner 1967, 75–76), 
and, consequently, when T. E. Bowdich, an ocer of the British African 
Company, arrived in Kumasi with the rst ever British diplomatic mission 
to Asante in 1817, he encountered a Dutch bible and a copy of Refutation 
of Popery (ibid., 101). However, concrete missionary work among the 
Asante did not start until the two visits to Kumasi in 1839 and 1841 by 
the Wesleyan-Methodist, the Reverend T. B. Freeman, during which time 
Asantehene Kwaku Dua Panin granted the Methodists permission to build 
a mission house in the capital, and negotiations about opening a school were 
started (Freeman 1968 [1844], 1–181). Six months aer Freeman’s rst visit, 
Danish Basel missionary Andreas Riis had also travelled to Kumasi, but was 
turned down and “came back with the impression that we had to wait for 
better hints from the Lord” (quoted in Kimble 1963, 152). Although their 
usual activities, such as arranging church services, running the school, and 
occasional public preaching on the streets, were protected by the king (e 
Missionary Chronicle 1845, vol. xiii, 16), the Wesleyan missionaries gained 
very limited and closely supervised access to the life of the kingdom. eir 
movements within the capital city, and Asante in general, were strictly 
monitored and regulated. e slow processing of requests and pleas to the 
king and his chiefs was also a constant source of frustration for missionaries 
eager to proceed with their work (e.g. Freeman 1968 [1844], 37–71). 
Moreover, the Asante subjects seemed to know that anything more than 
supercial curiosity about the new religion would not be acceptable. For 
instance, in 1850 John Owusu-Ansa56 wrote to Freeman that “[t]he people of 
56 By the terms of the 1831 peace treaty between the Asante and the British, Asantehene 
Osei Yaw Akoto had to deliver two Asante ‘princes’ to the care of the British (Wilks 
1975, 190). Consequently, Owusu Ansa, a son of Asantehene Osei Bonsu, and 
Owusu Nkwantabisa, a son of Osei Yaw, were taken to Britain, where they received 
an English education. ey were repatriated in 1841 and travelled to Kumasi with 
Freeman (ibid., 204). Owusu Ansa worked as a catechist in charge of the Kumasi 
mission for some time in the early 1850s. He later withdrew from missionary work 
and became a ‘royal secretary’ at the Asantehene’s court (ibid., 597–600). 
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Kumasi are in a state of slavery under their masters; they indeed listen to the 
preaching of the Gospel with attentive ear, and they know the freeness and 
happiness of those who embrace it; yet they so dread their masters that they 
will not come forward” (e Wesleyan Missionary Notices 1852, vol. x, 9). 
Despite great optimism in its rst stages,57 the early Methodist missionary 
project in Asante was a failure. It produced only a handful of converts (see 
McCaskie 1995, 391–392) and the work was constantly interrupted and 
hindered by illness, language problems, and visits to the coast or Europe. 
From the early 1850s onwards, the mission house in Kumasi was occupied 
only by a local hired caretaker (e Wesleyan Missionary Notices, August 25, 
1862, 149). Finally, as relations between the Asante and the British worsened 
in the 1860s (Wilks 1975, 598–599), the likelihood of carrying on mission 
work in Asante became more and more improbable (Kimble 1963, 153). 
It is hard to say anything conclusive about the initial opinion of Christianity 
by the pre-colonial elite, or what exactly they thought Christianity was.58 More 
than anything else, the Asante rulers seem to have been concerned about the 
impact that schools would have on the younger generations. From their point 
of view, missionary education was liable to make young people “rebellious”, 
“disobedient”, or “troublesome” (Freeman 1968 [1844], 150–151, 168–169). 
Furthermore, the missionaries’ position on the total abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade, and the prohibition of human sacrice was considered 
troubling (ibid., 131–132, 164–165). Consequently, it is dicult to avoid the 
question: why was the missionary project tolerated in the rst place? One 
interpretation given by the historians is that the missionaries had “practical 
utility” for the Asante who saw them as suitable intermediaries in the context 
of political relations and trade with the Europeans on the coast (McCaskie 
1995, 136–137). ey were needed as peacemakers to “help the peace of the 
nation and the prosperity of trade”, as Asantehene Mensa Bonsu put it in 1876 
(Debrunner 1967, 180). Indeed, the missionaries did deliver messages about 
“secular business”, as Freeman (1968 [1844], 178) called it, between Asante 
and the coast, and some of the information gathered by them was used for 
military intelligence purposes by the British (Wilks 1975, 597). Publicly the 
missionaries insisted on having a neutral, ‘apolitical’ role and merely asked 
the Asantehene to adopt a tolerant attitude towards missionary work. For 
57 In their journals and reports the missionaries oen had a tendency to interpret 
the curiosity and compliments of the Asante as signs of far-reaching acceptance 
of Christian teachings. For instance, in 1844 the Reverend G. Chapman was 
convinced that “many respectable and inuential persons in the town [Kumasi] 
entertain the conviction that Christianity will eectually accomplish its great 
design; and, eventually surmounting all opposition, become the religion of the 
land”. Apparently, this conclusion was based on a rather imprecise comment made 
by an unidentied old chief, who had told Chapman that the Asantehene had 
discussed the mission with his chiefs in a favourable tone (e Baptist Missionary 
Magazine 1844, vol. xxiv, 324). 
58 See, for example, Asantehene Ko Kakari’s attendants’ enigmatic statement (“It 
is the Word of God, and had better remain unopened”) about a copy of New 
Testament presented to the king by the Basel missionaries (Ramseyer and Kühne 
1875, 134) and McCaskie’s (1972, 36) interpretation of it. 
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instance, in 1862, the Reverend William West pleaded to Asantehene Kwaku 
Dua Panin for permission to reopen the Wesleyan mission house in Kumasi 
by stating the following: 
I told them, that, […] I wished […] to ascertain the mind of the King with regard 
to our Mission; that I was desirous of impressing upon the mind of the King 
that we had nothing whatever to do with politics, or the aairs of the Government, 
but were solely engaged in spreading the Christian religion, which we know to be 
of God; that in fact we had no other end in view. I ventured to express a hope, 
that, as our only object was the happiness and salvation of his people, he would 
in no way oppose the preaching of the Gospel, nor hinder his people in making 
a profession of Christianity. (e Wesleyan Missionary Notices, August 25, 1862, 
157–158; italics added)
Conversely, discussions with the missionaries and observing their behaviour 
provided the Asante a sort of keyhole view onto the European way of life and 
aairs on the coast (see, e.g., Freeman 1968 [1844], 138–143). One could also 
speculate on the extent to which the Asante chiefs thought of encompassing 
Christianity (see Comaro and Comaro 1991, 265) by making the clergy 
and the church institutions a part of the indigenous state structure, as 
had happened earlier in the case of Islam. e Muslims (Nkramofoɔ, sing. 
Kramo), both from Asante and of outside origin, had their own niches in 
the pre-colonial state structure and hence Islam was a part of, rather than 
a threat to, the prevailing order (Owusu-Ansah 1987; see Taylor 1998, 47).59
Whatever the Asante kings’ interest in Christianity had originally 
been, towards the end of the nineteenth century their tolerance had 
become resentment. In 1874 a British expeditionary force invaded and 
looted Kumasi (e.g. Lewin 1978, 43–47). e Asante kingdom retained its 
sovereignty, but it had to be constantly wary of British interference and 
the threat of permanent military occupation. is was also a time of local 
rebellions against the Kumasi-based central authority (ibid., 85–109). e 
relationship between the Asante and Christian missions was also altered: 
during the last two decades of the pre-colonial period some missionaries 
worked independently in southern Asante against a direct injunction from 
Kumasi (see, e.g., Debrunner 1967, 180–181). However, missions had to wait 
for the nal downfall of the kingdom in 1901 to get a permanent foothold 
59 e Asante came in contact with Islam through their northern tributaries and 
trading partners. Probably from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, a community 
of Muslims lived in Kumasi and worked as scribes, annalists, and physicians in the 
Asantehene’s court (Wilks 1975, 344–345). e rst Imam of Asante, who prayed 
for the king and acted as his spiritual advisor, was appointed by Asantehene Kwaku 
Dua in the 1840s (ibid., 277–278). According to McCaskie (1995, 389), the Muslim 
inuence in Asante politics during the pre-colonial period has been exaggerated in 
twentieth-century histories. For instance, the famous claim that Asantehene Osei 
Kwame had secretly converted to Islam and been deposed for that reason is not 
supported by most sources. Accordingly, the Muslim community in Asante was not 
proselytizing although many Islamic ideas and practices were incorporated into the 
indigenous beliefs and rituals. 
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in the whole of Asante and fully start proselytizing work. Before discussing 
Christian conversion and its implications, however, it is important to take 
a closer look at what was understood by fetishism: a term used to describe 
and explain the Asante religion by Europeans.
All-embracing fetish
According to William Pietz (1987, 23–24) the idea of fetishism originated 
in a mercantile intercultural space between European traders and their 
West African counterparts from the eenth century onwards. e 
merchants saw the essential element of African culture to be the Africans’ 
way of personifying material objects and thus misconceiving natural causal 
relations. Consequently, they found it dicult to regard the Africans as 
‘rational’ trading partners since the latter were ignorant of the ‘real’ nature 
and value of things. Later on, fetishism was also seen as a form of social 
and political organization, where the ‘irrational primitives’ were ruled by 
their immoral ‘fetish priests’, who used people’s fear of the ‘fetish gods’ to 
promote their self-interest. us the unequal distribution of material goods 
in African societies resulted from a powerful religious illusion. Social 
theorists of the European Enlightenment era highlighted the immorality of 
fetishism and juxtaposed African society, allegedly ordered by the interests 
of religious elites, with a truly enlightened society organized according to 
rational principles (Pietz 1988, 105–106). During the missionary era of the 
nineteenth century fetishism became closely associated with the religious 
human sacrice of West African states and the institution of slavery, as the 
slaves were the primary victims of sacrice. is was contrasted with the 
European civilizations’ supposedly truer respect for the value of human 
life (Pietz 1995, 23–34). e linkage between fetishism and sacrice also 
brought the kings and chiefs closer to fetishism, since performing sacrices 
was explicitly their duty. 
However, here I wish to draw attention to the all-embracing quality of 
fetishism, which not only puzzled Western observers, but also proved highly 
problematic for the early African converts to Christianity. For the Europeans, 
the fetish seemed to be omnipresent, pervading all categories of nature and 
society and, therefore, it was hard to see what actually constituted ‘African 
religion’. Major A. B. Ellis (1966 [1887]), stationed in West Africa with the 
First West India Regiment, noted, for example, that “[r]eligion is not with 
them [the Akan peoples], as with civilised peoples, a matter outside one’s 
daily life; it is a subject which aects and inuences in some degree almost 
every action of their daily life, and which is closely interwoven with all their 
habits, customs, and modes of thought”. Similarly, Henry Meredith (1812, 
34), the governor of the British fort in Winneba, described the religious 
life of “the natives of the Gold-coast” by pointing out that “[t]heir object of 
worship, no matter what it is, goes by the indenite term, Fetish”. According 
to Meredith, it was impossible to say precisely what “the object of worship” 
actually was, because 
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Fetish is a word of great license, and applied in great variety of ways: it frequently 
means anything forbidden. One man refuses to eat a white fowl, another a black 
one; saying, “it is fetish!” ere are places into which they do not wish a White 
man to enter; enquire, Why? ey are fetish! To kill an alligator, or a leopard, is 
fetish in some places. If a person be poisoned, or unwell, in a way they cannot 
account for; it is fetish! In lieu of an oath to prove truth of any assertion, they take 
fetish. (Ibid., 35; italics in the original)
Although deliberately exaggerated, this quote strikingly exemplies the 
problem of delineation. It seemed that anything and everything could have 
a religious meaning. Africans themselves, on the other hand, did not share 
this feeling of confusion. e explanation about the importance of fetishes in 
Asante society given by Asantehene Mensa Bonsu to a Wesleyan-Methodist 
missionary, the Reverend omas Picot, is highly illuminating in this 
sense. Picot arrived in the Asante capital Kumasi in April 1876 requesting 
permission to carry out missionary work and, what is more, demanding that 
the king grant the “liberty of conscience” to all Asante people (McCaskie 
1995, 139–142; Mobley 1970, 25). In his reply, the Asantehene turned down 
the request by explaining meticulously why the Asante could not abandon 
their fetishes: 
It is a tradition among us that Ashantis are made to know that they are subjects, 
altogether under the power of their King, and they can never be allowed liberty of 
conscience. e Bible is not a book for us. […] Our fetishes are God’s interpreters 
to us. If God requires a human sacrice or a sheep, He tells our fetishes, and they 
tell us, and we give them. ey tell us too where the gold is with which we trade. 
We know God already ourselves, and we cannot do without human sacrices. 
 … [W]e will never embrace your religion, for it would make our people proud. 
It is your religion that has ruined the Fanti country, weakened their power and 
brought down the high man on a level of a low man. e God of the white man 
and of the Fantis is dierent from the God of the Ashantis and we cannot do 
without our fetishes. (Quoted in McCaskie 1995, 140)
Mensa Bonsu’s views were supported by Bantamahene Kwabena Awua, who 
also added:
e Fantis can do without polygamy, and without slaves, but we cannot. As men 
dier in complexion so in religion. Your God is not like Our God… if you send 
in twenty missionaries, you will not get one Ashanti man to be a Christian. (Ibid.)
It would be interesting to know how terms like ‘liberty of conscience’ and 
‘religion’ were translated and understood by the king and his councillors 
and, consequently, what sort of conceptual common ground existed between 
the missionary and the king. Nevertheless, in Mensa Bonsu’s and Kwabena 
Awua’s response there are several interesting points concerning the place 
of ‘religion’ in Asante. First of all, they single out the two major types of 
exchange and distribution of spiritual powers: sacrice and marriage. It is 
made adamantly clear that giving up human sacrice and polygamy would 
severe the tie between the spirit world and the living and consequently 
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‘weaken their power’. e society described in Chapter 1 would simply cease 
to exist. erefore, what the Christian God “liked, and what he disliked”, 
as one chief put it to the Reverend Freeman (1968 [1844], 20), were not 
viewed as compatible with tradition. Secondly, the Asantehene states quite 
plainly that the acceptance of Christianity would eventually collapse two 
important divisions in Asante society: that between chiefs and their subjects 
and that between free men and slaves. Since the Christian Asante would no 
longer revere their ancestors, there would be no distinction between people 
with ancestors and those without. As one would expect, in such a situation 
dierences generated by the ‘greatness’ of one’s ancestors would also become 
meaningless. e ‘high man’ would indeed be no dierent from the ‘low 
man’. Consequently, there could be no such thing as a Christian Asante 
kingdom as the new religion would simply erase the foundations of the 
lineages and oces. e missionaries, on the other hand, certainly wanted 
to put an end to human sacrice, slavery, and polygamy, but seemed to have 
no objections to the ‘temporal power’ of the chiefs. In their sermons to, or 
conversations with, the chiefs, the missionaries emphasised the “folly of the 
heathenish observances” and the “gracious inuence of His Holy Spirit” on 
their hearts, but they never said or even insinuated that a Christian society 
would somehow be a leaderless society (e.g., ibid., 14-28). It seems that from 
their point of view a Christian Asante nation would be governed by kings 
and chiefs just as Christian England was ruled by the English monarchs and 
aristocrats. irdly, the Asantehene’s answer to the missionaries links the 
fetishes to material production and commerce but in an entirely dierent 
way to earlier perceptions of this relationship by Europeans. From the Asante 
point of view, the gold that was used in commerce with the Europeans was 
discovered by the fetishes and for that reason trade would not be possible 
without them (see also Guyer 2004, 11; Ofosu-Mensah 2010, 130–132).  
e missionary view of fetishism diered from that of merchants, soldiers, 
administrators, and the like. On the one hand, they could agree that fetishism 
was just an illusion inside the heads of the Africans and hence the spirits to 
whom the Asante made sacrices did not exist. erefore, a missionary only 
needed to convince converts that the traditional ideas were false in order 
to liberate their minds (see, e.g., e Friend of Africa, August 1841, 153–
155, 158). On the other hand, fetishism was seen to represent true evil and 
therefore it should be fought against and avoided (see, e.g., Ramsayer and 
Kühne 1875, 169). As a result, the fundamental problem for conversion was 
that, since fetishism was all-embracing, how could one possibly avoid it? If 
Christian conversion is marked by change, rupture, and discontinuity, what 
actually can be salvaged from the past, or does everything have to change? 
Here one can see a link to the situation described by Dumont (1992 [1986], 
23–59) in his treatment of the process of an “outworldly individual” becoming 
an “inworldly individual”. As spiritual salvation is considered an “outworldly” 
matter and this world is not only seen as worthless in that respect, but also 
potentially dangerous and diabolical, the relationship between the Christian 
and the world has to be thoroughly reassessed; and the rst requirement for 
a Christian (Ɔkristoni, pl. Kristofoɔ) to live in a world lled with fetishes was 
the disenchantment of nature. ‘Sacralizing’ or ‘personifying’ plants, animals, 
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bodies of water, rocks, and so on, became perceived as a misunderstanding 
(see Kyei 2001, 46). Consequently, sacred animals could be hunted, sacred 
rivers shed, and the catch of both could be eaten (see Dunn and Robertson 
1973, 133–137). e devil was not in nature. It should be noted that the 
introduction of the idea of ‘physical nature’ as something dierentiated from 
the social world is an enormous issue, certainly meriting treatment of its 
own (see Meyer 1997; also Comaro and Comaro 1991, 200–213), whereas 
here I have only briey indicated it as a prerequisite for the second stage: 
(re-)entering the society of ‘pagans’ as a Christian individual. e rest of the 
chapter focuses on that question.
Conversion
Aer 1901, when Asante was permanently placed under British occupation, 
both the Wesleyan-Methodist and Basel missions started operating there by 
special invitation from the Governor (Mobley 1970, 25).60 ey were soon 
joined by a Roman Catholic mission (Obeng 1996, 108–109). e early 
missions made slow yet steady progress, although most of their churches 
and schools were primarily attended by non-Asantes. For instance, in 
1912, aer a good ten years of missionary work, only two percent of the 
total population had converted (Colonial reports No. 771). Although the 
missions were independent ‘enterprises’, separate from the ocial colonial 
establishment (Dunn and Robertson 1973, 122–125), the slow conversion 
of the Asante reected the general hostility towards the military occupation. 
e Asante had never seen “the Church as an agency with separate existence, 
diering in purpose, from that of the other European agencies like trading 
rms and governments” (Bartels 1965, 113). Aer all, there had been nothing 
corresponding to these institutions in indigenous pre-colonial society and 
the rst European missionaries to visit Asante had been accompanied by 
soldiers, carrying letters from the British government on the Gold Coast 
(ibid.). More importantly, however, the resentment must have had to do 
with the fact that the teachings and way of life endorsed by the missions put 
the converts very radically at odds with their communities. 
e missionaries understood their work in terms of calling the converts 
from ‘pagan’ associations and surroundings to a Christian way of life by all 
means possible. is notion of rupture, characteristic of many Christian 
groups, also fuelled in a very important sense the transformations of larger 
society that were to take place. Using scriptural injunctions, the missionaries 
insisted that the converts had to be, at least spiritually, separated from their 
old allegiances and live apart as individual men and women; the Basel 
missionaries, for example, oen referred to the instructions of 2 Corinthians, 
60 e German and Swiss personnel of the Basel mission were deported by the British 
authorities during World War I and their work was continued by the United Free 
Church of Scotland Mission. In 1925 the Basel Mission was permitted to resume 
its work in Asante and a year later the Basel and Scottish Missions united under the 
name Presbyterian Church of the Gold Coast (Debrunner 1967, 279–294). 
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Chapter 6, wherein the Christians were told to separate themselves from 
the “indels” and not to touch the “unclean” (Williamson 1965, 56).61 
However, in a social setting where the spirit world was all pervasive, an 
attempt to separate oneself from it spiritually could ultimately mean that 
one had to abandon it completely because every aspect of Asante society 
could be brought under suspicion and condemned by the new order. Even 
such fundamental and, at rst sight, commonplace matters as village living 
arrangements could become an insurmountable problem. Customarily, 
as described in Chapter 1, every Asante village or town was divided into 
quarters, where the members of a single lineage were supposed to live in 
several households. e lineages also had their own burial grounds in the 
same locality. Each of these quarters was under the protection of its own 
ancestors and gods and was directed by the elders responsible for the ritual 
veneration of these spirits as well as the chief (Debrunner 1967, 198). 
Consequently, for the Christians, even everyday activities in the domestic 
circle with relatives could put them in contact with fetishes. Sometimes 
this was avoided by moving the Christians from their ‘ancestral quarters’ to 
detached settlements, new communities that were called Salems, Jerusalems, 
61 e books of Corinthians are still referred to by many Christian Ghanaians when 
discussing their relationship to traditional cosmology. Also some passages from 
the Old Testament, especially Exodus (Chapter 20) on “serving carved images” and 
Isaiah (Chapter 44) on the “the absurdity of idolatry” are oen brought up.
“Our boys in their ‘Sunday best.’ (The girls do not reside in the house.)” (TNA CO 
1069/33). The Reverend Dennis Kemp and Mrs. Kemp of the Wesleyan Missionary 
Society photographed with boarders of a mission school in the Gold Coast. Kemp 
travelled to British-occupied Kumasi in 1896 in order to re-commence proselytization 
work in the Asante capital (see Kemp 1898, 235–264).
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or ‘White man’s towns’.62 Hence, the idea of ‘religious separation’ led to an 
actual physical separation. ere, drawn away from their past lives, they 
entered a new type of society, built around the mission house, the church, 
and the school, where new ideals and concepts were expressed in terms of 
European culture (Williamson 1965, 56–57; Mobley 1970, 73–80). Although 
it has to be remembered that these changes touched only a small minority 
of the Asante people, and not even all Asante Christians, it is clear that such 
radical renunciation of society – and indeed of personhood – as it had been 
previously understood must have had a widespread shock eect. According 
to one critical observer, Christianity meant externality:
e eect of the separateness of the two towns was to make the people look upon 
becoming a Christian as a physical act embracing the bodily removal of one’s 
person from the heathen to the Christian town, the sending away of all but one 
of the convert’s wives, and the normal upkeep of one’s attendance at prayers and 
services of the Church. From the earliest times it became a fad to be a Christian. 
Christians were those who were free of restraints and taboos of the heathen town, 
and as they thought, of the authority and rule of princes of this earth. (Danquah 
1928, 90, quoted in Mobley 1970, 75) 
In the early decades of the colonial rule the government received 
a considerable number of complaints from chiefs whose converted subjects 
refused to heed their summons or to provide services on the grounds that 
service to the chief was ‘fetish worship’ (Busia 1951 [1968], 133–135; Tordo 
1965, 197–198). “I now go to church, I am not under the chief ”, was a 
common reply from the converts when asked why they refused to provide 
their services (Busia 1951 [1968], 137). At worst, these dierences led to 
violent altercations between the Christians and ‘traditionalists’ (Tordo 1965, 
197–198). Furthermore, there was evidence that some people had turned to 
Christianity in the rst place in order to avoid their traditional obligations. 
Some were said to be Christians in name only who had converted for ‘worldly 
gain’ – in order to avoid paying taxes collected by the chiefs, for example. It 
was also understood that the introduction of cocoa, a cash crop that required 
a low labour input, was making people selsh and greedy, and conversion 
to Christianity provided a way for some of the newly rich cocoa farmers “to 
protect their money” from the claims of their kinsmen and chiefs (Allman 
and Tashijan 2000, 28–39).63 In some places it was reported that opposition 
62 e establishment of segregated Christian communities was a characteristic of the 
Basel mission. However, the Wesleyan mission houses were also located apart from 
the villages (Mobley 1970, 75).
63 In addition to economic motives, some scholars have also discussed Christian 
conversion in Asante as a weapon in factional politics (Robertson and Dunn 1973, 
135); as abandonment of an unfavourable social status (ibid., 125); and as a part of 
achieving the standing of a ‘modern person’ in one’s community (McCaskie 1986, 
12; 2000a, 114–123). I do not have any objections to these interpretations as none of 
them maintain that conversion could be explained solely by these factors. However, 
it is important to point out how the “utilitarian” and “intellectualist” approaches to 
conversion should not be understood as opposites, but rather as complementary 
views addressing dierent stages of the conversion process (Robbins 2004a, 84–88). 
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to a particular chief had taken the form of conversion, and subsequently 
a wholesale rejection of chiey rule (Tordo 1965, 197–198). In 1905 the 
governor of the Gold Coast wrote: 
e tendency of Christian converts to alienate themselves from the communities 
to which they belong is very marked, and is naturally resented by the chiefs, who 
claim their hereditary right, in which they are supported by Government, to 
make the converts in common with their fellow tribesmen obey such laws and 
orders as are in accordance with native custom, not being repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience. (Quoted in Busia 1951 [1968], 133–134)
Roughly een years later, as the number of converts underwent a sudden 
increase, the chief commissioner of colonial Ashanti started to doubt the 
benets of Christian conversion if it broke the fabric of traditional society: 
In fact in certain parts of Ashanti something in the nature of a “mass movement” 
towards Christianity has set in. It may be, and Missionaries are alive to this 
fact, that such a movement has attendant dangers. Possibly set native habits of 
morality and the valuable and it may be the inspired elements in native religion 
will be cast aside in an access of momentary enthusiasm without anything lasting 
or substantial to take their place. (Colonial Reports No. 1142)
 
ese developments presented a dilemma for the British ocials who tried 
to implement indirect rule – a policy of conserving African society and 
culture and ruling the colonial subjects through traditional institutions – but 
who also had to facilitate Christian missionary work. e missions wanted 
to stay out of ‘politics’, as they understood it, but did not want their religion 
to become branded as subversive and assisted the government to enforce 
the principle that Christians cannot shirk “ordinary obligations imposed on 
them by native custom” (Tordo 1965, 198).
Separating religion and politics
e colonial authorities tried to come up with a solution for the conict 
in 1912, when the governor of the Gold Coast visited Asante. He met 
a committee consisting of the chief commissioner, three other government 
ocials, and representatives of the Christian missions: Wesleyan, Basel, and 
Roman Catholic missionaries. is committee, comprising only European 
members, drew up rules for the chiefs and the churches. e two rules 
regulating chief-subject relations were: 
1.  No Christian shall be called upon to perform any fetish rites or 
service, but shall be bound to render customary service to his chief on 
ceremonial occasions when no element of fetish practice is involved
2.  An eort should be made to draw a distinction between fetish and 
purely ceremonial service. (Quoted in Busia 1968 [1951], 134)
90
3. Conversion to citizenship
When a Christian convert refused to perform a service required of him 
on the ground that it was fetish, the district commissioners were to decide 
whether this was the case or not (ibid.). Furthermore, it was reiterated that 
all Christians were under the jurisdiction of their chiefs’ courts which they 
had to attend when summoned (Allman and Tashijan 2000, 31). It would be 
dicult to list all the things that nally became included in the category of 
fetishism and thus not mandatory for the Christians, but what is important 
is that a real attempt was made to separate in detail the religious from the 
political and thus secularize the Asante chieaincy. However, the separation 
remained vague, to say the least, and the district commissioners dealt with 
a wide variety cases. A Gold Coast-based ocial described a case received 
in his court on “a typical day”:
Next is a case of assault, which is defended, half a dozen prisoners being paraded. 
e complainant states that he has lately become a Christian, and therefore holds 
that he is not liable to answer the company [i.e. group for communal work] call to 
go and cut thatch grass. e company objected, and, according to native custom, 
tied him up and ned him 5s. As he can show no marks of violence, he is told 
that the fact that he is a Christian does not appear a valid reason, to the court, 
for shirking his share of work for the public good, and the case is referred to the 
native tribunal. (Freeman 1919, 29)
Although for the commissioner this was just another case among the thes, 
burglaries, and other minor oences, it clearly demonstrates the sort of 
disintegrative potential the committee’s ruling had brought with it. Since 
the whole of social life was immersed in religious meaning, a Christian 
convert could potentially reject any sort of activity or relationship on the 
basis that it was fetishism. e colonial ocial’s task was then to point out 
that cutting grass, for instance, is ‘work’, not fetishism. For the commissioner 
such distinctions were patently obvious, and indierence to the fullment 
of such obligations implied shirking, laziness or, what is worse, mutiny, 
but for the community in his jurisdiction all these small verdicts had real 
structural implications. One can certainly ponder whether the refusal to cut 
grass was a genuine issue of private religious conviction for the convert or 
a form of everyday resistance against both traditional obligations and colonial 
authorities under a religious pretext, but here the most important issue to 
note is that such arguments were reasonable enough for some people. Aer 
all, it is not in any way obvious that Christians have to cut grass.  
Despite this noticeable open-endedness, the committee’s ruling seems to 
have claried the relationship between chiefs and their Christian subjects 
to some extent. In the year following the ruling, the chief commissioner 
of Ashanti wrote that the new rules “have so far had the eect of lessening 
the breach between the factions” and that relations now showed a “decided 
improvement” (Colonial reports No. 771). At least in some locales peaceful 
co-existence between the town and the Salem seems to have been achieved. 
An old school master reminisced how in his childhood during the 1910s the 
chief was a respected gure even among the Christians:
91
Christian citizens
It was the practice that the Ɔhene of Agogo and his Stool Elders went to church 
in State on the New Year’s Day to join the Christians to worship God. e 
admonition sternly made by the Catechist, and repeated several times, to the 
eect that members of the congregation should show their respect for their earthly 
ruler by full and punctual attendance at that particular day, was heeded obligingly. 
(Kyei 2001, 146; italics added)
e isolation of Christian communities within towns and villages remained 
a heated topic up until the 1950s (Mobley 1970, 71–77). Similarly, the debate 
about the ‘customary services’ mandatory for the Christians continued 
throughout the colonial period. Substantial ambiguity remained, even 
aer the government’s rulings, and disputes about the borderline between 
religion and politics persisted. 
Christian citizens
e Christians did not merely refuse to obey; they also had propositions 
about their own position in the social world in which they lived, in which, 
in a very concrete manner, a ‘rights-bearing individual’ was placed at the 
centre of society. Ever since the converts had been freed from ‘fetish services’ 
by the colonial government, a person’s ‘free choice’ of religion had started 
to determine the nature of relationships with his / her chief. Consequently, 
the previously dominant traditional view of the ‘constitution’ of the Asante 
polity had been challenged (which was, of course, directly contrary to what 
the administrators thought they were doing). To put it another way, the 
Christian Asante of the early colonial period were depicted increasingly as 
‘citizens’ of their natal chiefdoms.
One well-known instance took place in 1942, when Christian clergy, both 
European and local, submitted a petition to the Asantehene in which they 
requested that Christians should not be forced to treat ursdays as days of 
rest. Previously, the Asantehene and his council had decreed that farm work 
on ursdays, a sacred weekday for the Asante ‘earth-goddess’ Asase Yaa, was 
an oence (Busia 1951 [1968], 135). e petition was titled “Memorandum 
on the relation between Christians and the State” and it argued that the 
converts were loyal to their chiefs but could not rest on ursdays because 
Sunday was already their holy day. e petition was eventually turned down 
by the king, but it illustrated how a group of people that had been constantly 
growing in numbers was thinking about their relationship to their rulers. 
e three quotes that follow are from the memorandum and they reveal 
some notable changes in the ways the traditional state was conceptualized:
On the part of the chiefs we would ask that they accept as a fact the existence of 
Christians as members of their State and lay down ways by which they can show 
their allegiance to their chiefs without at the same time oending their Christian 
conscience (e.g. if a chief orders community work, say on roads, to take place 
on a Sunday as being the day most suitable to the majority of his subjects, he 
might at the same time state that Christians may do their share of the work on 
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the preceding Saturday. is taking of the initiative by the chief in remembering 
those of his subjects who are Christians would, we believe, go a long way towards 
relieving the strained feeling at present existing in such matters). 
 We believe that the Christian Community is large enough for the State to be 
the loser if Christians are cut o from a share in the country’s political life. If no 
recognized place exists in Native Customary Law for those who do not believe in 
‘fetish’, has not the time come in view of many changing circumstances for the 
adaptation of Native Customary Law in order that it may include in its provisions 
all loyal citizens?
 Against this background we look at the position of Christians in relation to the 
observance of ursday. We recognize that this is an observance closely linked 
with ancient beliefs of the Ashanti people; beliefs which, however, are not to our 
mind wholly compatible with the Christian belief in God. Our members, if they 
observe the day, cannot do so for the ancient Ashanti reason. e question arises 
should they be asked to observe the day out of respect for the beliefs of others in the 
community. We feel that we cannot ask this of our members, in that to refrain 
from work on ursday would be to them a confession of faith in Asase Yaa and 
her relation to harvest and famine and therefore a denial of the Fatherhood and 
providential care of God. A like diculty of conscience holds in relation to other 
special days and observances which have a similar signicance to Asase Yaa. If, 
however, the chief reason behind this observance is not so much the association 
with Asase Yaa as a desire for some communal act to express the unity of the 
nation, we would ask whether there is not some other act of allegiance in which 
the Christians could take part; an act which would not place the working life of 
farmers under the disadvantage of refraining from work on two days in the week. 
(Quoted in Busia 1968 [1951], 220–222; italics added)
First of all, allegiance and conscience are separated, which corresponds to the 
divisions between politics and religion as well as citizenship and humanity 
as an attribute of the individual. In fact, the word citizen is used here, along 
with terms like subject and member of a state. Secondly, when referring to 
‘traditional religion’ it is spoken of as a “belief of others in the community”, 
which entails the idea of religion as a private matter that does not concern 
the community as a whole but rather each of its members separately. irdly, 
when a “communal act to express the unity of the nation” is discussed, the 
authors of the memorandum seem to put forth an idea that the community 
exists as the result of a conscious eort by the individuals that comprise it. 
In an indirect way this relates to the notion of contract, since the Christians 
see themselves here as negotiating how their individual contributions to 
unity should be channelled. It is also implied that the state is a sum of its 
individual members, given that it is predicted that the state would actually 
lose if Christians were excluded from it. 
Here one is able to see how the Christian element of Asante society had 
developed its own individualistic understanding of chieaincy, which on 
the surface could look very much like traditional holistic chieaincy, but 
which ultimately rested on an entirely dierent foundation. From the point 
of view of the missionaries and administrators, the kings and chiefs were 
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religious rulers of their ‘traditionalist’ subjects in the sense that they shared 
the same faith – much like modern-era British monarchs who had retained 
their positions as the head of the church although their rule was no longer 
based on divine right (see Dumont 1992 [1986], 71). Christian converts 
could live their lives unaected by the putative divinity of the chiey oce, 
but politically they were still subjects of their chief and this was to be 
their primary identity. Here we can see political allegiance (or nationality) 
departing from religion and it is becoming a concern for everyone (including 
the Christian believer) that the latter is not allowed to violate the former (see 
Asad 2003, 181–194). What should be specically emphasized is that this 
new conception was not limited only to the position of Christians: it covered 
the whole polity and thus the non-Christian members of the community 
were depicted as ‘people who believed in the fetish’ as though they had also 
selected to exercise their right to freedom of conscience and, in consequence, 
merely subscribed to a dierent set of beliefs than the Christians. Hence, 
at the outset, both the convert and the traditionalist were ‘citizens’ of their 
chiefdom or, to put it in the harsher parlance of indirect rule, they were rst 
and foremost ‘natives’ who lived under ‘native authority’.
Retrospectively, we are able to see that the discourse on rights, freedoms, 
citizenship, and contract had come to stay, and it has now become central 
in shaping the ways in which the Asante people see their own society. 
us it can be argued that the clash between the Christians and the chiefs 
in the early twentieth century has had a far reaching impact on Asante 
and Ghanaian society. In the next chapter I examine in closer detail the 
theoretical constructions created by both administrators and scholars who 
saw the Asante kingdom, and Akan polities in general, as states comprising 
citizenry, with kings and chiefs as their representatives or ‘political leaders’.
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C olonial sovereignty in Africa has oen been depicted as particularly  brutal and arbitrary. e late nineteenth-century scramble for the 
continent gave birth to a form of governance in which sovereignty was 
exercised “in an almost elementary form upon populations that a priori 
were reduced to the state of bare life” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 24; see 
Agamben 1998). Accordingly, in the case of Asante, some commentators 
presented the colonial conquest as a necessity arising from the savage nature 
of its inhabitants. Even as late as the 1930s a civil servant in the colonial 
oce wrote that the Asante had basically been “a set of war-like, rather 
truculent natives with an overweening belief in their own powers which, 
of course, they had to unlearn” (TNA CO 96 715/3a). e African colony 
became a “permanent zone of exception”, since its native inhabitants were not 
recognized as members of the “community of civilized men” and thus their 
administrators were not under any obligation to treat them according to the 
kind of laws that were applicable in their European home countries (Hansen 
and Stepputat 2006, 302–305; see Agamben 2005). In this setting the Christian 
missions saw themselves as “islands of order, aiming at imparting ‘civilization’ 
by more benevolent means” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 25). Nevertheless, 
the colonial administrators did not work in an ideological void and they 
were inclined to justify their plans and decisions by making references to 
social theories and ‘authentic’ information about ‘native customs’ provided 
by local informants. Even if the Africans were not considered civilized 
men and therefore not equals, their societies were thought to conform to 
the same evolutionary and social ‘laws’. Hence, as in other corners of the 
empire, the administrators of colonial Africa also furnished sociological and 
historical models of the ‘native societies’ they ruled (see Cohn 1983; Kaplan 
1990). In fact, colonial-era discussions of subjects such as “native authority” 
and “customary law”, which some contemporary political theorists see as 
the institutional foundation of “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani 1996, 
37–179), used ideas about the development of the modern state and its civil 
society as principal reference points. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, I must emphasize here that 
I do not wish to deny the atrocious and repressive nature of colonialism in 
practice, let alone claim that the ‘native states’ created by European powers 
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in Africa were somehow civil and democratic. Nor, on the other hand, am 
I claiming that the pre-colonial political formations were basically democratic 
or consensus-based, subsequently destroyed or distorted by colonialism, 
and possibly resurrected or rejuvenated at some future point. I am rather 
stressing that kingship and chieaincy became ‘politics’, partly because their 
formal legitimation in the colonial era was connected to Western ideas about 
how individuals organize themselves in groups, divide labour, elect leaders, 
make laws, and so on. is is by no means a simple matter and the objective 
of this chapter is to discuss the multiple ways chieaincy was understood to 
be political in the colonial period. 
Drawing the line between religion and politics in the missions and 
villages was a matter of complicated negotiations and contestations between 
the administrators, missionaries, chiefs, and converts. Piece by piece, from 
one situation to another, such things as attending court or participating 
in communal work were separated from the religious sphere of fetishism. 
Alongside this process, however, a theory of the Asante political system was 
developed. Its intellectual roots lay in British political thought of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the result of which was to award 
chieaincy an explicit conceptualization as a political institution. ese 
theories should not be assessed only as ideological products created to 
bolster the dierent projects of indirect rule, however, as they also formed 
the intellectual foundation of the politics of early Ghanaian nationalism. In 
what follows I begin by reviewing these theories, especially with regards the 
question of secular politics. e last part of the chapter is dedicated to the 
foremost instance in which the colonial government publicly invoked these 
theories in their reorganization of the Asante political system; that is, when 
the colonizers decided to ‘restore’ the pre-colonial Asante kingdom they had 
dissolved earlier.
Colonial folk models
Indirect rule was never really a politico-administrative dogma, but rather 
a practice that evolved during the British colonial endeavour, and therefore 
its ideological foundations lay not so much in any rigid codes, but in 
a worldview shared by the people who applied it. e colonial bureaucrats’ 
outlook reected the evolutionist model of human development that was 
characteristic of early twentieth-century social and political thought, and 
their decisions derived from and realized that model, one which assumed 
that the development of each individual and every society invariably 
repeated a single, linear evolutionary sequence. us the “primitive 
society” of backward African tribesmen would ultimately develop into 
a “civilized society” governed by rational thinking (Kuklick 1979, 44–48). 
e responsibility of the colonizing power was to safeguard and to a certain 
extent regulate this process. e change had to be gradual and any sudden, 
revolutionary leaps in progress were considered hazardous. As one of the 
chief advocates of indirect rule, Lord Lugard (1922, 211), put it, in order to 
“accord with natural evolution” the methods and institutions of the colonial 
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rule had to be deep-rooted in the “traditions and prejudices” of African 
peoples. Consequently, it was established that the forms of government best 
suited to Africans were those they had created for themselves. Traditional 
institutions should be modied by the colonizing power only when necessary 
for the main purpose of colonialism, the exploitation of the colonized 
country, or when the traditional institutions were repugnant to European 
morality (Crowder 1968, 168–169). 
e evolutionary view was consistent with the contemporary folk-
political theories to which the colonial rulers adhered, therefore it is best 
to start ideological consideration with a brief overview of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century British perceptions of state, society, and 
conquest. As Henrika Kuklick (1984, 60–61) has pointed out, during that 
period two “ideal-typical models” of political organization dominated 
the debates on the legitimacy of colonial rule as well as the fundamental 
nature of “primitive society”. e conservative viewpoint assumed that the 
capacity to rule other people was an inborn talent only possessed by a small 
number of individuals; social integration took place as the masses, led by the 
talented few, cooperated in order to achieve collective ends, while statuses 
and material rewards were distributed unevenly in society according to 
the unequal talents of individuals. Consequently, the legitimate form of 
government was a centralized state, ruled by a hereditary aristocracy which, 
in the British version of conservatism, placed a distinctive emphasis on the 
notion of conquest: specically, strong polities and advanced forms of social 
organization were created when superior conquering peoples subjugated and 
consolidated inferior peoples. e foremost historical example of this was 
the Norman conquest of Anglo-Saxon England in 1066, which was seen as 
a necessary condition for the birth of the English nation. e Anglo-Saxons 
had been a divided group of ‘barbarians’, which a more highly developed 
‘conqueror race’ united as a single nation, meanwhile bestowing the benets 
of civilization. Another important reference point took the discussants 
a thousand years further back in history and, much like the Norman 
conquest, it also represented a paradigm for British colonialism:
As Roman imperialism laid the foundations of modern civilisation, and led the 
wild barbarians of these islands along the path of progress, so in Africa to-day 
we are repaying the debt, and bringing to the dark places of the earth, the abode 
of barbarism and cruelty, the torch of culture and progress, while ministering to 
the material needs of our own civilisation. […] We hold these countries because 
it is the genius of our race to colonise, to trade, and to govern. e task in which 
England is engaged in the tropics – alike in Africa and in the East – has become 
part of her tradition, and she has ever given of her best in the cause of liberty and 
civilization. (Lugard 1922, 618–619)
e liberal position, on the other hand, believed that talent was distributed 
fairly and uniformly to all humans. Dierences in status could only be 
based on individual achievement rather than any kind of inborn talent 
or hereditary order. Such meritocratic dierences should never curtail 
the liberties of others, and the use of force to achieve political ends was 
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not considered legitimate. On the contrary, a legitimate government was 
based on a contractual agreement between individuals, and positions of 
leadership could be held only by the consent of those governed. From the 
liberal perspective, conquest and government based on force were illegal 
and ‘unnatural’. Furthermore, according to the more radical authors, 
the Norman conquest had destroyed traditional Anglo-Saxon political 
institutions, which, they argued, had embodied true democratic ideals. e 
inuential school of Whig history that held liberal values in high esteem 
sought to establish continuity in English history by arguing that although the 
Normans had originally triumphed through military force and established 
the aristocratic order, their rule of the island ultimately had to be based on 
the consent of the ruled. Hence an original mixture of the liberal and the 
conservative political models was born. Both the conservative and liberal 
models could be placed under the evolutionary umbrella: the dierence was 
whether the political evolution took a “militant” form, based on conquest, or 
an “industrial” form based on contract (Kuklick 1984, 61–62).
e colonial administrators relied on models like these when they 
mapped the types of peoples who inhabited the colonies and how they 
should ideally be governed. Africans were, as Lugard (1922, 72) put it, 
“a race which illustrates every stage in the evolution of human society, from 
[…] the lowest type of cannibal, to the organised despotism and barbaric 
display of a negro kingdom”. In the taxonomy of indirect rule, the latter 
belonged to the category of “advanced communities”, which should be 
granted self-government (ibid., 196–213), while “primitive tribes”, the type 
to which the former belonged, were not yet ready for that; rather, it was 
advisable for the administration “to hasten the transition” from the tribal 
stage by making them accept centralized chiey authority (ibid., 214–217). 
In the case of colonial Ghana, the Akans were seen as one of the “dominating 
races”, while the acephalous societies of the Northern Territories were 
considered to be in the process of amalgamation into larger tribal units 
under centralized government (see, e.g., TNA CO 96/688/11a). In the 
beginning of the interwar period, the colonial administrators presumed 
that increasing centralization of political organization was the commanding 
feature of social evolution. erefore, administrators were urged to form 
new ‘native states’ by amalgamating previously distinct communities. If 
pre-colonial precedents, or ethnic or linguistic links could be provided to 
support that trajectory, it could be maintained that the government was 
merely accelerating or continuing a natural development, which had been 
slowed down or interrupted by the early stages of colonial take-over (see, 
e.g., TNA CO 96/624a). e historical existence of pre-colonial empires like 
Asante, which had expanded through the conquest of its neighbours, was 
seen as a conrmation of the evolutionary model: the larger were taking 
over the smaller even before European rule (Kucklick 1979, 47–51). is 
line of thinking, which subscribed largely to the conservative state model, 
underwent signicant modication towards the end of the interwar era as 
ocial support for those chiefs perceived as “autocratic rulers” was widely 
criticized and the concerns of the ruled became part of the legitimizing 
discourse. e chieaincy institution was still considered essential for self-
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government, but sponsoring incompetent or corrupt chiefs against the 
popular will was acknowledged to be an administrative problem. From now 
on, it was important to assert that there were checks and balances on chiey 
power, and any kind of democratic tendencies considered to be inherent 
in traditional political systems were to be cherished (ibid., 55–58). Hence 
the conservative understanding of traditional society, with its references to 
conquest states and hereditary aristocracy, was given a liberal component.
e liberal in the feudal
During the early twentieth century the Asante kingdom and other Akan 
polities were tted into the models dominant in the metropolitan discourses 
about origins, development, and functions of the state. It is noteworthy 
that the rst to attempt to do so were actually African intellectuals. Two 
Western-educated lawyers in particular, John Mensah Sarbah and J. E. 
Casely-Hayford, who were based on the Gold Coast, wrote extensively 
on Akan chieaincy from the perspective of Western legal and political 
theories. ey were both key members of the Aborigines’ Rights Protection 
Society, which was founded in 1896 in order to oppose new colonial land 
legislation and ght for the cause of self-government (see, e.g., Kimble 1963, 
330–357; Edsman 1979). Sarbah’s and Casely-Hayfords’s texts represent 
a major scholarly enterprise but, more importantly at the time, they were 
critical contributions to a political debate. ey sought to demonstrate that 
the indigenous inhabitants of the country had their own political and legal 
institutions, which did not deserve to be abolished and replaced by colonial 
versions, but which should rather be modied to meet the standards of 
a new era. More specically, by drawing analogies between Western and Akan 
institutions, they wanted to convince their readers that Akan polities were 
basically democratic constitutional states (Edsman 1979, 55–56; Rathbone 
2008, 478–479). is was a crucial departure from the nineteenth-century 
European accounts which, for instance, described the Asante kingdom as 
a system of “military despotism” (Bowdich 1966 [1819]), 65). Since the 
Gold Coast barristers called for the adoption of a “healthy imperial policy”, 
which would entail recognizing “the authority of the Kings and Chiefs, 
strengthening their inuence, and working through them” (Casely-Hayford 
1970 [1903], 114), they needed to prepare studies of the “aboriginal State 
System” and its “Constitutional History” (ibid., xi–xiii), a task which was 
performed with reference to liberal Western models. Instead of referring to 
traditional stool histories and the spirit world, the origins of political and 
legal institutions were traced to the human nature innate in every individual, 
and from which everything evolves. For instance, Sarbah quotes scholars 
and statesmen of both antiquity and modernity when hypothesizing about 
the origins of the decision-making bodies of Akan communities: 
It is universally admitted that wherever there is an assemblage of persons united 
together for common purposes or ends, there must be some notion of law; 
for mankind have, as Cicero observed, a genius for law. “at there must be 
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a supreme power in every state or in every self-dependent community,” says 
Paterson, “is an axiom which cannot be explained, but which must nevertheless 
be assumed. Even in the rudest forms of state there is a similar power, whether 
lodged in the patriarch or the elders of the tribe, and it is usually found to 
assume by turns a legislative, a judicial, and an executive phrase. is supreme 
power is only a synonym for that human voice, which cannot be resisted by any 
one individual or by any minor combination of them short of the majority; for 
whenever one resists it, all the other individuals readily combine consciously or 
unconsciously to uphold it.”
e family group being the unit of society among the peoples on the Gold Coast, 
Asanti, and neighbouring states, in the head or patriarch of the family resides the 
supreme power. e towns scattered over the country have grown from villages 
originally founded and occupied by single family groups, the members whereof, 
bound together by ties of kindred, possessed rules of life naturally simple, 
which were observed more because they were in accordance with the general 
notions, views, and convictions obtaining or current among them, than from any 
undesirable results their violation or breach may cause. As the family group gets 
larger, and the village community grows, and the households increase in number, 
the public or general aairs of the community are guided by the patriarch of 
the family, now the headman of the village, who acts with the assistance of the 
village council composed of the heads of the other family groups or households 
and others, usually old men. e village council thus represents the fountainhead 
of the common life, and its determination nds expression in the popular voice. 
(Sarbah 1904, 20–21)
Here chieaincy arises from a need to prevent social disorder and not 
from the necessity to engage in sacricial exchanges with the ancestors and 
gods, and, similarly, power emanates from the community that the chief 
represents and not from the spirit world. Both Sarbah and Casely-Hayford 
drew attention to the councils at every level of political decision-making 
and emphasized how the rulers of every grade were always responsible to 
these bodies for their activities. erefore the chief is not “a despot or other 
irresponsible person, but is, as a matter of fact, the rst among his equals, 
and controlled by them in the Council which represents the whole people 
and expresses their will” (Sarbah 1968 [1906], 235–236). us the councils 
for the “aborigines” should be what their parliament is for the British (ibid., 
236). Ultimately, if these principles are guarded and followed faithfully one 
would have “a perfect system, which, properly developed and worked, would 
usher in a new civilization” (Casely-Hayford 1970 [1903], 254). However, in 
this reformist vision, this system of chiey rule would be applied only to 
local-level governance. e native government would be encompassed by 
“a well-informed central government, with a Science Department” that 
would encourage foreign investments, electrication programmes, and 
introduce all sorts of “modern conveniences” (ibid., 115). 
At certain points in their ethnographic and historical descriptions the 
Gold Coast reformers do address the all-embracing nature of religion in 
traditional society. For instance, Casely-Hayford states very plainly that 
“[o]vershading and permeating the political, judicial, and social economy 
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of the Aborigines is that system of faith and worship known as Fetishism” 
(ibid., 101) but he does not elaborate on how fetishism is actually present 
in those social domains. Similarly, he asserts that “[t[he King, in the Native 
State System, is the Spiritual Head of his people” (ibid., 106) but does discuss 
how the system could be seen as being built on spiritual ideas. Sarbah (1904, 
15–16) touches on the same subject when he talks about how a person’s 
rights are in “no way forfeited, diminished, impaired, or aected by change 
of religious opinions”, except if he “forsakes heathenism for Christianity”, 
whereupon he will not be able “perform the necessary stool ceremonies” 
and thus will not be able to ascend to a traditional stool. e manner in 
which religion is perceived as an “opinion” of a person-cum-citizen suggests 
that the Gold Coast barristers were the rst to oer some sort of a theoretical 
model, even if a meagre one, for the separation of religion and politics. Since 
the “new civilization” that they strove for resembled a modern secular state, 
the religious signicance of chieaincy is minimized in their ethnographic 
descriptions and theories. e close link between chieaincy and religion 
is acknowledged but it is enveloped by the larger idea of a secular political 
community that relies on representation, science, and capitalist economy. 
Ultimately, this model belongs to the same liberal tradition that provided 
the intellectual background for the practices of administrators, missionaries, 
and catechists who drew the lines of demarcation between religion and 
politics in the convert communities of rural villages. But more importantly, 
what was established was a prominent reference point for twentieth-century 
discussions of chieaincy, where it was increasingly perceived as part of 
politics. As Richard Rathbone (2008, 479) puts it, the Gold Coast lawyers 
provided “a rough template” of Akan society for subsequent scholars and 
administrators. In particular, they were an inspiration for those Ghanaian 
nationalists, most notably J. W. De Gra Johnson (1971 [1928], 35–41) and 
J. B. Danquah (1997 [1961], 18–33), who maintained that a modern nation-
state could draw on indigenous political traditions.
e indirect rule system incorporated chieaincy into the colonial 
administration but as an administrative arm rather than a representative 
institution. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the conception of chiefs as 
elected leaders who represented their people was ideologically valuable 
for British colonialism in Ghana and many of the original ideas of 
Sarbah, Casely-Hayford, and others were discovered and studied by the 
administrators; complemented and supported by the work of government 
anthropologists such as Rattray, who was thoroughly familiar with, and 
oen referred to, the writings of the Gold Coast lawyers, and who provided 
the fullest ethnographic description and theoretical interpretation of what 
he called “the Ashanti constitution”. His approach combined evolutionary 
thinking with the conservative and liberal folk models typical of his time. 
Rattray’s remarks echoed what Sarbah had written a little less than three 
decades earlier, when he posited the “family” as the basic communal unit 
under the headship of the patriarch. From there “[t]he family had expanded 
into the clan, both had merged into the tribe, now the tribes were to merge 
into the nation under a King” (Rattray 1929, 74). Correspondingly, the king 
and the chiefs at dierent levels stood in a similar relation to their domains 
101
The liberal in the feudal
as the family elder stood to his household. According to Rattray, it was the 
“quest of common safety” that had made these groups form unions; beyond 
that, they were allowed to preserve their autonomy, and they forcefully 
resisted any intrusion into their internal aairs from any external authority. 
Hence, Rattray ultimately described the kingdom as a “loosely bound 
confederacy”, where the principle of decentralization prevailed (ibid., 404–
405). Historically what had taken place was analogous to the dawn of feudal 
England: 
Osai Tutu, Chief of the Territorial Division at Kumasi, and hitherto holding 
a position similar to that of any of the surrounding chiefs, (Mampon, Kumawu, 
Onsu, Juaben, Assumegya), now became more than a primus inter pares, which 
at most he may already have been: he became Asante Hene (King of Ashanti). 
He succeeded to a tribal organization which he strove to form into a state. e 
Territorial Divisions of many tribes became a kingdom, the men of many tribes 
became its citizens; the oath of allegiance superseded the kindred tie which 
had hitherto alone ‘conferred the privilege to command obedience and alone 
imposed the obligation to obey commands’. A silent and unnoticed revolution 
took place with regard to land tenure which was in conformity with the main 
characteristic of feudalism. A kind of multiple proprietorship arose. e King 
became the superior owner of all land, i.e. soil, in the kingdom, but this claim 
coexisted with many grades of inferior ownership right down a descending scale 
until the inferior property of the family land-holder was reached. ere were 
other analogies of the feudal system. Like William I, aer Hastings, Osai Tutu 
found himself surrounded by a number of powerful lords, and a host of notables 
in his own territorial division at Kumasi, who demanded recognition for their 
services. Mampon was made Chief of the ‘Silver Stool’. Kumawu and Assumegya 
were accorded certain privileges. (Ibid., 76)
e events and agreements that in the stool histories of various chiefdoms 
were linked to the sacrices to the spirit world that preceded the war against 
Denkyira (as discussed in Chapter 2) were now translated into the logic of 
conquest theory, where a victorious warring king redistributes the rewards 
of his conquests to his aristocratic allies. 
However, there was something profoundly liberal in the feudal. 
Although the king was seen as the founder of his kingdom and the owner of 
its lands, his position was ultimately considered to depend on the consent 
of his people. Accordingly, Rattray emphasized the importance of councils 
as decision-making bodies but, even more radically, he concluded that the 
individual citizen was really the focal point of the whole system and that the 
political process among the Asante was democratic in the full sense of the 
term:
We pride ourselves, I believe, on being a democratic people and atter ourselves 
that our institutions are of a like nature. An Ashanti who was familiar alike with 
his own and our Constitution would deny absolutely our right to apply this term 
either to ourselves or to our Constitution. To him a democracy implies that the 
aairs of the Tribe (the State) must rest, not in the keeping of the few, but in the 
hands of the many, i.e. must not alone be the concern of what we should term 
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‘the chosen rulers of the people’, but should continue to be the concern of a far 
wider circle. To him the State is literally a Res Publica; it is every one’s business. 
e work of an Ashanti citizen did not nish when by his vote he had installed 
a Chief in oce. […] e rights and duties of the Ashanti democrat were really 
only beginning aer (if I may use a homely analogy) the business of the ballot-
box was over. In England, the Government and House of Commons stand 
between ourselves and the making of our laws, but among the Ashanti there was 
not any such thing as government apart from the people. (Ibid., 406–407; italics 
in the original)
Even though Rattray’s theory of the history and disposition of the “Ashanti 
constitution” was thoroughly political, he wrote extensively on the chief ’s role 
as an intermediary between people and the spirit world and the ritual duties 
involved. He even claimed that the eorts of the government to sponsor 
chieaincy would fail if, at the same time, policies that undermined “old 
religious beliefs”, like promoting Christian missionary work, were endorsed 
(ibid., 405–408). During his tenure as the government anthropologist 
Rattray’s ideas and expertise were not enthusiastically welcomed by those 
of his colleagues who were conducting the actual administrating (see, e.g., 
TNA CO 96 667/2a). However, his key propositions about the decentralized 
and democratic nature of the Asante polity were revived in the mid-1930s 
when the colonial government decided to restore the “Ashanti Confederacy” 
to the form it was presumed to have had before 1874. 
Secular origins?
e political history leading to the “restoration” can be outlined as follows. 
e pre-colonial Asante kingdom that had grown powerful through warfare 
and trade during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see, e.g., Arhin 
1967; McCaskie 1980b; 1984; 1995; Wilks 1975; Yarak 1990) was severely 
weakened by the British military invasion in 1874 (Lewin 1978, 43–47). 
e British retreated back to the coast, but the previously overwhelming 
authority of the Kumasi oceholders was now challenged by “secessionist” 
chiefdoms (ibid., 85–109), disgruntled commoners (see Wilks 1975, 534–
543), and “cultic movements” (see McCaskie 1981, 129–133; Akyeampong 
and Obeng 1995, 502–504). Finally, aer the death of Asantehene Kwaku 
Dua Kuma in 1884, the kingdom was plunged into a long and brutal armed 
conict between the supporters of two rival candidates for kingship, namely 
Agyeman Prempeh and Yaw Twereboanna. Agyeman Prempeh emerged 
victorious in 1888, but had to redistribute a number of villages, honorary 
titles, gold, and ceremonial objects as rewards to his chiey allies (McCaskie 
1984). e young ruler sought to restore the kingdom to its former greatness 
and waged wars against the rebellious northern chiefdoms (Lewin 1978, 
135–176), but a British military expedition sent to seize Kumasi in 1896 
put an end to his eorts. e Asante capital was ransacked and Prempeh 
and some of his senior chiefs were taken prisoner and later sentenced to 
prolonged exile in the Seychelles Islands from which the survivors returned 
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only in 1924, and only in the capacity of “private individual” (Boahen 
2003a; McCaskie 2003). In 1900 the occupation was disrupted by a period 
of insurgency (McCaskie 2000a, 76–79; 2007, 158–161) or “the last of the 
Anglo-Asante wars” (Boahen 2003b). Aer suppressing the uprising in 
1901, the British ocially annexed the territories “heretofore known as 
Ashanti” to “His Majestys’s dominions” (Wilks 1975, 661–662). 
e Asante kingship was now abolished, and the kingdom disbanded, 
to be replaced by a number of independent ‘kingdoms’ or ‘states’ (see, e.g., 
Tordo 1965, 82–321). At the outset, the objective of colonial rule was to 
isolate Kumasi from other chiefdoms, thereby negating its position as the 
capital of the former kingdom. In the words of the then Chief Commissioner 
of Ashanti, “[t]he ocious, unjust, and oen cruel interference, in the 
past, of the Coomassie chiefs with the internal aairs of the outlying tribes 
having been the cause of perennial dissatisfaction, the obvious policy of 
the Administration was to break o all political connection between the 
two” and therefore the Kumasi chiefs were “strictly forbidden to obtrude in 
matters that did not concern their proper territories” (Fuller 1921, 253). e 
insurgent chiefs who had been removed from oce, imprisoned or killed 
were now replaced by “British clients”, many of whom might not have been 
eligible for the oces they came to occupy (see McCaskie 1986, 8–17; Tordo 
1965, 148–159). Similarly, those chiefdoms that had taken active part in the 
insurgency were punished and those who had been ‘loyal’ to the British were 
rewarded: the former lost subjects and territories that were redistributed 
among the latter. Furthermore, a number of ‘sub-chiefs’ had their stools 
elevated to a higher rank than that which they had previously occupied, 
thereby being separated from their former superiors and becoming chiefs of 
independent divisions of colonial Ashanti (PRRAC 1984, 18). 
By the early 1930s, however, the colonial administration had come to the 
conclusion that the policy of disintegration had been a mistake and plans 
for its reversal were drawn up (TNA CO 96/715/3b). Stool debts, succession 
disputes, destoolments, and abdications were a growing problem and 
according to the colonial governor, “more disturbances [were taking place] 
in Ashanti than in any other administrative area of the Gold Coast” (TNA 
CO 96/711/16a). Such troubles appeared to be especially serious in those 
chiefdoms that had been created by the administration, which, according 
to the annual administrative report of 1934, suered from “either lack of 
knowledge of, or a lack of respect for, the Customary law of Ashanti”. In the 
“old system” these problems had been dealt with by the Asantehene and now 
it was seen as urgent that “some central authority” be established to “ensure 
that customary law […] is strictly observed” (TNA CO 96/718/4). e Great 
Depression of the 1930s played no small part in these developments. It 
had already been one of Lugard’s (1922, 230) tenets that the indirect rule 
system had to enjoy “some measure of nancial independence” and now 
that the coers in London were emptying (see TNA CO 96/702/3) this tenet 
had to be taken very seriously. In other colonies earlier experiments with 
introducing a poll tax system operated by government employees had failed 
and now it was admitted that the task of collecting taxes should be assigned 
to traditional authorities (TNA CO 96/700/14a). In Asante this was seen as 
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only natural as “[t]he essence of their former system of Government […] 
was based on the right of the chiefs to claim monetary and social support 
from their subjects in return for the lands which they held from the stools” 
(TNA CO 96/662a). Following Lugard’s (1922, 230–255) proposal of 
direct taxation, the chiefs would collect taxes from their subjects and the 
revenue would be used pay salaries to their personnel and to “inaugurate 
schemes of development”. Separate “Stool treasuries” for the chiefs had been 
established, but someone was needed to supervise the taxation to ensure 
that levels were not excessive and that resulting revenue was used for the 
benet of the community (TNA CO 96/711/16a). Meanwhile, it had become 
clear that in those chiefdoms where the “traditional allegiance” had been 
altered by administrative rearrangements following the conquest, there 
was no willingness to pay taxes. erefore making the indirect rule system 
nancially sustainable in Asante was seen to require its reunication (TNA 
CO 96/706/7a).
As a solution for administrative problems, the colonial government 
proposed the “restoration of the old Ashanti Confederacy”. e detailed 
construction of this “colonial hybrid”, as McCaskie (1990, 62) has called 
it, and its implications have already been discussed extensively by others 
(e.g. Busia 1968 [1951], 165–217; Tordo 1965, 286–401; Berry 2001, 35–
102) and it is not necessary to review those works here. At this juncture all 
I wish to highlight are two aspects of the restoration that are particularly 
interesting for the topic at hand. Firstly, I examine why the colonial 
administration deemed it necessary to ‘remake’ the social contract that they 
thought had brought the pre-colonial kingdom into existence, and secondly, 
how chieaincy was dened almost exclusively in political and legal terms, 
while its religious foundation was pushed to the background and religion in 
the new polity became a matter of citizens’ ‘opinion’. 
As many historians have pointed out (e.g. McCaskie 1995, 398), and 
even some contemporaries conceded (e.g. TNA CO 96 705/17a), it is rather 
questionable whether the government actually restored anything when they 
installed Agyeaman Prempeh’s nephew, Osei Agyeaman Prempeh II, as the 
new Asantehene in 1935 and claimed to have brought back “ancient political 
institutions” (TNA CO 96/715/3c). Aer all, the Asante chiefs had already 
recognized the old king as the Asantehene when he had returned from exile in 
1924 and he had even performed many of his royal ritual functions although 
converted to Christianity (Tordo 1965, 205–212; see also Akyeampong 1999, 
300–305; McCaskie 1983, 198–199; 2005, 507–508). e administrators, 
however, did not acknowledge such a continuum, maintaining that they 
had actually been capable of bringing an obsolete kingdom back to life in 
a modernized form. As already indicated above, the idea of a confederacy 
was consistent with Rattray’s notion of decentralization and democracy as 
constitutive principles of the pre-colonial polity, a formulation which of 
course had its precedents in older Gold Coast ethnographic and historical 
traditions. e administrators followed Rattray in assuming that the 
kingdom had initially been a military alliance of independent tribes, which 
had then developed into a permanent polity presided over by a king. e 
chiefs of dierent tribes had taken an oath of allegiance to the king and 
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become his advisors. e system was characterized as “ultra-democratic”, 
since everyone starting from the level of households had a say in collective 
matters. e chiefs of dierent ranks jealously guarded their autonomy, and 
the “federal principle” that brought the chiefdoms under the direct authority 
of the king became active only in times of war and national crises. According 
to a government memorandum, the task of the administrators was now to 
convert “what was mainly a military organisation of intermittent activity 
into a civil institution with regular administrative and judicial functions” 
(PRRAC 1984, 7–8). 
Since the kingdom had originally been a “voluntary confederation” it 
was necessary for the administrators to inquire the chiefs and elders of each 
‘native state’ in colonial Ashanti whether they wished to join the confederation 
or not. Altogether twenty ve chiefdoms produced their answers in writing 
and almost one third of them were in the negative (see ibid., 45–104). 64 
e majority of the objections were overruled by the government on the 
grounds that the chiefdoms resisting the new union were not ethnically “true 
Ashanti” and therefore their consent was not indispensable. e refusal of 
three “true Ashanti” chiefdoms posed a bigger problem, but that too was 
circumvented by a rather unusual calculation, in which the written consents 
and refusals given by the chiefs and elders were transformed by colonial 
ocials into the votes or ‘opinions’ of individuals living in the chiefdoms. 
us they summed up the populations of two “dissident chiefdoms” and 
then added to this number a half of the population of the third dissident, 
in which they said existed a signicant pro-confederacy opposition. When 
this gure was considered as a proportion of the “total true-Ashanti 
population”, the outcome was that only 7.44 percent of the Asante opposed 
the confederacy. e government concluded that their decision was guided 
by majority democracy:
e signicant fact about these gures is not that the opponents are so many, 
but that they are so few. It must be emphasized that no pressure of any sort has 
been brought to bear on the chiefs to give their vote in favour of the restoration 
[…] [T]he documents as a whole reveal the burning desire of the people to 
receive back their nationhood […] is being so, it would not be just that the 
ambitions of the great majority of the people should be thwarted by the local 
jealousies of the few. e recommendation of the Government […] therefore is 
that the dissident voices should be disregarded and […] the confederacy should 
be restored under an Asantehene. (Ibid., 16–17) 
Curiously enough, the colonial state felt that it had been able to make history 
repeat itself as the people under its rule had given their consent through their 
representatives and rearmed the social contract formed by their ancestors. 
64 e content and style of the letters from various chiefdoms dier drastically. 
Some are merely cordial but laconic acceptances of the proposition, while some 
include long accounts of kinship relations, land boundaries, ceremonial objects, 
gi exchanges, etc. e matter of human sacrices preceding the formation of the 
kingdom is brought up in a letter from Edweso, where the arrangement is described 
at length and the Asantehene is accused of violating it.
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Finally, it was given a formal expression in a ceremony in which the chiefs 
took an oath of allegiance “in customary fashion” to the Asantehene (TNA 
CO 96/715/3d). Aer this contract had been recreated, the commissioners 
and the chiefs could start discussing the proper positions of the stools in the 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, every chief was considered as having “the natural 
desire” to obtain for himself “some higher place, rank or inuence than his 
stool formerly occupied” as a reward for his support of the Asantehene re-
installment (TNA CO 96/706/7a). 
“The Asantehene and His Excellency the Governor, Sir Arnold Hodson, K.C.M.G.” 
(TNA CO 1069/44). Asantehene Prempeh II was born in the late years of the pre-
colonial kingdom, but was in many respects a child of the colonial era (McCaskie 1990, 
61). He had a Wesleyan-Methodist upbringing but later became an Anglican, following 
the example of his predecessor who had converted to Christianity though the Church of 
England missionaries while in exile (Pobee 2009, 240).
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Now that the Asante polity had been conceptualized in the language 
of contractualism, religion and ritual were given a role in its symbolic 
legitimation. In the historical overview of the “old confederacy” prepared 
by the colonial ocials, Komfo Anokye’s position as the great sacricer was 
not mentioned; rather he was referred to as the person responsible for the 
transition from “status to contract”; that is, he had organized the kin-based 
tribes into a political union: 
Under his [i.e. Obiri Yeboa’s] successor, Osei Tutu, the rst Asantehene, arose the 
Ashanti confederacy, its principal author being his minister, the priest Okomfo 
Anokyi. Again the organization was essentially military but Anokyi’s genius 
introduced several civil characteristics of great importance. One of the most 
signicant of these latter was the surrender and destruction of the old “family” 
stools of the Amansie tribes [i.e. allied chiefdoms] and their replacement by new 
“political” stools, conferred by Osei Tutu upon the various Amansie chiefs, while 
paramount above them all stood the Golden Stool made by Anokye for Osei Tutu 
– the Golden Stool which ever since has been regarded as containing the soul of 
the Ashanti nation. (PRRAC 1984, 6)
In the administrators’ notes, the Golden Stool appeared primarily as 
a national symbol sanctied by religious ideas rather than a source of divine 
power for the Asante ruler (ibid., 13–14). Royal rituals were described from 
a similar standpoint: “[t]hroughout the rites the recurrence of the phrases 
‘Asanteman’ and ‘Asantehene’ indicate that it is towards the Ashanti nation 
that the minds of the worshippers are turned” (ibid., 14). Hence, following 
the ideas of the Gold Coast lawyers and Rattray, the Asante kingdom was 
considered to have its origins in the secular: it had originally been a ‘political’ 
union, which was aerwards a given a religious seal. If the missionary 
discourses had been mostly ‘synchronic’ in the sense that they were about 
the denition of rights and freedoms, models like this introduced a historical 
perspective, which was in line with the assumptions of the modernist social 
sciences about the chronological relationship between religion and politics 
in society (see Asad 2003, 190–193).
Otherwise, the model of the Asante polity as a community of rights-
bearing, free individuals, which was nascent in the petitions of the Christians, 
had its large-scale ideological formalization in the new confederacy. e 
chiefs were still referred to as the “spiritual heads” of their people, but only for 
those whose practice the “Ashanti religion”, since religion is clearly separated 
from allegiance to a chief: “the people will receive, as now, the assistance of 
the missionary societies and there will be no interference with the teaching 
of religion to those who desire it” (PRRAC 1984, 4). is assurance was also 
given by the governor in his speech to the Asante people delivered in the 
restoration ceremony: 
Henceforth, the ancient loyalties of the Ashanti are to be ocially recognised 
and sanctioned; every man in these divisions will enjoy his rights, and render due 
service, under the form of government familiar to his ancestors; all will pay homage 
to the Asantehene, and venerate the Golden Stool, that symbol of unity among 
you for many generations.
108
4. A liberal kingdom?
 In this restoration I must point out there is no new creation but a return to 
former institutions. ere will be no alteration in the principles of justice, no 
danger to any man’s liberty, no interference with religious opinion or observance. 
ese essentials of good government will remain. e domestic aairs and 
property rights of properly constituted divisions will not be interfered with 
unless the native authorities concerned invite assistance nor will the loyalty of 
any Chief to the British Government be obscured. (TNA CO 96/715/3c; italics 
added)
e discourse about the rights and liberties of individuals, let alone electoral 
democracy, belonged largely to public speeches, newspaper articles, and 
speculative memoranda, however. A very dierent story emerges if one 
reads, for example, e Native Authority Ordinance issued by the governor 
at the time of the restoration. Instead of citizens, such documents talk about 
‘natives’, who are “persons of African descent” and “subject to the jurisdiction 
of native tribunals”. ey do not mention decentralization or democracy 
as attributes of the native authority system, but rather list activities that 
fall within the native authorities’ sphere of inuence such as, for instance, 
the regulation of gambling, cutting of trees, consumption of “intoxicating 
liquors”, or preventing the spread of locusts. While the legal parameters 
for the exercise of authority are explicit, the high liberal principles are le 
implicit in expressions used, for example, in relation to the election and 
installation of a chief, which should be “in accordance with native law 
and custom” (TNA CO 96/721/1a); naturally, the nal decision on matters 
concerning “native law and custom” was always in the hands of the chief 
commissioner and the governor (TNA CO 96/753/16). However, this was 
not just a matter of a gap between colonial ideology and practice. e record 
of decisions and actions taken by the new Asantehene and his Confederacy 
Council during the late 1930s and the 40s suggest a process of concentration 
of political and economic power in the kingship. is was evident, for 
instance, in the destoolings of paramount chiefs (e.g. TNA CO 96/741/7), 
alterations to customary laws (TNA CO 96/753/16), and transfers of villages 
from other chiefdoms to Kumasi jurisdiction (TNA CO 96/813/12). 
e restoration had been opposed by a group of non-Asante African 
nationalists and a handful of dissatised chiefs (see TNA CO 96/715/4; 
PRRAC 1984, 111–119). As the initial campaign to prevent it had failed, 
the dissidents later led destoolment charges against the Asantehene (TNA 
CO 96/724/9) and attacked the king in the press (TNA CO 96/728/18a). 
In the words of the governor, they were propagating the view that “the 
Confederacy was in fact not the democratic institution which they had been 
led to believe in the rst instance, but rather it was an autocracy with the 
Asantehene at its head as a powerful and despotic ruler” (ibid.). At the time, 
the Asantehene was supported fully by the colonial establishment (ibid.), but 
in years to come, the support would gradually diminish. So-called young 
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men,65 “the teachers and clerks, traders and storekeepers, lorry owners and 
drivers” (Tordo 1968, 167), felt that they were not represented in the Native 
Authority system and the le wing of the growing decolonization movement 
adopted their anti-chief cause. 
e succeeding chapter explores how chieaincy became increasingly 
politicized during, and right aer, Ghana’s independence as it was transformed 
into a divisive issue in party politics as well as a strong nationalistic symbol. 
In that context I will also discuss how Christian attitudes toward fetishism, 
or traditional religion, have become more complicated as some elements of 
what was known as fetishism have been adopted as a part of nationalistic 
imagery, while others are still abhorred as backwardness or idolatry.
65 e Twi term nkwankwaa has oen been translated into English as young men. e 
term does not, however, refer to age but rather to commoner status in one’s natal 
chiefdom. In the colonial period it was used particularly to refer to educated non-
oce holders who resented the chiey rule (see Allman 1990, 268; Tordo 1968, 
168).
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I n January 2001, when I interviewed the late Amakomhene Akosa Yiadom  II in his palace, I showed him a copy of the Amakom stool history 
recorded in 1963 by the Institute of African Studies at the University of 
Ghana. I had photocopied the document in the archives and at that point 
I understood very little about its history and signicance. e elderly chief 
rst took a quick glance at the cover to see who had authored the history, 
and then started reading it, turning the pages hurriedly and forcefully. Aer 
nishing it, he raised his eyes from the paper and said to me: “ese are all 
lies. is must be corrected.” In 1961 his uncle, Amakomhene Mensa Yiadom, 
had been removed from oce, imprisoned, and had his properties seized by 
the government because he had opposed the ruling party of independent 
Ghana headed by President Kwame Nkrumah. e history at hand had been 
produced to legitimate the succession of a government-sponsored candidate 
to the Amakom stool (see Kallinen 2004, 58–62). Now, four decades later, 
the Amakomhene reminisced about how he had thought of challenging the 
ruling party candidate back then and making a bid for the stool vacated by 
his uncle. Ultimately he had decided against it, as he had been “very young, 
just graduated from college”. Ghana’s rst coup d’état in 1966 had eventually 
overthrown the Nkrumahist chiefs, and Mensa Yiadom, among others, had 
been re-installed. e Amakomhene concluded our conversation by stating 
that “all governments of Ghana, from Nkrumah to Rawlings, have tried to 
destroy the Asante kingdom”. On the one hand, it could be expected that 
an Asante chief would mention Nkrumah and J. J. Rawlings as examples of 
heads of state who had promoted anti-chief or anti-Asante policies (why this 
is so will become evident below), but on the other, the two names can also 
be associated with two distinct but interwoven discourses about chieaincy. 
In the rst case, chieaincy was integrated into the clientelist system of 
a one-party state, while in the second, chieaincy was increasingly dened as 
a part of ‘national culture’, which had to be kept separate from ‘politics’, not to 
mention ‘religion’. However, both discourses are distinctively post-colonial, 
in the sense that whatever meaning or value chieaincy was understood to 
have, it had it in relation to the post-colonial state. 
During the rst decades of independence the strong colonial state was 
replaced by authoritarian governments, oen convened by the military, and 
the chieaincy institution was encompassed by state power and ideology. 
Scholars like Mahmood Mamdani (1996, 8) have asserted that in many 
African countries the new post-colonial state apparatus in fact continued 
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the legacy of indirect rule. is meant that the old structures of power 
were “reproduced by the postcolonial state’s support of chiefships and its 
investment in ‘traditional’ culture” (Piot 2010, 6). In ideological terms this 
implied an ambiguous position for chieaincy both as an adversary and an 
ally. On the one hand, it could be seen as a relic of a ‘tribalistic’ or even 
‘feudal’ past and thus an enemy of progress and development; furthermore, 
the chiefs themselves were viewed as collaborators with the former colonial 
masters. Hence the institution was to be reformed with a strong hand by the 
state authorities, who sought to gain better control of the rural communities 
through it. On the other hand, on a more abstract level, chieaincy was 
understood as a symbol of what was distinctively Ghanaian or African. It 
oered an ideological bridge that crossed the divides of colonial conquest 
and decolonization, enabling contact with what was considered to have been 
pure and harmonious traditional culture. In this scenario, chieaincy was 
an important part of national culture that unied the citizenry and therefore 
it should not be allowed to become tainted by partisan politics. 
In this chapter I discuss post-colonial-era chieaincy as a ‘politico-
cultural’ institution, using the policies of Nkrumah and Rawlings regimes as 
examples. us my intention is not to write an entire ‘political biography’ of 
chieaincy in the post-colonial period, reviewing all the changes in policies 
and legislation of the dierent governments (for such treatments see, e.g., 
Arhin Brempong 2001), nor to investigate thoroughly the manoeuvrings of 
particular chiefs or politicians (for those see, e.g., Rathbone 2000). However, 
by concentrating on these two regimes I hope to shed light on the two-
sided ideological nature of traditional political institutions that has been 
considered characteristic of Cold War-era Africa. e last part of the chapter 
returns to the problems of secularization, describing how the concept of 
national culture, and chieaincy as part of it, has come under attack from 
the Pentecostal-Charismatic churches who have assumed a critical stance 
toward both traditionalism and secular politics. 
‘Comrade chief ’
In his philosophical and political writings Nkrumah subscribed to the notion 
of traditional African society as a site of humanism and egalitarianism, 
but he undoubtedly regarded the chieaincy of his own time as a colonial 
invention. If liberal-capitalist ideology had posited an individual who was 
selsh and competitive by nature, and had to form contracts in order to 
protect himself from the selshness of others, African socialism, as it was 
envisioned by Nkrumah, was based on an idea of man as “a spiritual being, 
a being endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value” 
(Nkrumah 1964, 68). To him this view of human nature was “refreshingly 
opposed to the Christian idea of the original sin and the degradation of 
man” (ibid.), while traditional African society of pre-colonial times had 
been a realization of this principle. Indigenous institutions, such as the clan, 
had emphasized the initial equality of all men and society’s responsibility for 
its every member. In this condition, the formation of classes in the Marxist 
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sense was impossible. erefore, in traditional society, “no sectional interest 
could be regarded as supreme; nor did legislative and executive power 
aid the interest of any particular group” (ibid., 69). However, all this was 
changed when colonialism introduced inequality to the black continent. 
e colonial system corrupted the Africans by privileging certain groups of 
people, among whom were “certain feudal-minded elements” who had been 
able to convince “the exploiter administration” that they possessed virtues 
that made them suitable for positions of power and authority (ibid., 69–70). 
Socialism in Africa meant a return to its egalitarian principles (ibid., 76–77) 
and those chiefs who had been “in league with imperialists” had to leave 
their oces (quoted in Rathbone 2000, 22–23). 
Nevertheless, chieaincy itself could not simply be abolished. Even 
though Nkrumah (1963, 63) explicitly identied chieaincy as one of the 
“traditional forces that can impede progress” (ibid., 83), he had to admit that 
the institution was connected to Ghanaian society so closely and in so many 
ways that eliminating it by force would probably cause more harm than 
leaving it be. Instead, he was content to predict a “natural attenuation of 
chieaincy under the impact of social progress” (ibid., 84). In the meantime, 
however, chieaincy could be used by the government to “encourage popular 
eort” (ibid.). On the level of policy, this had two major consequences: the 
usage of chiey oces as rewards in building and maintaining patron-client 
networks and the ‘detribalization’ of chieaincy. 
During and immediately aer the dissolution of the colonial system 
the radical nationalist rulers of Ghana launched a number of regional 
and local government reforms that aimed to undermine the power of the 
chiefs. e very rst local government reform in 1951, preceding the formal 
independence of the colony, created new decision-making bodies at the 
local level – local and district councils – which were meant to be “ecient, 
modern and democratic” and “wholly distinct from the traditional 
councils” of the chiefs; this meant, in the words of the then Minister of 
Local Government, a “transfer of power from the ocial and the chief to the 
common man” (quoted in Rathbone 2000, 30–31). Only two years later, the 
Asanteman Council compiled a memorandum for the Governor of the Gold 
Coast, wherein the chiefs stated that despite verbal assurances from the new 
government that it would maintain chieaincy, the institution was actually 
“being divested of all of its inuence and dignity” (PRAAD ARG 2/2/68a). 
However, by this time the colonial ocials had given up their commitment 
to honouring ‘ancient traditions’ and made administrative eciency 
a priority. For example, a colonial civil servant processing a paramount 
chief ’s complaint against the Asantehene in 1948 considered references to 
traditional histories or “Ethnological studies” as the basis for a successful 
case simply old fashioned:
But the question cannot be decided on the grounds of historical rights alone, 
although the local people approach it in this light. e Administration revived 
the Ashanti Confederacy, not because of historical rights, but as a convenient 
organization for local administration. Contemporary local government policy 
places new emphasis upon transforming traditional institutions and rights into 
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more modern administrative forms. erefore the importance of traditional and 
historical claims is rapidly decreasing. (TNA CO 96/785/3a; italics added)
Similarly, the Confederacy Council had been told in 1949 in an “Emergency 
meeting” that “the Home Government would be strongly behind any 
movement for increasing representation of the people in the local 
government”; thus the chiefs and their elders who only a decade earlier 
had been considered the true representatives of the people would now 
have to make room for the ‘young men’ in the Native Courts (TNA CO 
96/791/2a). is initiative was in agreement with large-scale policy changes. 
For instance, Lord Hailey (1956, 526–527) in his famous African Survey 
assumed that the “political element” in the Gold Coast wanted to replace 
traditional institutions everywhere with local government based on popular 
elections, conning the chiefs “to the exercise of the ceremonial or ritual 
functions dictated by custom”. (is, again, reects the view according to 
which ‘political’ is the core and ‘ritual’ the surface.) In Hailey’s opinion, 
there was really no other way as the Native Authority reform had been 
introduced too late and not eciently enough to take root. Now that the 
colonial administration had started to withdraw its support for chiey rule 
as it prepared for the handover of power, the traditional rulers were at the 
mercy of the ‘political element’. e Asante chiefs’ response was to join 
forces with the regionally-based opposition party, the National Liberation 
Movement (NLM), which had actually been founded by ‘young men’ who 
had previously held strong anti-chief stances. e chiefs, the Asantehene and 
the Golden Stool became powerful gureheads for the short-lived movement 
that called for Asante autonomy within, and later secession from, the future 
nation-state of Ghana. However, although gaining support in Asante, the 
party lost the national elections leading up to independence, and its agenda 
was not favoured by the colonial masters who were supervising the process 
of political independence either. Right aer the formal independence 
a law was passed to prohibit all political parties “based on tribal or religious 
allegiances” and the Asantehene and most of chiefs retreated (see Allman 
1990, 272–279; 1993, 162–192) .
When in power Nkrumah’s socialist government sought to convert the 
chiefs into becoming supporters of the ruling party, the Convention People’s 
Party (CPP) (see, e.g., PRAAD ARG 2/2/115a). is was achieved mainly by 
paying monetary allowances to chiefs loyal to the new regime and granting 
the status of “traditional state” to their chiefdoms or villages meaning 
that they would thus become equal with, or even outrank, their former 
overlords (see PRAAD ARG 2/2/105). Chiefs who supported the CPP 
were also rewarded with governmental positions: for example, positions 
on the boards of directors of government companies and appointments to 
Ghana’s foreign missions (Arhin Brempong 2001, 41). ose who resisted, 
and had been members of the NLM, were silenced by public humiliations 
and outright threats (Rathbone 2000, 110–112). e realpolitik nature of the 
chieaincy policies of the young post-colonial state is laid bare in a regional 
administrator’s letter to the Ministry of Justice reecting on the creation of 
new “traditional states”:
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…in the event consideration was given to the elevation to paramountcy of those 
chiefs who were active supporters of the Party or other such private persons 
who subsequently became chiefs. Initially, therefore, the new elevations served 
a twofold purpose – rstly as a reward to the chiefs concerned for their loyalty 
to the Party and secondly through them to bring party ideological education to 
the Ashanti Region House of Chiefs. […] e Asantehene has never been happy 
about the new creations and […] it would be wrong to interpret his silence on 
the issue as consent; he has only been forced to acquiesce in a policy which he 
was powerless to oppose. (PRAAD ARG 2/2/105b)
As chiey oces had become rewards for faithfulness to the party and the 
state, their uneven distribution among party members started to cause 
concern. When Nkrumah visited Kumasi in March 1962 he pointed out 
that “in Ashanti, and to some extent, in other parts of the country, matters 
relating to chieaincy are causing a great deal of unrest and strife in our 
Party”. Apparently, for some people becoming a chief had become more 
important than being a loyal cadre:
Here and there a chief ’s stool becomes vacant. Two Party comrades contest for 
enstoolment. One succeeds. Immediately the loser of the stool contest becomes 
aggrieved and turns against the Party and Government. Not only that, he at once 
sets out to undermine the successful comrade who has been enstooled. Both of 
them have supporters on their sides so unnecessary strife ensues and the Party 
splits over this issue of chieaincy.
 In future the Party and Government will take a very serious view of such 
matters and adopt very drastic measures to correct this state of aairs in our 
towns and villages. Government will for instance quickly remove any person 
from a traditional area who indulges in such disruptive activities and thereby 
tends to undermine not only the progress and prosperity of the villages and 
towns but also the solidarity of the Party. (Nkrumah 1962, 1–2) 
Instead of trying to abolish chieaincy, the Nkrumah regime ultimately 
created a system of clientelist chieaincy, oen considered typical of post-
colonial Africa (Mamdani 1996, 287–290). Just as in the colonial period 
chieaincy was encompassed by a modern state apparatus, the crucial 
dierence was that now both the politicians and civil servants that ran 
the apparatus, and the chiefs who presided over the traditional councils, 
were considered citizens of the nation state. is enabled the kind of “elite 
assimilation” that Jean-François Bayart (1993, 155–176) has described in 
many parts of the continent: a party comrade could become a chief and 
a chief a party comrade. 
In addition to eradicating the remnants of ‘feudalism’ and colonial rule, 
Nkrumah’s major concern was tribalism. He advocated a secular state, where 
no religious institution or group would have a privileged position (Addo 
1999, 194), and sought to repress all movements which expressed ethnic 
nationalism (Coe 2005, 60–61). is was also visible in the chieaincy 
policies of his time. e government created separate bureaucratic bodies 
for the chiefs called Regional Houses of Chiefs that had the “power to 
consider any matter referred to it by a Minister or the [national legislative] 
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Assembly and at any time oer advice to any Minister” (PRAAD ARG 
2/2/114a); mostly, however, their task was to handle appeals from chieaincy 
disputes at the local level (ibid.). us chiefs who belonged to various ethnic 
groups and traditional kingdoms, but resided in a single government-created 
administrative region, were to convene to discuss matters of customary law. 
In the case of the Asante kingdom, however, this meant a breakup, since the 
Nkrumah government had decided to split the old colonial entity of Ashanti 
into two administrative areas, the Ashanti Region and the Brong-Ahafo 
Region. In principle, the split was not supposed to have any eect on the 
traditional allegiances of the chiefs of the two regions, but it was generally 
understood that by doing so the government sought to “break the back of 
what it considered as dangerous Asante nationalism” (Drah 1979, 147).66 
rough these measures the post-colonial government wanted to ensure that 
chieaincy was ‘administrative’, and denitely not ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’, thereby 
recognizing chieaincy, rather than kingship; and in a strict legal sense the 
Asantehene was now a chief in (not even of) one administrative region.
Chieaincy and national culture
e place of ‘tradition’ or ‘heritage’ in the national culture of the modern 
Ghanaian state has been a controversial issue ever since the time of the 
independence for several reasons (see, e.g., McCaskie 2009, 138–143; 
Monls 1977), and anthropologists have written about the topic extensively 
in a number of dierent contexts (see, e.g., Coe 2005; Schramm 2000; 
Steegstra 2005). On the whole, the problematic question with regards to 
national culture has been its idealized quality as a unifying category that 
transcends religious, political, ethnic, and linguistic divisions in society, but 
also something which is simultaneously in constant danger of becoming 
corrupted by ‘partisan’ ideologies. In fact, its origins can be traced to the 
missionary era, when ‘culture’ was demarcated as a religiously neutral 
sector of social life that did not pose a threat to the converts. Although the 
early missionaries labelled indigenous cosmologies as fetishism and the 
converts were cautioned to avoid traditional rituals in any way they could, 
paradoxically, the missionary project was also dependent on them. In order 
to make Christian teachings intelligible for their audiences the missionaries 
had to nd indigenous terms to convey their message. Accordingly, there 
had to be cultural correspondences that helped the translation: for instance, 
a decision was made to start calling the Christian God by a name that was 
previously assigned to the creator god of the indigenous cosmology. In this 
way, Christianity and the indigenous cosmologies were seen as comparable 
and compatible – even though the latter was ultimately to be rejected (Meyer 
1999, 52–62). is operation rested on a referential semiotic ideology, where 
66 Even nowadays the composition of the kingdom is not compatible with the regional 
boundaries. e chiefdoms of the kingdom are located in the Ashanti and Brong-
Ahafo Regions, but there are also Asante ‘islands’ in the Eastern and Volta Regions. 
Hence, there are Asante chiefs in four dierent Regional Houses. 
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words are understood as names of things and the link between the word 
and the thing is arbitrary, contingent on agreements made by the speakers 
(see Lambek 2013); it allowed for there being a local language and a culture 
– separable from religion – that could be directed to communicate the 
universal message of Christianity (see Keane 2007, 83–112). 
Moreover, the missionaries had brought with them the European idea 
of a nation based on a common language, ethnicity, and history. Although 
the original vision had been one of separating the Christian community 
from traditional society, especially its rituals, this uncompromising attitude 
gradually started to change. Eventually, the ideas and practices of traditional 
society became distant and abstract for the Christians living in their own 
Salems or in the urban centres, and they began to evaluate them as parts of an 
objectied culture, removed from their original social context. In the course 
of this, many educated Christians concluded that not everything in the ‘pagan 
past’ was sinful and, correspondingly, not all of the Westerners’ habits were 
worth adopting. So, when a new modern national identity was created, rst 
Akan or Asante and later Ghanaian, some of the ‘old customs’ were used as 
its building blocks (Coe 2005, 29–52). is led to the cultivation of a national 
language, history, folklore, costume, and the like (see Peel 1989), but many 
traditional ritual forms were also incorporated. Consequently, pouring 
libations for the ancestors, drumming, and dancing could be considered 
‘Ghanaian cultural performances’ separated from their earlier fetishist 
associations. A Christian person watching or listening to them as a member 
of the audience or even taking part in them as a performer would not be 
perceived as someone committing a religious act, and thus compromising 
his / her religious conviction, but rather as someone expressing his / her 
Ghanaian cultural identity. at has allowed such practices to become a part 
and parcel of all sorts of nationalistic events including Independence Day 
celebrations, political party rallies, and sporting competitions. Similarly, 
some elements of local ritual calendars have been promoted by the state as 
‘Ghanaian cultural festivals’. In a certain sense, they have become secular 
rituals connected to nationalist ideology, and more recently, also to tourism 
and commercialization (see Adrover 2013; Schramm 2004). eir exterior 
form might in many cases be very similar to traditional ‘religious’ rituals, 
but they are very dierent in the sense that the principal instigators of, and 
agents in, the rituals are the people who are considered to be performing 
them as a result of free will (in order to express identity, preserve heritage, 
and so on) and not under an ancestral or divine obligation (see Keane 1998, 
19–23; 2002, 69–74).
Although its historical origins lie in missionary Christianity, the 
endorsement of national culture became the responsibility of state 
institutions in the post-colonial period (Coe 2005, 52) and hence has 
been understood to be mostly a secular state project. It was a priority for 
the Nkrumah regime which saw it as a potent weapon against tribalism 
(ibid., 60–65), but it was expanded to its fullest during the government of 
J. J. Rawlings in the 1980s and 1990s, when, for example, “cultural studies” 
became a compulsory subject in Ghanaian schools (ibid., 75–82). is 
endorsement of national culture was accompanied by legal reforms that 
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barred chiefs from participating in partisan politics at both grassroots 
and national levels. Rawlings had come to power by leading a military 
coup–cum–populist-socialist revolution, which was supposed to eradicate 
corruption and crime in the country. (ese events are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 8.) In Rawlings’ ‘revolutionary ideology’ the chiefs were 
perceived as elitists who should not have any important role in the politics of 
the country, and during the time of the coup many chiefs were subjected to 
violence by the military (Boafo-Arthur 2003, 127). Finally, when the period 
of military rule came to an end in 1992 and Ghana assumed a multiparty 
system, the new constitution stipulated that “[a] chief shall not take part 
in active party politics; and any chief wishing to do so and seeking election 
to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin” (CRG, Chapter 22, Article 
276). However, chieaincy was no longer greeted with antagonism – it was, 
rather, simply transferred from the category of politics to that of culture.
In its public contentions, the Rawlings government emphasized the 
meaning of chieaincy as a cultural institution in which the ideals and 
virtues of traditional society were still preserved. For instance, in a public 
speech in 1999, Rawlings claimed that “being a chief is neither a profession 
nor an occupation but a mission to serve the interest of the people”. He 
also promised “that the government will do everything possible to enhance 
and sustain the sanctity of the chieaincy institution” (Nyinah 1999). To 
a certain extent, as part of a national culture that belonged to all citizens, 
chieaincy was seen to be above the ghts and bickering of day-to-day 
politics. Since the early 1990s chieaincy aairs have been assigned to the 
Ministry of Chieaincy and Culture in the institutional framework of the 
state. e “vision” of the ministry is to “preserve, sustain and integrate the 
regal, traditional and cultural values and practices to accelerate wealth 
creation and harmony for total national development” (Ghana Government 
Ocial Portal). e Regional Houses of Chiefs are its member organizations 
along with, for instance, the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, the 
National eatre of Ghana, and the Pan-African Writers Association (ibid.). 
Hence, chieaincy has become in some sense comparable with ne arts such 
as architecture, drama, and literature. In the new constitution the National 
House of Chiefs, a government body already established before Rawlings’ 
time, was given the position of ‘reviewer’ of traditional culture:
e National House of Chiefs shall […] (b) undertake the progressive study, 
interpretation and codication of customary law with a view to evolving, in 
appropriate cases, a unied system of rules of customary law, and compiling 
the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin; 
(c) undertake an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to 
eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful. 
(CRG, Chapter 22, Article 272)
Here a modern bureaucratic body is entrusted with a task of rationalization 
and ‘purication’ of the chieaincy institution. It is expected to create and 
maintain ‘national standards’ for chieaincy and at the same time abolish 
those of its characteristics that could oend modern sensibilities.
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As one might expect, the exclusion of chiefs from politics by putting 
them on the pedestal of culture has not worked perfectly. e notion of 
‘cultural’ chieaincy has been challenged by those who think that the chiefs, 
as citizens of the nation state, should be accorded the same political rights 
as other Ghanaians, as well as by those who are sceptical about the chiefs 
actually staying out of politics; the former opinion is mostly expressed by 
the chiefs themselves (see Boafo-Arthur 2003, 144). e doubt about the 
political impartiality of the chiefs is a recurring topic in Ghanaian public 
debates. For instance, during the 2000 presidential elections, the people 
with whom I discussed party politics had a rm awareness of the de facto 
partisanship of chiefs. In Asante there seemed to be a shared understanding 
that the Asantehene and most of the paramount chiefs supported the 
opposition party candidate John Kufuor, who eventually won the elections. 
Kufuor himself is an Asante and a royal of the Kumasi Apagya stool. I saw 
him taking part in public ceremonies in the Asantehene’s palace on several 
occasions, and each time the crowd cheered him enthusiastically. Likewise, 
almost everyone could tell me who the ‘NDC chiefs’ were, that is, those 
few Asante paramounts that were considered to support the ruling party 
candidate. Of course, none of the chiefs expressed such views in public and 
sometimes the speculations about their political leanings were based on 
fairly supercial and doubtful observations; for instance, the way a chief and 
a candidate greeted each other in public might be read as a sign of support 
or opposition. e political press took part keenly in these discussions; for 
example, based on the assumption that the chiefs have a major inuence on 
the voting decisions in their localities, the press would produce headlines 
about alleged declarations of support from the chiefs for particular candidates 
(see, e.g., Amoako-Attah 2000; Fredua Agyemang 2000). Most recently, the 
Asantehene’s alleged inuence in the result of the 2012 presidential elections 
has been a heated topic (see e.g. Modern Ghana, 15th September 2013). 
Despite this kind of controversy, however, it is important to remain aware 
that the notion of national culture, and chieaincy as a part of it, is not being 
directly challenged; it is really only the possibility of cleansing chieaincy of 
mundane politics that is being problematized. Outright rejection of the idea 
of chieaincy as culture has, in fact, come from certain Christian quarters. 
Culture and religion 
As discussed above, some of the ritual forms integral to traditional 
chieaincy have become associated with Ghanaian national culture and in 
this respect they have developed secular meanings, shiing them from the 
domain of religious rituals to categories of ‘ceremonies’ and ‘festivals’, and 
thus becoming acceptable to members of mainstream Christian churches. 
However, simultaneously, they have also reconnected to religion. From at least 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the missionary view of indigenous 
119
Culture and religion
religious ideas and practices as ‘heathenism’ was disputed,67 and, particularly 
from the 1960s and onwards, African theologians and intellectuals started 
to call for an ‘africanization’ or ‘indigenization’ of Christianity, which meant 
practising one’s Christian faith without losing one’s cultural identity. In 
practice ‘africanization’ has entailed such things as incorporating drumming 
and dancing into the church liturgy as well as giving Christian meanings to 
certain traditional concepts and symbols. However, it was always thought 
that this should never compromise the core message of Christianity and give 
way to syncretism, which the reformers thought had happened in many of the 
so-called African Independent Churches (Meyer 1992, 98–103). In Asante, a 
long-term proponent of such ideas has been the Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of Kumasi, Peter Sarpong, who has reapplied chiey titles, ‘praise poems’, 
and regalia to God, Christ, and the church functionaries (Obeng 1996, 129-
130); but, maybe more controversially, he has made a number of positive 
statements about the pouring of libation, which is basically a ritual oering 
made by chiefs and traditional priests to the spirit world. According to 
Sarpong, it should have a central place in public functions, because it is “not 
demonic or evil, as some perceived, but rather it sought for blessings and 
other benecial graces for the nation, its leaders and the entire population” 
(Modern Ghana, 10th March 2011). Hence, its overall favourable meaning 
should overshadow its non-Christian origins. We can, of course, see here 
the importance of the cultural continuity that the post-Vatican II Catholic 
Church has actively promoted,68 but more specically, it is obvious that the 
‘africanized’ forms of Christianity have kept pace with nationalist ideology, 
as the Christian worshipper is perceived as a Ghanaian (or an African) and 
the rituals involved are considered to express that identity as well as bringing 
God’s blessing to the nation and its representatives. Hence, the modern 
‘africanized’ variants of Christianity seem to match the blueprint of religion 
in a secular nation-state: a person’s rst loyalty in ‘this-worldly’ existence 
belongs to the nation (see Asad 2003, 192–194).
Such incorporations are not possible for all Ghanaian Christians. 
Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity, a movement that gained a strong 
footing in Ghanaian society during the 1980s and 1990s, sees the value 
of culture very dierently. Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity has been 
characterized as a ‘cult of transformation’ but also a ‘cult of discontinuity’, 
67 In his political writings Casely-Hayford (1970 [1903], 104–106) called for a 
“national Church” and saw it as a convert’s right to “sing his own native songs, and 
play his native airs in church”. 
68 II Vatican Council was an ecumenical council convened by Pope John XXIII 
between 1962 and 1965 which has been characterized as “the symbol of the church’s 
openness to the modern world” (Hennesey n. d.). It promoted larger communal 
participation by giving a central role to local cultural forms in the church and 
establishing common ground with non-Christians (ibid.). It is said that aer the 
council the Catholic Church’s public role also changed from that of staunch critic 
of secular modernity to endorser of human rights and development ideologies. is 
had a major impact on church policies in many African countries (see Hinfelaar 
2011). 
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because the converts are expected to make a complete break with their 
pre-conversion lives. Once the break has been made, the converts are to 
keep themselves separate from the surrounding social world by adhering 
to an ascetic moral code that prohibits most of its pleasures, and gures it 
as a domain governed by the devil. As noted in the beginning of Chapter 
3, all forms of Christianity emphasize the importance of rupture and 
change in one way or another and for Ghanaian Pentecostals an important 
question is how to distance themselves from traditional ‘pagan practices’. 
e interesting point is that pre-conversion ontologies are not abandoned 
as lies or delusions; rather, they are preserved and regularly engaged with. 
Consequently, Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity accepts the cognitive 
claims of traditional religion concerning the existence of spirits and 
their powers, but it does not agree on the moral values attached to them. 
It demonizes the indigenous spirit world and urges the followers of true 
Christianity to combat the spirits as representatives of the devil (Meyer 1998a; 
Robbins 2004b, 127–129). From the Pentecostal perspective, connections to 
ritual performances such as pouring libation, and ritual objects like chiey 
ancestral stools, bring people under the inuence of evil spirits. According to 
this logic, contemporary Ghanaians who have been able to make ‘paganism’ 
a thing of the past should not readopt it in a new innocent-looking form 
because, notwithstanding the veneer, they will become ‘cursed’: punished by 
God for their participation (Meyer 1998a, 323–324). A Pentecostal pastor 
warned people of this danger in a religious pamphlet: 
. . . if you also partake in idol worship with its attendant rites like pouring of 
libation […] and a host of witchcra practices, enshrined in our traditional 
festivals, which have been cunningly put under the umbrella of ‘culture,’ then 
know that you are extending the expiry date to another four generations. If your 
children also continue in your footsteps, then the curse will continue perpetually. 
is is the reason why it is imperative for this present generation in Ghana to do 
away with idol worship. (Quoted in ibid., 326; italics added)
Here culture is perceived as a ‘Trojan horse’ inside which fetishism is 
smuggled back into society and, what is worse, also allowed to contaminate 
Christianity. As Birgit Meyer (1992) has pointed out, even mainstream 
churches live with the risk of fragmenting because of convictions like this. 
Furthermore, along with its culture, the whole idea of a nation has been 
revalued by the Pentecostals. ey increasingly perceive Christianity as a 
global movement, which the authority structures of the post-colonial state 
should not limit. e horizontally tied informal networks of churches 
throughout West Africa and beyond make this idea a reality. Growing 
migration to Europe and North America as well as new high-tech 
communication and media networks have further amplied the processes 
of ‘de-territorialization’ and ‘de-nationalization’ of Pentecostal culture. In 
this movement a person’s primary identity is Christian and not national, 
let alone ethnic. us Pentecostalism sees itself as translocal rather than 
indigenous (see e.g. Marshall-Fratani 1998; Englund 2003; Piot 2010, 53–
76, 91–94). As a result, it seems directly to negate the basic assumption of 
modern secularist ideology, according to which an individual’s primary 
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allegiance is to the nation and this should not be compromised by secondary 
religious loyalties.
For many Pentecostals chieaincy is inseparable from ‘pagan religion’ 
and thus re-introducing it as culture cannot be anything else than a diabolical 
hoax. Consequently, some Pentecostal churches view traditional institutions 
with similar zeal as the early Christian converts and are frequently in 
confrontation with chiefs and other so-called traditionalists. is situation 
has also produced a secularist backlash in which Christians are told not to 
confuse culture with religion. For example, a web columnist asks why the 
idea of cultural heritage seems to be problematic only to African Christians:
I have never heard a white Christian Pastor condemn Julius Caesar or any 
of the Roman and Greek gods. Rather, the collapsing temples of Greek and 
Roman ‘idolatry’ are promoted as national treasures, visited by Popes, Cardinals, 
Pastors, Christians and countless tourists. I wonder if one cannot be an African 
Christian, and yet remain respectable [sic] of what his ancestors accomplished, 
just as Europeans seem to have done. Why should some African Christians 
view Chieaincy and its regalia as idolatrous, when the white missionaries who 
converted Africans to Christianity were sent to do that job with the blessings of 
their Queens and Kings? (Ellison 2005)
Although Christianity can be characterized as the majority religion in 
present-day Asante and many chiefs are practicing Christians, conicts 
between churches and traditional rulers surface occasionally. Traditional 
rulers are still expected to perform many of the ritual duties of their pre-
colonial predecessors and one of the ery topics of discussion is whether 
Christians can assume traditional oce, and if so, to what extent they 
can perform the rituals linked to the oce without compromising their 
religious convictions (see, e.g., Gilbert 1995). Similarly, the participation 
of Christians in collective traditional rituals remains a contested public 
issue. Everyone following Ghanaian news media is familiar with complaints 
about either chiefs ‘imposing pagan customs’ on Christians or Christians 
‘violating traditional norms’.69 ese debates are also becoming more and 
more aligned with the ideas of international human rights (Atiemo 2006). 
As some Pentecostal-Charismatic churches disapprove of both the idea of 
national culture and the primacy of the secular state, they are not willing to 
accept chieaincy either as ‘politics’ or ‘culture’.
69 Perhaps the most publicized incidents in recent times have been connected to 
the so-called drumming ban decreed by the Ga Traditional Council in the Accra 
area. e Ga people, who are the indigenous inhabitants of the capital, celebrate 
an annual ritual ‘festival’ called Homowo presided over by the paramount chiefs 
of the area. During some phases of Homowo drumming, dancing, and loud noises 
are tabooed. Some Pentecostal churches of the city have been (intentionally or 
not) indierent to this ban and continued playing music in their services, which 
has led to conicts between the church members and Ga traditionalists (see Van 
Dijk 2001). Some Asante have viewed this as evidence of what they see as the sorry 
state of Ga chieaincy. According to them, no church in Kumasi would ever dare 
to challenge the Asantehene in a similar manner. Comments like this have also led 
to heated exchanges in the media between representatives of the two ethnic groups 
(see Atiemo 2006, 374).
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I n his recent book Charles Piot (2010) argues that the last decade of the  twentieth century was marked by the crumbling of the post-colonial order 
in Africa, calling attention to the ways in which the centres of power and 
chains of authority that dened relations between the rulers and the ruled 
have been called into question in the post-Cold War world. On the global 
level, he observes, power is no longer exercised through the structures of 
the “old order”, the nation states and their organizations, but rather through 
the horizontally-linked signature institutions of the neoliberal world order 
such as the World Bank and the IMF. Based on his material from Togo, 
Piot also claims that in rural Africa the state-supported chieaincy and the 
gerontocracy attached to it are losing ground. In Togo, for example, there 
appears to be no trace of a resurgence of chieaincy; on the contrary, the 
local political eld has been taken over by such ‘anti-traditional’ actors as 
the Pentecostal churches and NGOs. For Piot this has meant the end of the 
hundred-year history of indirect rule.
In the previous chapter I have already discussed how in Ghana the 
state-sponsored ideology of national culture, with chieaincy as part of it, 
has been powerfully criticized by the Pentecostal-Charismatic Christian 
movement that has assumed a strong transnational identity. Considering 
the Pentecostal critique and the global developments described by Piot one 
would certainly expect that Ghanaian chieaincy would also be fading away, 
together with the weakening nation-state and its meagre resources; sidelined 
from politics and suspect as a cultural symbol the future would not seem 
to have much to oer. However, at the beginning of the new millennium 
the chiefs seem to be more than ready to exploit the opportunities of the 
post-Cold War age and have been nding recognition and support from 
new, unexpected sources. ey are also emerging as transnational actors 
and this has quite dramatically altered their relationship to the post-colonial 
state and the nationalism propagated by it. In this chapter I discuss these 
developments and, in particular, the unique relationship between the World 
Bank and the present Asantehene which has been established in recent years. 
e most striking feature is that chieaincy seems to be breaking away from 
the control of the nation-state while establishing new kinds of ‘indirect 
rule relationships’ with the horizontal institutions (see Berry 2004, 97–98); 
meanwhile it is being legitimated by an ideology, very similar to that of 
the colonial era, that portrays chieaincy as an indigenous form of liberal 
democracy. 
123
Chiefs and civil society
Chiefs and civil society
Ghana of the 1990s was not only a developing or ird World country, but 
also among the 38 poorest countries in the world. As such its economy was 
(and still is) heavily dependent on a host of donor organizations such as 
the World Bank with the result that many of the policies of the Ghanaian 
government have been steered by the preferences of the donors (see 
Boafo-Arthur 1999). Previously, the World Bank and other international 
development organizations, which operated within a neo-classical economic 
framework, had ignored traditional institutions. eir approaches were state-
centred and the contribution of traditional institutions to the development 
of Africa was seen as either insignicant or negative (see Adi 2005). By 
the 1990s, however, many international donors had become disappointed 
with states as partners and were seriously reconsidering the fundamentals 
of development aid. A World Bank report published in 1995, for instance, 
argued that a major obstacle to the development of Sub-Saharan Africa was 
that the majority governments in the region had been for most of the post-
independence period “captured by small groups of elites, usually ethnically 
bound” who had not been accountable for their decisions or dealings to the 
people they governed; consequently, the infrastructure of African countries 
had remained undeveloped or had been allowed to deteriorate, which also 
directly impeded the work of the aid organizations. e initial solution to 
the problems had been to send in “tens of thousands of expatriate technical 
assistants”, but the end result was poor (World Bank 1995, 62). 
Before long, Western donors started to talk about the crisis of the 
African state and its institutions, taking into account that the plight of the 
continent was not simply the outcome of the greed and irresponsibility 
of its rulers: it was rst and foremost a structural crisis. To nd their way 
out of the predicament and put an end to so-called Afro-pessimism, the 
World Bank launched a research program titled Africa’s Management in the 
1990s (AM90s), in the course of which its analysts traced the root cause of 
the crisis to the colonial legacy. According to them, at independence most 
African countries had inherited “a hybrid and disconnected system in which 
modern governance and public administration systems were superimposed 
on the traditional institutions and the indigenous management system of 
civil society” (Dia 1996, 43). e colonial state had been created to serve 
the political and economic needs of the European metropoles and not 
the development of the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies with the 
result that there were no channels through which local populations could 
eectively take part in political decision-making or prevent abuses of power. 
is model of administration had not changed much aer the end of the 
colonial era and continued to be “powerful, isolated, repressive, and locally 
alienating” (ibid.). At the same time, however, there had existed a great 
variety of traditional institutions at the level of civil society that the Africans 
themselves had developed for their own needs, but which were now suering 
from scarce resources and lack of ocial recognition (ibid., 36–44). is gap 
was to be bridged by modernizing traditional institutions, on the one hand, 
and better integrating modern institutions into local society, on the other, 
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which would then create improved conditions for economic growth (ibid., 
28–35). In practice, this has meant public sector reforms whereby many 
government functions have been outsourced to private enterprises, NGOs, 
and traditional authorities like chiefs (World Bank 1995, 62–66), initiatives 
which reect the neoliberal policies that have dominated the Western 
powers’ approach to development since the 1980s (see e.g. Ferguson 2006, 
1–49; Harvey 2005, 87–119).
As the analysts of the AM90s program were convinced that the 
institutional and legal framework of African states had to reect “societal 
norms and behavior, as enshrined in indigenous and informal institutions”, 
they turned their attention to those countries where they thought 
reconciliation between formal and customary institutions had been achieved 
(Dia 1996, 105). In Ghana chiefs were said to provide important public 
services to local communities and were, in fact, closer to the people than any 
other institutional actors. Furthermore, chieaincy had shown remarkable 
exibility as it had been tested by time and it was still able to attract highly 
educated professionals to become traditional rulers. e role of Asante chiefs 
as judges and land administrators was used as a prime example by the AM90s 
analysts. e paramount chiefs and their councils were said to constitute the 
law courts of local communities, which were now busy handling cases that 
had been withdrawn from government courts and brought to chiefs’ courts; 
according to the Bank’s estimation, in no less than 90% of cases people 
accepted the decisions of traditional rulers and did not appeal to higher 
courts. As administrators of stool lands the chiefs allocated land for farming, 
building, and development projects and occasionally also generated money 
income for their communities by selling some of their holdings (ibid., 105-
110). Although African chieaincy systems traditionally had a hierarchical 
structure they were seen to be “generally governed by consensus and broad 
participation” (ibid., 39). is was manifested in the ways the chiefs were 
elected to their oces by their people and the systems of checks and balances 
on possible abuses of power. Again, the popular destoolment process among 
the Asante was mentioned as an example (ibid., 39–41).70 e researchers 
concluded that the traditional institutions can “adapt to the requirements of 
modern management” and that “the continuing and important role and the 
contributions of the chieaincy institution need to be recognized by both 
donors and national governments interested in promoting sustainable local 
community development” (ibid., 109–111). It was not only that chieaincy 
was an important “additional governance institution”, easing the workload 
of formal institutions, but enhancing and supporting it was now also seen 
70 e legitimacy of traditional political institutions was also studied by using 
quantitative research methods in the Volta Region. e study indentied ve 
dierent “chieaincy functions” (judicial, religious/cultural, legislative, symbolic, 
and military/security), aer which survey participants were asked to grade how 
eectively the chiefs were able to fulll these functions. e results of this “citizen 
performance rating” indicated that chieaincy in the Volta Region of Ghana had 
a very high ‘legitimacy rate’, higher than, for instance, the central government of 
Zambia (Dia 1996, 110–111).
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as the most eective way for “greater empowerment of local communities” 
(ibid., 106). us chieaincy, not so long ago labelled as ‘feudal’ or ‘elitist’, was 
now talked about as an essential part of democratic civil society in Africa. 
e irony of it all is, of course, that the views of the World Bank researchers 
of the 1990s were very similar to those of the colonial administrators of the 
1920s and 30s, while it was concurrently being maintained that the colonial 
state structure was the root cause of Africa’s current problems. 
King of the World Bank
e best example of the new role of the chiefs is the co-operation between 
the World Bank and the Asante Kingdom which commenced in 1999 on 
the initiative of the newly installed Asantehene Osei Tutu II. In a meeting 
with the then Ghana Country Director of the World Bank, the Asantehene 
had expressed his concern about how traditional rulers had been le out of 
the planning and management of development projects at the community 
level. e negotiations later led to the establishment of a World Bank-
funded project titled Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities 
Project (PPTAP) (Osei Tutu II 2004). rough the project the World Bank 
granted a “learning and innovation loan” of ve million US dollars to 
provide infrastructure for basic education, create health education modules 
for traditional authorities especially with regards HIV/AIDS, build the 
management capacity of traditional authorities, and preserve local cultural 
heritage; the Asanteman Council, successor to the colonial Confederacy 
Council, was the project’s “responsible agency” and principal implementer 
(World Bank 2003). On two occasions the Bank also invited the king to its 
headquarters in Washington DC where he was able to secure funding for 
water and sanitation facilities for 1,000 communities in Ghana (Osei Tutu 
II 2004). According to some sources, the Asantehene received in total more 
than 50 million dollars from the World Bank for promoting community-
based development projects during the early 2000s (see Akosah-Sarpong 
2004). While, in terms of international development aid in general, the sums 
received were quite modest, the remarkable thing here is how the aid has 
been directed. It has not been channelled through governmental institutions, 
or even NGOs or religious bodies, but through a king and his council who, 
in the legal framework of the state, should not even exist. e government of 
Ghana which, aer all, is listed as a borrower in the loan documents of the 
PPTAP (e.g. World Bank 2003), has been relegated to the role of spectator, 
while functions of education and health care are being ‘outsourced’ to the 
chiefs by a powerful horizontal institution. 
In addition to monetary aid, the World Bank has also been involved in 
programs that aim to strengthen the adjudication capacity of traditional 
leaders in Asante and elsewhere in Ghana. e World Development Report 
2002, titled Building Institutions for the Market, claimed that economic 
growth and poverty reduction had been achieved only in countries with 
ecient and inclusive markets: swi and aordable dispute resolution was 
listed as one of the main institutional requirements for the growth and 
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functioning of markets (World Bank 2002). In the case of Ghana, the Bank 
was concerned about the large number of court cases relating to ownership of 
land that were pending in government courts and retarding Ghana’s growth 
prospects. erefore, it was suggested that the traditional authorities should 
have a central role in the delivery of justice and thus enable “Ghana to achieve 
its developmental objectives” (Gonzales de Asis 2006). In the discussions 
about the necessity for justice reforms the eectiveness, inexpensiveness, 
and familiarity of the traditional institutions were very openly juxtaposed 
with the alleged ineptitude of state institutions. For instance, at a seminar 
titled Leadership Dialogue with Traditional Authorities organized in a luxury 
hotel in Kumasi in December 2005, the then Senior Vice-President of the 
World Bank told his chiey audience that African customary law systems 
“evolve naturally with the communities” and thus remain important, while 
“the States in many countries have failed to provide access to justice to 
most of the population”. erefore it had become impossible to talk about 
justice in Africa without taking the traditional institutions into account: the 
question was “how, not whether, to support them, and how best to integrate 
them with the formal system” (Dañino 2005).71
e bank loans and market-friendly legal reforms have been accompanied 
by a discourse about Ghanaian chiefs as ‘managers’ or ‘business executives’ 
(see Abdulai 2006). In April 2000 the Asantehene spoke to the Ashanti 
Regional House of Chiefs about attracting investors to their localities:
It’s no good just selling the land and pocketing the proceeds. But arranging for 
equity share in an investment, you create condence in the investor because he 
knows you are involved in the business. You may even become a director and this 
will ensure your future well being. Additionally, you create job opportunities for 
your people and the economic prosperity of your area. (Kumasi Mail, July 25 – 
July 31, 2000)
Here the traditional ruler has to consider land rst and foremost as a resource 
that can be employed in money-generating activities with corporations. 
e Asantehene himself has also set up a development business, Golden 
Development Holding Company Ltd., to “undertake multi-sectoral regional 
development projects to accelerate the economic and social growth in 
Asanteman through subsidiary companies under health, education, tourism 
and infrastructure, banking and nancial services, agriculture and agro-
business, land and forestry sectors” (Modern Ghana, 21st October 2001). 
Accordingly, promoting external investment has become an important 
part of his representative tasks both in Ghana and abroad. Visiting trade 
71 One chief who participated in the ”Leadership Dialogue” told me that he does not 
think that there is a single chief in the country who would object to the idea of 
chiefs having more power and hence they would at least in principle support the 
World Bank reforms. However, when we started discussing how the traditional 
courts could actually be incorporated into the state justice system, he was quick 
to point out a number of incompatibilities that would be almost impossible to 
overcome. 
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exhibitions, receiving business delegations, and inaugurating commercial 
buildings, among other similar activities, now top his itinerary (see e.g. 
Ghana Review International 2004). is can be viewed as a part of a global 
trend, wherein traditional communities are expected “to ‘become business-
like,’ to ‘market’ themselves, to ‘manage’ their symbolic and material assets” 
(Comaro and Comaro 2009, 8; see also Cattelino 2011; Cook 2011).
Although there are striking similarities between the ideas of the architects 
of indirect rule and the development theorists of the World Bank, the 
twenty-rst-century situation diers in many ways from that of the colonial 
era, a major example lying in how the chiefs dene themselves. During 
the colonial period the public discourse about the democratic nature of 
chieaincy was mainly directed at the policy-makers and the anti-colonial 
opposition in the metropolitan country, and, to some extent, the African 
intellectuals in the colony, but the chiefs themselves, at least in Asante, took 
very little part in it. e current situation is quite dierent: the chiefs are 
familiar with global development debates and recognize the relevance of 
them to their own positions, and some participate in them at least as uently 
as Western bureaucrats or academics. e introduction in the Asantehene’s 
keynote address at the Fourth African Development Forum (ADF IV), 
in October 2004, titled Traditional systems of governance and the modern 
state, that echoed the sentiments of the ‘liberal tradition’ is an illuminating 
example: 
African societies, throughout the centuries, have been organized on the basis 
of a social contract whereby people come together to form a state or nation 
because they believe that, through their combined eorts, they will be more able 
to realize their common aspirations for peace and security, which are essential 
for their physical and spiritual welfare and progress, both as individuals and as 
a community. It is to achieve these objectives that the people agree collectively 
to surrender to a king or ruler the power to control their lives and to organize 
and regulate activities within their society. In the process, they have always had 
clear understandings and agreements regarding the ideas and principles that 
underlie their political systems and on the basis of which power and authority are 
to be exercised by the various elements of government. By traditional systems, 
I refer to genuine traditional institutions, uncontaminated by colonial or post-
independence modications or distortions. (Osei Tutu II 2004) 
Here the underpinnings of a political community are found in the individual 
incentive to unite for the common good – very much like in the theories 
of the early Gold Coast nationalists or in the petitions of the Christian 
converts. Furthermore, in his address the Asantehene claimed that in Africa 
the majority of citizens live in rural areas and are hardly touched by “the 
sophisticated constitutional and legal structures or the ocial court systems” 
and hold “a traditional worldview and look to their chiefs and elders for 
development, settlement of disputes, allocation of land, nancial support 
to the needy and other elements of social insurance”. He also maintained 
that the traditional rulers’ concern about issues of development is more 
consistent and long-term than the politicians’, because the chiefs’ “social 
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contract” with their people is forever and not merely until the next election. 
us the chiefs “can and do play a vital role in development, which at once 
enhances democracy and sustains good governance” (ibid.). e speech is 
a perfect example of how the chiefs are now able to portray themselves as 
the genuine representatives of the people, or at least that silent majority that 
is not familiar with the complexities of the post-colonial state. e state in 
Africa is seen as something ‘imposed’ or ‘transplanted’, whereas chieaincy 
is considered something ‘natural’ and ‘familiar’. Similarly, the Asantehene 
does not present chieaincy to his international audience as an institution 
that has a religious foundation, its structures culminating in sacricial 
rituals, but rather as the ‘authentic political institution’ which it represents 
in the eyes of Western sponsors. is talk about contract and consensus 
is, however, a departure from the authoritarian tone sometimes used in 
domestic circles: for instance, when it is declared that every chiey oce in 
the kingdom belongs to the Asantehene and he has the “powers to take over 
any stool whose disloyalty is suspect” (Kumasi Mail, October 10 – October 
16, 2000), or that “he would not hesitate to take over lands [from the chiefs], 
which are lying fallow and not benetting anybody” (Kumasi Mail, July 25 
– July 31, 2000).
For the donor organizations, chieaincy’s new self-denition has oered 
a valuable conrmation of the validity of their vision. During a lecture at 
Metropolitan Washington Trinity College in 2004, James D. Wolfensohn, 
the then President of the World Bank, was asked whether the imposition 
of a free market economy would eventually lead to any positive results in 
the ird World. In his reply Wolfensohn denied that the World Bank was 
trying to impose any economic or political models on anybody and brought 
up the Asante case:
Less than ve days ago, my wife and I were in Ghana, and we visited the Ashanti 
tribe and visited the Asantehene, the leader of the Ashanti Tribe, which is 8 
million people. And we were received with the music of horns […] and drums, 
a system of absolute beauty in terms of tribal customs. And we’re working with 
the Ashantis to help them build the sort of society that they want. And the 
leader of the Ashantis is anxious to ensure that the rural community develops 
as he wants, but he wants to bring in also some industry and he wants to bring 
in computers and he wants to bring in modern education for his people. And 
this is not something which we’re imposing. is is a decision which the tribal 
leadership has decided it wants to do, and I think that is the way that it should be 
done. I don’t think we should go to countries and insist that they should follow 
one political framework or one economic framework if they want to follow 
another. (Wolfensohn 2004)
Without going into any detail concerning the local political or economic 
framework, it is assumed that the Asantehene, “the tribal leadership”, and the 
“tribe” have a consensus about “the sort of society that they want”. A similar 
view is prevalent in the World Bank’s own project descriptions, where 
traditional institutions are characterized as ‘popular’ or ‘user-friendly’. Here 
the presupposed antiquity and authenticity of the traditional institutions are 
also interpreted as evidence of some kind of ‘direct democracy’. However, 
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this line of thinking elides the fact that even though the Asantehene’s 
initiatives and projects have been received enthusiastically by many, there 
are also some Asante people who have been very critical of his policies and 
dealings with the World Bank. For instance, an open letter to the President 
of the World Bank was published on both Ghanaian and American internet 
sites in which the writer, a Ghanaian journalist, demanded a thorough 
external investigation of the Asantehene’s projects, because he had reason 
to believe that some of the funds had been misappropriated (Poku 2005). 
e critics have found it hard to accept that chieaincy, which was not long 
ago dened as ‘cultural’, is all of a sudden becoming ‘politicized’ (see, e.g., 
Yarrow 2008, 234–235).
e views promoted by the chiefs and the World Bank suggest that the 
traditional institutions embody ideals that are widely considered universal 
and hence their legitimacy does not depend on state recognition. As we 
have seen, liberal ideas about the contractual or democratic foundations of 
chieaincy are already a hundred years old, but the most novel characteristic 
here is rather the global or transnational nature of chieaincy, distinctive to 
the neoliberal era. Not only does the Asantehene by-pass the Ghanaian state 
and deal with the horizontal institutions directly – for example, by holding 
talks in the World Bank’s US headquarters – he is also in permanent contact 
with Asante and other African communities in diaspora, seeking to get 
them involved in the development projects (see, e.g., Ghana Business News, 
10th June 2010). However, what is more interesting is his work in promoting 
chieaincy in other countries in the region. e civil-war torn West African 
state of Sierra Leone, where international donor organizations initially 
adopted completely dierent approach to traditional political institutions, is 
a case in point. Chiefs were blamed for the social and economic inequalities 
of the rural areas, which were seen as a major cause of the civil war, and 
therefore aid organizations, the World Bank among them, were reluctant to 
include them in any post-war rebuilding programs. Some even discussed 
the option of abolishing chieaincy altogether as ‘corrupt’ or ‘unsustainable’ 
(Fanthorpe 2005). In response to this, the Asantehene, who had already in 
his 2004 speech noted that “the absence of strong traditional systems” had 
signicantly contributed to the instability in countries like Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire, has since been appointed by the Sierra Leonean 
government as the “principal resource person” for a program to restructure 
the chieaincy institution (State House, 28th April 2010). During his visit to 
the country in April 2005 he held talks with the then president and spoke 
to a meeting of all the 149 paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone. He reiterated 
his views on how conicts in Africa could have been prevented if “we had 
held solidly to our God-given traditions and customs” and how traditional 
systems “held the key to peace, stability and development in the continent” 
(Yeboah 2005). us, it seems that horizontal networks of chiefs are now in 
the making. 
Osei Tutu’s ‘neoliberal kingship’ is not discussed here at length because it 
might appear to constitute an end point to the secularization of chieaincy 
that started more than a century ago as a result of Christian conversion 
and the conicts that had followed. e great sacrer has not been reduced 
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to a business manager. On the contrary, Osei Tutu still diligently observes 
many of the same rituals and taboos as his predecessors. erefore we could 
rather say that now, in addition to the spirits of his warrior ancestors and 
the Golden Stool, the power of the Asantehene is also backed by the World 
Bank. But what is more, the Asantehene and his ‘managerial chiefs’ are also 
agents in that post-Cold War landscape described by Piot. In similar ways to 
the Pentecostal churches the chiefs of Ghana are also becoming translocal. 
ey are not withering away with the post-colonial state, but are rather 
assuming new identities, functions, and principles of legitimation, which 
in turn resonate with the notions of the colonial era, when chieaincy was 
dened as, and shaped toward becoming, a secular institution.
Problems of purification III
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S ecularism has not been solely about the separation of the social categories  of religion and politics. It has also entailed a “dematerialization of religion”, 
in the direction of something that ought to be understood primarily as mental 
or spiritual (Keane 2013). is has had certain political consequences which 
will be explored in this nal part of the book. Decreeing administrative rules 
for separating individual ‘religious conscience’ from politics was one thing 
but to cast the indigenous belief system in the mould of an individualistic 
religion was quite another. e early missionaries had concluded that 
Africans had no religion – merely fetishes and superstitions which did not 
deserve to be included in that category (Chidester 1996, 11–16), a perception 
that was later challenged by ‘indigenist’ missionaries’ discussions of African 
metaphysics, and colonial administrators’ ideas of ‘tribal religion’. In the 
former, the all-embracive nature of religion in traditional society was given 
a peculiar individualist interpretation. Since a great variety of ‘religious 
practices’, like pouring libation to ancestral spirits, observing dietary taboos, 
or preparing medicines, was a part of everyday life for the Africans, this had 
to be evidence of their deeply religious nature. e problem was that this 
estimable characteristic was misdirected to the supercial and superstitious. 
Fortunately, in the ‘depths’ one was able to see elements or traces of high 
religion; for example, in the belief in a creator or supreme god. e task of the 
missionary was, therefore, to suppress the supercial elements and develop 
those which were more profound (Fabian 1990, 350–351). 
e determination to cleanse African religion of superstition was 
shared by the administrators, although their motivations had less to do 
with theology. It was deemed that an African ‘tribe’ had its own distinctive 
language, culture, political system, and religion, all of which separated it 
from other units at the same level. While tribal religion legitimated the 
authority of the traditional rulers and therefore supported the indirect rule 
system, certain aspects of it did not t this design and had to be marginalized 
or suppressed: anti-witchcra ‘cults’ that travelled across both tribal and 
colonial boundaries, for instance, or prophetic revitalization movements 
that questioned the authority of the chiefs were seen as such. Consequently, 
they were excluded from the category of religion and demoted to the 
class of superstition (Ranger 1993, 68–69). In the case of the Asante, the 
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administrators, missionaries, and even anthropologists alike aspired to 
sweep “their Pantheon clean of the fetish” (Rattray 1959 [1927], v–vi), while 
saving everything that was valuable in the traditional religion (Rattray 1929, 
vi–xiii). 
Reforms in this vein have also taken place all over the globe in relation 
to Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, as well as dierent forms of 
Christianity (Keane 2007, 78-79). Webb Keane has analyzed such processes 
in Indonesia via his innovative use of Bruno Latour’s concept of purication, 
an idea originally developed in a dierent context. In order to understand 
how modern natural and social sciences acquired their own separate 
spheres of study, Latour discusses how nature and society are separated 
from each other as pure forms; consequently the phenomena studied by 
the dierent disciplines have to be dened so that they belong exclusively 
to one or the other. us purication produces two distinct “ontological 
zones”: that of human beings and that of non-humans, each functioning 
according to a dierent set of rules (Latour 1993, 1–29). From the point of 
view of modern sciences, traditional societies that personify or deify nature 
have made “a horrible mishmash of things and humans” that needs to be 
sorted out (ibid., 38–39). However, the diculty with purication is that it 
is inevitably accompanied by processes of translation which create hybrids 
that are mixtures of nature and culture, making purication a never-ending 
task (ibid., 49–51). 
Keane also brings up the idea of purication when he discusses 
individual agency as the link between Protestant Christianity and the idea 
of modernity. In his study he shows how it was a central preoccupation for 
the Dutch Calvinist missionaries to convince the Indonesian converts that 
God, Christ, and human beings possessed agency, in their own respective 
ways, while sacricial oerings, ritual recitations, and spirits, for example, 
did not (Keane 2007, 54). In the missionary parlance fetishism became 
a derogatory term directed at those who had “purportedly confounded 
the proper boundaries between agentive subjects and mere objects”. is 
accusation entailed a similar ontological division as that present in modern 
thinking in Latour’s description: material objects that obey the laws of 
nature, on the one hand, and mental and / or spiritual subjects that have 
their own will, on the other (ibid., 77). Hence the missionaries were puriers 
in the very sense that they sought to detach agency from things such as the 
words in a prayer (ibid., 181–185), or the food shared in ceremonial meals 
(ibid., 237–248) in Keane’s Indonesian examples. en again, even though 
the goal of Protestant purication was an immaterial and transcendent 
religion, it could not have existed or been transmitted socially without some 
sort of symbolic and material instantiations. Hence, one needed books, 
buildings, songs, and gestures, among other things, which nonetheless were 
always at risk of becoming fetishized and thus turning into hybrids (ibid., 
79–80). Lastly, Keane points out that Latour’s discussion of purication 
primarily concerns the relationship between science and society, and that it 
does not fully explore the driving force behind the urge to purify (ibid., 23–
25). Why is purifying a moral imperative for modern reformers and what 
exactly threatens us if the agency of humans is projected onto mute objects? 
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Keane’s answer has to do with freedom and responsibility. To many the idea 
of modernity presents itself as a “narrative of liberation”, in which human 
subjects are becoming increasingly aware of their own agency and freeing 
themselves of superuous material or social constraints. According to this 
line of thinking, purication is absolutely necessary in order to achieve 
individual autonomy, since false perceptions of things acting on the subject 
compromise his / her freedom (ibid., 54–55). Conversely, the acceptance 
of any kind of fetishist ideas cannot be viewed as a morally neutral choice 
or even a simple mistake, because by submitting personal agency to 
material objects, words, or fantasies, a human being is transferring his / her 
responsibility for real actions and events to mere things. erefore, from 
the modernist perspective, fetishism is “a source of political self-betrayal” 
(ibid., 77). 
Here I adopt Keane’s formulation of purication, understanding it to mean 
the determining of what will count as possible agents and what as possible 
actions. As Keane argues, attempts to establish the real place of agency in 
the world have important consequences in every sector of society (ibid., 
80–81). Accordingly, in the nal part of this book, I discuss the importance 
of complicated negotiations and contestations over political agency in 
colonial and post-colonial Ghana. What happens when ‘things’ like local 
deities, witchcra, and sacrices are not recognized as agents and actions 
by modern state authorities, while they remain very much so for the people 
being governed? How have Pentecostal Christian ideas about the agency 
of God and malevolent spirits in the workings of secular politics spread to 
the public sphere and with what consequences? When modern thinking 
removed God from both nature and society, holistic ideologies about states 
transcending themselves, or existing for a higher cause, were overthrown. 
However, as Latour (1993, 31–34) points out, in modern religion God is 
“doubled” in a curious way. On the one hand, God becomes transcendent, 
neither inuencing real relations between human beings living in a society 
nor the mechanisms of the material world. On the other, however, this does 
not lead to overall secularization, because God is still present in the “private 
hearts” of individuals, which allows them to form opinions about society and 
nature that are in accordance with God’s will. Nonetheless, although religion 
might not have disappeared from society, God and other kinds of spiritual 
beings are not regarded as valid political agents. is makes it entirely 
reasonable, for instance, to criticize political leaders for being ungodly, or to 
pray that they benet from spiritual guidance and direction, but pointless to 
think that one could become a leader oneself by making sacrices to spirits, 
or to petition the spirits to remove an unpopular leader from oce. 
In this section of the book I concentrate on the problems involved with 
this kind of duplicity: how it is enforced by colonial and post-colonial states 
and how the subject populations are either indierent to it or critical of it. 
In Chapter 7 that follows I discuss witchcra as an object of purication. 
During the pre-colonial period malevolent witchcra had been among the 
state taboos in Asante and its suppression was explicitly the duty of the chief.
e colonial administration banned the conventional methods of witch-
nding and chiefs were stripped of their powers to sentence accused witches 
136
Problems of purification
to death or slavery. For the administrators witchcra beliefs and anti-
witchcra activities represented a tradition that was not only irrational but 
also inhumane and hence it should be abolished and certainly not valorised 
as a part of ‘native religion’. Hence, the transformation of witchcra into a 
category of superstition was a product of secularization. At the same time 
the administrators were forced to cope with a number of rather dierent 
problems related to witchcra, as they were simultaneously witnessing the 
rising popularity of new, country-wide, anti-witchcra ‘cults’. ere was 
no acceptable place for ‘unreal’ witchcra beliefs in the modern colony, 
but, nonetheless, they constituted a ‘real’ force to be reckoned with. e 
Ghanaian post-colonial administration has inherited this dilemma as it too 
combats anti-witchcra violence, now dened as a human rights problem. 
Chapter 8 focuses on dierent perceptions of two military coups staged by 
army ocers with leist leanings in the late 1970s and early 80s. In their 
propaganda the ocers and their supporters labelled the military takeovers 
as “revolutions” – fundamentally a modern concept that puts human agency 
at the centre stage of history in place of divinely ordained cycles of nature 
or the successions of royal dynasties. Furthermore, the coups were expressly 
secularist as it was emphasized that all religious associations in the country 
were to accept the new order and remain loyal to it. Despite this, some coup-
era policies were openly deed by Christian churches, while, interestingly, 
other groups gave the coups a religious interpretation in which it was 
claimed that the ocers had gained power from the spirit world in exchange 
for sacrices. us, in the eyes of some of the subject population a secular 
revolution had become enchanted.
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A lthough tribal religion was seen to support the chiey rule and was  thus benecial to the colonial order in Africa, it also posed a serious 
problem for the administrators. e anthropologists of the era had stated 
that the European governments were able to replace the chiefs in their 
“secular capacity”, but they were never able to assume those credentials of 
the chiefs that were considered “mystical” and “derived from antiquity” 
(Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1969 [1940], 16). ere was always going to 
be the secret, esoteric, and spiritual sector of society that was out of their 
reach. e colonizers could never enter these “sacred precincts” and, as 
a result, their administration was inevitably perceived as something that was 
forced on the subject populations from the outside. e most ecient way to 
overcome this problem was the establishment of a hierarchy of knowledge 
in which scientic rationalism was regarded as universal and true and 
indigenous knowledge as local and relative. e administrative machinery 
was to be operated according to the rules of the former, whereas the latter 
was to be le for the ‘natives’. Yet throughout the colonial period and in 
all colonial empires, the “sacred precincts” were constantly intruded upon 
by the European rulers who, for instance, reformulated customary laws, 
judged chieaincy disputes on the basis of origin myths, and created new 
“traditional” oces (Palmié 2002, 71–72). ey were dragged into sacred 
domains by what were regarded as the more pressing administrative concerns 
of ‘upholding the peace’, ‘restoring order’, and so on, but also by the agency of 
the colonial subjects. Hence, even though the administrators acknowledged 
that ‘native religion’ was not their area of expertise, they were constantly 
debating the acceptability of its content and the correct interpretation of its 
norms. is inconsistency was also the legacy that the administrations of the 
post-colonial era inherited from the European colonial governments despite 
their otherwise vast ideological dierences. In the name of ‘modernization’ 
or ‘development’ the rulers of independent African nation-states adopted 
a European-based concept of how a state should collect and use knowledge, 
thereby renouncing the validity of indigenous forms of knowledge (Cooper 
and Stoler 1989, 612), but they too have faced constant pressures to interfere 
with local epistemologies. 
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Witchcra beliefs do not t the modern blueprint of religion which centres 
on the individual believer’s spiritual conviction and experience,72 and one of 
the tasks assumed by modernist reformers in Africa since the colonial period 
has been to separate witchcra beliefs from so-called indigenous African 
religions as well as African culture, thereby producing a residue that should 
be disposed of. is chapter discusses the ritual suppression of witchcra, 
and ocial attempts, both colonial and post-colonial, to eradicate or control 
witchcra beliefs. Two separate cases are discussed. e rst concentrates 
on the diculties met by colonial administrators in the 1920s and 30s who 
investigated and sometimes abolished anti-witchcra movements that were 
considered dangerous. e second part explores how witchcra suppression 
has become a human rights issue in contemporary Ghana. is is discussed 
in relation to the reaction of post-colonial governments to refugee camps 
in northern Ghana that are populated by suspected witches banished from 
their home villages. Both cases illustrate how witchcra is not granted any 
sort of agentive status in society, while the systems of knowledge related 
to it are persistently disqualied from the public sphere by administrators, 
legislators, and educators. is, in turn, impairs the authorities’ ability to 
function. e concluding section discusses the hybrids formed on those 
occasions when modern states assume anti-witchcra functions. Before 
considering the cases, however, it is useful to look at the logic of witchcra 
and the dierent forms of its suppression. 
Witches, gods, and angels
e anthropological studies of Ghanaian anti-witchcra ‘cults’73 in the 
twentieth century have largely concentrated on the chronological perspective. 
Some authors have maintained that beliefs and fears related to witchcra are 
a relatively recent phenomenon in Akan societies, caused by the social ills 
resulting from rapid changes in the colonial economy. us the so-called 
‘savannah cults’ that originated in the grasslands of northern Ghana and 
were introduced to the south in order to combat witchcra were actually 
an innovative response to new kinds of problems (Field 1940). Others 
72 As Peter Geschiere (1997, 225) has pointed out, terms like witchcra and sorcery are 
clumsy translations of indigenous African notions with much broader meanings. 
However, they are nowadays used by Africans throughout the continent (in public 
discussions, mass-media, etc.) and therefore it is very dicult to do without them. 
I do not nd supposedly more neutral terms like “occult forces” or “occult practices” 
any better. For instance, in Ghana the Christian population sometimes use the 
term “occult” for some traditional ritual practices, which they contrast to their 
own “church religion”. People living in rural communities, practicing ‘traditional 
religion’, do not subscribe to such dichotomies. 
73 Martha Kaplan (1990) claims that in colonial societies movements that departed 
from the established and ocially approved ‘custom’ and were thus potentially 
subversive were easily branded as ‘cults’. Accordingly, she nds the term “to be 
more a category of colonial discourse and practice than an analytic window into 
the complexities of the making of history in colonized societies” (ibid., 4–5). 
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maintained that witchcra and witch-nding were long-standing concerns 
in Akan societies and the proliferation of new ‘cults’ had more to do with 
the colonial administration’s prohibition of some of the older methods of 
witch-nding (Goody 1957). e historians have also contributed to these 
discussions by pointing to important continuities and discontinuities between 
the witchcra discourses of dierent eras (see McCaskie 1981; Allman and 
Parker 2005). Some of the colonial era movements, like Tigare, Tongo, and 
Bra Kunde, are still active in the present day Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo 
Regions, although they do not command the same popularity as they did in 
the early and mid-twentieth century. However, new ones have also appeared. 
e following description is based on several visits to three dierent shrines 
of Atia Mframa in Nkoranza, where I attended sessions of witch nding and 
observed the preparation of protective medicines and charms.74 
Witches (ᴐbayifo, pl. abayifoᴐ) are people – mostly women, but it is 
understood that a man can also be a witch – who control a spiritual power 
known as bayi in order to harm other people. Bayi itself is understood to 
be a morally ambivalent force which can be used for either good or evil, 
with traditional priests claiming to use bayi for good purposes; for instance, 
in protective magic. In popular stories witches have been described as 
ripping unborn babies from their mothers’ wombs, eating human esh, and 
drinking blood, but they are also held responsible for more commonplace, 
yet very serious, problems like poor harvests, failed business deals, ill health, 
or unexpected deaths. Among the Akan witchcra is believed to operate 
only among lineage relatives; therefore, as witches are said to drink the 
blood or eat the esh of their matrilineal relatives, they are envisaged as 
individualistically consuming the shared substance upon which the very 
existence of the kin group is dependent. us they are perceived as people 
74 Atia Mframa has many of the common characteristics of a ‘savannah cult’. It was 
brought from Northern Ghana to the village of Bredi No. 1 in Nkoranza by the local 
priest, Okomfo Kwadwo Adjei, and its current ‘headquarters’ are located there. It 
has gained popularity as a powerful ‘witch-hunter’ and hence many priests from 
dierent localities in Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo have travelled to Bredi in order to 
obtain it for their shrines.
Atia Mframa is celebrated 
annually in the village 
of Bredi No. 1. Okomfo 
Ankomah Adjei, the son and 
successor of the founder of 
the community, is paraded 
through the village on a lion-
shaped palanquin.
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who have put their own passions before the continuation of the group and 
are consequently guilty of extreme selshness. Witchcra is seen to be 
fuelled by jealousy and envy between relatives, which signals disunity and 
departure from the solidarity demanded by moral and traditional norms 
(Fortes 1969, 179–183): fears and anxieties typical of holistic societies 
(see, e.g., Kapferer 1988, 7–15). As a result, the ‘clients’ of anti-witchcra 
shrines are oen people who fear that their success in life, especially in the 
economic sphere, has attracted the attention of their envious witch-relatives 
(see, e.g., Parish 1999, 431–432). Conversely, in the confessions of witch 
suspects the victims of their witchcra are depicted as persons who have 
exploited the goodwill and helpfulness of their relatives earlier in life but 
neglected them aer becoming successful (see, e.g., Ward 1956, 52–55). 
Suspicions and speculations about the activities and identities of witches 
are part of everyday life in Akan communities and mostly they do not lead 
to any dramatic consequences, let alone homicidal violence. Although the 
subjective points of view dier according to situation, it can be said that 
the witchcra discourse as a whole is primarily about “moral personhood” 
(Englund 1996, 273). is is underpinned by perceptions of the unity of the 
kin group and the inseparability of the individual. For modern puriers, of 
course, witchcra discourses are an enormous worksite as they confound 
relations between human beings, mechanisms of nature, and spiritual 
interventions.
Witches are detected and suppressed with the help of charms, medicines, 
forest-monsters, dwarfs, ancestral spirits, and local gods. So-called anti-
witchcra movements usually develop around certain charms or the shrine 
of a god which has a reputation as an ecient witch-hunter. e shrines 
are maintained by traditional priests possessed by the god who can speak 
through them. As indicated above, sometimes the deities and charms 
have been imported to their current location and it is oen said that the 
most powerful witch-hunters have come from northern Ghana or even 
as far north as Burkina Faso or Mali (see McLeod 1975, 113). However, 
many locally-born deities are also known for their potency in ghting 
witchcra.75 ose gods and their priests that are known to perform well 
75 Scholars have speculated on the reasons why southern Akan groups have perceived 
the northern savannah gods to be the most potent weapon against witches. It has 
been suggested that the Akan did not consider their own local abosom to be eective 
against witchcra, while the North, which represented the uncivilized ‘other’ to the 
Akan, was seen to possess the strangeness and ambivalence needed to combat 
the forces of witchcra that were antithetical to Akan society. Furthermore, their 
power was evidenced by the Akan understanding that the northern peoples were 
not anxious about witchcra (see McLeod 1975, 112–113; Allman and Parker 2005, 
106–142). e priests I talked with usually spoke about the relationships between 
dierent spirits, both northern and local, by using a kinship idiom. Although they 
made many distinctions between dierent kinds of spirits, they seldom posited any 
stark dichotomies between them and more oen cultivated expressions like “they 
are a family of spirits” or “all the spirits are one”. ey readily admitted that many 
of the northern spirits are ‘popular’ because they are good at catching witches, but 
categorically denied that the local gods were not capable of doing the same.
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may earn a nation-wide reputation and people from faraway places oen 
come to consult them. I have been told that some Ghana-based deities 
are consulted by visitors from neighbouring countries and as far away as 
Nigeria. Sometimes the priests travel abroad and oer their services to the 
members of the Ghanaian immigrant communities in Europe and North 
America and permanent shrines also operate in the metropolitan centres of 
the global north (see Parish 2011; 2013). 
People consult the gods in times of anticipation, risk-taking, trouble, 
and confusion. Sudden sicknesses, deaths, missing people or property, 
quarrels with other people, pending visa applications, and future economic 
ventures are all concerns that may provide a reason for seeing a traditional 
priest. At times people may already be under the impression that they have 
fallen victim to witchcra and might have a number of suspects in mind. 
Alternatively, in order to prevent witch attacks in the future, they may 
see the priest to ask for a charm or a medicine (aduro, pl. nnuro) that will 
protect them from the powers of the witches in the future. On their arrival 
the visitors are formally welcomed, aer which they introduce themselves 
and their problem to the priest and his / her attendants. From there the case 
is taken to the god and at this point a gi, for example, a bottle of strong 
alcohol and a small sum of money, is presented. e god is consulted when 
the priest has fallen into a trance-like state called akom, marked by shaking 
and twitching of the body, reddish eyes, and changed voice. In akom the 
god speaks through the priest and its messages are communicated to the 
audience by an attendant of the priest. Alternatively, instead of going into 
akom, some priests throw cowries, beads, or bones on a circular area and 
read the patterns they form as signs from the god. If witchcra is diagnosed 
as the cause of the problem in question, the god will give instructions about 
how the witch can be ‘caught’ and, usually, some specic rituals have to 
be performed in order to unleash the powers that will do so. For instance, 
I once witnessed a case where a list of suspects written on a piece of paper 
was wrapped inside a bundle of poisonous skin-irritating plants according 
to the detailed instructions of the priest. e actual witch was supposed 
to feel the sensations caused by the plants and would subsequently need 
to confess in order to get relief. e deity might also reveal the identity of 
the witch directly and order him / her to be brought to the shrine house. 
Nonetheless, it is believed that the spiritual powers of the god are potent 
enough to force witches to confess when they are responsible for misfortune 
as they are thought to experience physical pain, abnormalities, and mental 
strain until they plead guilty. A priest of Atia Mframa described this to me 
in the following way:
You have to confess! If you don’t confess the spirits will surely kill you. I have seen 
horrible things happen to those people who wouldn’t confess. Right in front of 
this place [a room where suspects are kept] I have seen a person beaten up by 
invisible hands. e person was screaming and writhing with pain on the ground, 
but you couldn’t see anybody there doing the beating. And it wouldn’t stop before 
the person promised to confess.
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e confessed witches can be ritually ‘cured’ or ‘cooled’ by the traditional 
priests, aer which they can go on with their lives in their own communities. 
ose who refuse to confess may become ostracized, driven into exile from 
their villages, or even subjected to violence. Customarily, those who have 
been helped by the god should indicate their gratitude by bringing gis to 
the shrine, which may include money, drinks, farm animals, or luxury items. 
According to the historians, curing witchcra was actually the innovation 
that the new movements had introduced since the late nineteenth century 
(see McCaskie 1981, 129–130). During the pre-colonial era witches had 
been oen sentenced to death by chiey authorities and, even if their lives 
were spared, they were banished from their natal lineages which meant a 
loss of ‘jural personhood’ and degradation to slave status (see Rattray 1929, 
19, 313). Witch-nding methods of the pre-colonial era included poison 
ordeals, and the practice of “carrying the corpse”, as the dead body of 
a witchcra victim was believed to be capable of showing the way to the 
home of his / her killer, although these methods were prohibited by the 
government during the early stages of colonial rule (Rattray 1959 [1927], 
31, 167–170). e relationship between the ‘cults’ of the colonial era and the 
traditional rulers varied. At times the ‘cults’ became associated with local 
destoolment movements, but in some instances chiefs sought to incorporate 
them into their oces in order to gain popularity among their subjects, 
or even to regain the power to punish witches which had been taken away 
from them by the indirect rule system (e.g. Parker 2004, 409–410): as their 
‘political’ powers were secularized, they sought to enhance their spiritual 
powers in the sphere of anti-witchcra activities (see also Fields 1985, 
65–66). Nowadays, it seems that in some localities the indigenous deities 
connected to the chiey stools, and the witch-hunters of outside origin, have 
merged into a single ritual complex. Hence, those traditional priests who are 
the caretakers of the shrines of the ‘state gods’ are also oen involved, or at 
least in close relations, with the witch-nders.
Some Christian churches are thought of as powerful agencies in the 
nding of witches and their subsequent exorcism. ese movements, a few 
of which had already been founded before World War I, are oen referred 
to as “healing churches” (see Debrunner 1961, 149–162); some of the oldest 
and smallest of these groups have died out or lost most of their following, 
while new ones are constantly appearing. For instance, in 2005–2006 when 
I conducted eldwork in the rural Brong-Ahafo Region I studied a locally-
founded church that practiced witch-nding using methods that closely 
resemble those of the traditional priests. Instead of local gods or charms, 
the pastors of the congregation become possessed by ‘angels’ (abɔfoɔ, sing. 
ɔbᴐfo) who are able to identify witches and also to force confessions. e 
movement had become more and more popular during the early 2000s 
and also gained a foothold in urban communities. Moreover, many of 
the churches belonging to the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement are 
dedicated to ghting witchcra (see, e.g., Meyer 1999, 175–179; Newell 
2007). Although some European missionaries of the colonial era denied 
the existence of witchcra (Debrunner 1961, 135–136), many associated it 
with the evil powers of the devil, thereby indirectly conrming its existence 
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(ibid., 143–144). Hence, it appears that even the adoption of a new religion 
has not been able to secure the demise of the ‘superstitions’ of the old. 
 
Investigating a cult
As discussed in Chapter 4, the architects of the British indirect rule system 
sought legitimation from evolutionary thinking, asserting that the subject 
societies should be le to develop on their own. However, there were certain 
exceptions to the rule when an intervention on the part of the colonizing 
power was deemed necessary; a common example comprised those cases 
where traditional institutions or practices were considered “repugnant 
to natural justice and humanity”, that is, European moral ideas; the 
conventions of African witch-nding fell into this category and they were 
to be suppressed as dangerous superstitions (Lugard 1922, 563–564, 617). 
e colonial government’s position on witchcra beliefs demonstrated very 
plainly the paradox inherent in the ideology of indirect rule: on the one 
hand, society was seen as a ‘natural occurrence’ that developed along its own 
course, but on the other, it needed to be improved and redened by its rulers 
(see Kuklick 1979, 43–50).
e rst anti-witchcra ‘cult’ that was prohibited by the colonial 
administration in the Akan area of Ghana was called Aberewa (lit. ‘Old 
Woman’). It had originally been imported there from the French Côte 
d’Ivoire and despite protests from missionaries it had been allowed to 
remain for several years because it was deemed safe, or even helpful, by the 
administrators, who considered it a part of tribal religion. Nevertheless, the 
ocial opinion of Aberewa started to shi when some prominent chiefs 
complained about the movement’s uncontrollability, while the practice 
of mutilating the corpses of those persons believed to have been killed 
by the god as punishment for practicing witchcra was found shocking. 
Consequently, Aberewas’s prohibition was announced in 1908 and the 
colonial police force systematically demolished all of its shrines, to be 
followed in the 1920s and 30s by numerous similar ‘cults’, many of which were 
investigated and some of them stamped out by the colonial administration 
(Allman and Parker 2005, 128–148). Interestingly, from the point of view 
of the indirect rule system, what Christianity and anti-witchcra ‘cults’ had 
in common was that they were both ‘pan-tribal’ and both posed potential 
challenges to the authority of local chiefs, making them politically suspect 
(see Ranger 1993, 67–72). Of course, actions against ‘cults’ were easier to 
justify since they were aberrant and superstitious by denition.
Another example is provided by a movement that developed around 
a god called Kukuro (lit. ‘Li it up’) in the late 1920s. Its specialities were 
healing sicknesses and helping infertile women, but its new popularity was 
mainly based on its capacity to nd and heal witches and oer powerful 
protection against witchcra. ose who sought its help were thought to 
have put their own lives at risk since Kukuro was believed to keep a close 
watch on its followers and punish their bad deeds. A colonial administrator 
who had visited the shrine wrote:
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I was informed that if an adherent of Kukuro even in a distant place does anything 
bad Kukuro “catches” him and he falls sick. In which case he confesses his evil 
deed. He then comes to Kukuro and makes an oering (e amount is entirely 
voluntary – no specic fees are charged) whereupon he is cured. On further 
enquiring what bad thing he might do, I was told he might use bad medicine, 
practise witchcra, bury money underground or contemplate murder. It would 
not aect him if he were guilty of seduction or stealing – unless the injured party 
especially invoked Kukuro. (PRAAD BRG 28/2/7a)
e shrine of Kukuro was located in the village of Nkyeraa in the Wenchi 
District of the Western Province of Ashanti (now the Brong-Ahafo Region 
of Ghana). Kukuro itself was very old and the oral traditions of the area 
associate it with events dating back to the rst half of the eighteenth century 
(see Meyerowitz 1974, 58; see also Allman and Parker 2005, 124), although 
the district commissioner of Wenchi heard about it for the rst time in 1925, 
at which point Kukuro was considered an ordinary “village fetish” with a 
modest following (PRAAD BRG 28/2/7b). As its reputation as an ecient 
witch-hunter spread, visitors started to arrive from all over central and 
southern Ghana and several high-ranking chiefs were said to have consulted 
it (PRAAD BRG 28/2/7c). ree years later, in 1928, its activities rst came 
to the notice of government ocials in the capital of the Central Province, 
Kumasi, when complaints were made about its ‘immoral behaviour’. 
Allegedly, Kukuro had started killing people arbitrarily and extorting money 
from those who wished to be spared and the complainants appealed to the 
authorities to abolish the ‘cult’. What made these complaints problematic 
was that the supposed victims of Kukuro had died by natural causes and in 
localities far from the shrine. For instance, the paramount chief of Adanse, 
an area roughly 170 kilometres from Nkyeraa, had reported to his provincial 
commissioner that Kukuro is “thoroughly bad and that a number of his 
subjects (he states 100) have died aer visiting it while others have had to pay 
over large sums of money to the Fetish” (PRAAD BRG 28/2/7d). Similarly, a 
European Roman Catholic missionary stationed at Kumasi, 130 kilometres 
from Nkyeraa, claimed that some members of his congregation had been 
put under the protection of Kukuro by their non-Christian relatives and 
they were now being killed by Kukuro who supposedly did not approve of 
Christianity (PRAAD BRG 28/2/7c).76 
Since the accusations made against Kukuro were exceptionally serious 
and came from inuential quarters, the local district commissioner was sent 
to Nkyeraa to investigate the activities of the notorious witch-nder. In the 
village the commissioner interviewed the priest of Kukuro, his attendants, 
and visitors who had come there for consultation. He also witnessed 
76 Some missionaries were convinced that witchcra was not merely a ‘pagan fallacy’ 
but that it was in some very real way connected to the devil (see Debrunner 1961, 
143–144). For instance, a Methodist missionary who had treated a mentally 
ill woman suspected of witchcra diagnosed her to be, among other things, 
“spiritually damaged” (PRAAD BRG 3/1/1a). 
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a thanksgiving ceremony, in which Kukuro’s followers were bringing 
oerings to it in order to show their gratitude for its overpowering their 
enemies: 
...a young man came forward. Aer handing his chicken [a mandatory gi to 
Kukuro on consultation] to the servant he said: “I came to you for the protection 
of my cocoa farm. is person who wrought me mischiefs [sic] has been revealed 
to me and I have seen a sign of progress in my undertakings. I come to redeem 
my promise and to thank you with a sheep and a bottle of rum”. (PRAAD BRG 
28/2/7b)
e priest of Kukuro and his attendants were not aware of the killings of 
which the god was charged, but as for killing people in general, they admitted 
that their god was capable of that although they did not exactly know how 
that happened:
Some people it is stated who consult the fetish and ask for protection against 
persons who have tried to do them harm will return to the fetish and tell it 
that they have come to thank him for his protection. ey have discovered 
their enemy and he is dead [...] But the fetish does not know if such a man [i.e., 
the dead enemy] existed, or if he is dead or indeed anything about him. It has 
simply to rely on the statement of the person making it. e servants of the fetish 
acknowledge that they can’t prove how the people are killed. ey are aware of the 
death only from the confessions made. Apparently all people dying must confess 
what they know or imagine to be the cause of death. (Ibid.) 
Basically, Kukuro’s people were admitting to the commissioner that their god 
was indeed killing people, or “evil doers”, as they put it, but their ‘confession’ 
did not meet the standards of administrative rationality. In addition to that, 
there was absolutely no material link between the shrine and its assumed 
victims: “Certain it is that they do not give any medicine to its [Kukuro’s] 
devotees, nothing is passed from the fetish to the consultants and nobody 
touches the fetish” (ibid.). us the possibility of poisoning, for instance, 
had to be ruled out. e administrators had to accept that according to their 
criteria there were really no crimes to investigate:
It is to be observed that both the Omanhene of Adansi [i.e., paramount chief] 
and the Missionary allege that the fetish has caused the death of many people, 
but unfortunately neither quotes a particular case. If one concrete case of death 
resulting from a visit to the fetish or indeed of any ill eects endangering human 
life can be proved then I think that one case alone would be sucient to warrant 
its suppression. (PRAAD BRG 28/2/7e)
Consequently, the case against Kukuro was dropped and its ‘cult’ was never 
abolished, although it was investigated once again in 1931, but that time 
for involvement in a destoolment case (see PRAAD BRG 28/2/7a). During 
my eldwork in Ghana in 2006, Kukuro’s ‘cult’ was still active in Nkyeraa 
although it did not have the same popularity that it had roughly eighty years 
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earlier. e Kukuro case is a good example of the colonial administrators’ 
inability to address the concerns of the colonial subjects because of the 
division they had created between themselves and those they ruled. e 
administrators were not methodologically, conceptually, or in any other way 
equipped to investigate murders that took place in the spiritual realm – even 
though maintaining law and order in the colony was their most solemn duty. 
Kukuro was not an isolated case and throughout the 1930s and 40s the 
colonial administrators in Ghana received numerous complaints about local 
“witch-nding fetishes”. In the 1930s a “Native Customs Order” banning 
“the practice of witch or wizard nding” was introduced in colonial Ashanti 
(PRAAD BRG 3/1/1b), but even the legislators themselves did not believe 
that it would put a stop to, or even restrain the phenomenon in any signicant 
way. In fact, they sought to interpret the phenomenon according to Western 
economic rationality, which partly convinced them that they were dealing 
with something unstoppable. is is how one commissioner saw it:
It is to be feared that the practise of Witch nding is so lucrative and the general 
belief in the powers of witches is so universal, that nearly every Fetish, however 
harmless may be its original pretensions, nds it dicult to refrain from taking 
up this protable and popular line of business.
 ere can be little doubt that the survival of this practice in spite of the 
suppression of a series of Fetishes on account of such activities is the result of 
a popular demand created by the almost universal belief in the supernatural 
powers of those “possessed of a devil”.
 In such circumstances it cannot be expected that the practise of Witch nding 
can be put an end to by the enactment of law. (PRAAD BRG 3/1/1c)
Conversely, it was likely that such measures would create tensions of 
a dierent kind. For example, as Natasha Gray (2005) has shown in her 
treatment of anti-witchcra movements in Gold Coast, the members of the 
outlawed ‘cults’ found themselves in a double predicament, where they were 
forced to risk either being punished by legal nes for taking part in unlawful 
rituals, or suering the punishment of the gods for not fullling their 
ritual duties. Furthermore, from the point of view of the colonial subjects, 
practicing witchcra, which had previously been classied as a violation of 
state taboos and punishable by death in a chief ’s court, was now removed 
from that status and relegated to the colonial category of superstition, 
while anti-witchcra activities, which had been traditional methods of 
investigating and punishing the transgressions, were now criminalized (see 
also Fields 1982, 576–577). Consequently, the ban on witch-nding could 
not be enforced for very long. e priests of the anti-witchcra movements 
had also found a way to bypass the bans by assuming a new professional 
identity as ‘native physicians’, who claimed to treat witchcra suspicions and 
confessions as symptoms of psychic disorders. In practice, however, they used 
their conventional methods. is new biomedical discourse eventually met 
with the approval of the colonial administrators, who probably considered it 
a painless way out of an awkward situation. e chiefs also regained some 
of their previous powers in this eld as the Ashanti Confederacy Council 
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was put in charge of licensing the physicians (Allman and Parker 2005, 174–
180).77 
e police investigations and legislative measures related to witchcra 
are an extreme example of how purication aects the administration of 
justice. e scope of charges and punishments is limited by the number 
of possible “responsible actors” or types of actions (Keane 2007, 80) and, 
because witch-nding spirits and witchcra are not among them, the crimes 
reported to the authorities cease to exist. However, at the same time the 
authorities have to come to terms with the limitations of their own agency: 
although they maintain that witchcra is false therefore not worthy of 
knowing, they have to recognize their incapacity to regulate a society that 
does not share this position. 
Public witchcra
ese days it has become a more or less commonplace notion that in Africa 
witchcra does not only appear in the traditional societies of rural areas, 
but that it is also found in urban settings and in modern sectors of society. 
In addition to villages and farms, the witches of today are also thought 
to operate in intrinsically modern surroundings such as global credit 
institutions, gambling casinos and international football tournaments, 
among others. During the 1990s, this observation brought witchcra topics 
back to mainstream Africanist anthropology. One of the contentions in 
this literature has been that witchcra discourses are critical commentaries 
on the downside of modernity (Comaro and Comaro 1993, xxvii–
xxix). Hence, instead of fading away or disappearing as Africa ‘develops’, 
witchcra has actually been on the increase in recent times (Comaro and 
Comaro 2000, 310). For example, the Comaros (1999, 279) maintain 
that post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a dramatic rise in “the 
deployment, real or imagined, of magical means for material ends”, which 
has in many places led to “violent reactions against people accused of illicit 
accumulation”. According to them, both the magical means and the violence 
against those who use them are local attempts to cope with the changes 
and contradictions entrained by global, “millennial” capitalism (ibid., 284–
77 Aer the independence of Ghana the Nkrumah government removed the regulation 
of “traditional medicine” from the jurisdiction of the chiefs to a government-
sponsored body called the Psychic and Traditional Healing Association. In the 
succeeding decades a number of new “medical associations” were formed (Allman 
and Parker 2005, 225–226). In the 1960s and 70s government projects concerning 
“traditional medicine” focused primarily on the scientic study of medical plants, 
and “faith healers” and “spiritualists”, who claimed the “supernatural” as the source 
of their healing powers, were reluctant to work with them (Twumasi and Warren 
1986, 121–125). e priests that I have studied with in Brong-Ahafo are active 
members in medical associations and some have held important positions in them; 
however, in their daily work at the shrines they do not use the vocabulary of the 
modern medical profession or Western parapsychology. For instance, I have never 
heard anyone refer to themselves as a ‘psychic’.
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285). Similar observations have also been made with regards Ghana about 
a new, rising interest in the occult and its connections to global capitalism. 
For instance, Meyer (1995, 250) has discussed how Ghanaians use occult 
imagery to “diabolise negative aspects of the capitalist world economy” such 
as individualistic accumulation and indierence to the collectivist ethos. 
Such views, however, cannot be accepted without certain reservations. 
First, the modernity of witchcra seems to be relatively old. In the late 
colonial era, in the 1940s and 1950s, anthropologists were already claiming 
that the preoccupation with witchcra in Ghana was essentially a modern 
phenomenon resulting from rising tensions in social relations caused by 
the ups and downs of the recently introduced cash-based cocoa economy 
and the individualistic ideologies of capitalism and Christianity (e.g. Ward 
1956). Although the theories and conceptualizations of the earlier scholars 
were markedly dierent from those of, for example, the Comaros and 
Meyer, the same basic understanding was held that witchcra could not be 
studied without reference to modernity. Second, as the Comaros (2000, 
310) themselves acknowledge, it is dicult to “quantify the occult” and 
hence make any denite assertions about its proliferation. 
However, what is clear is that, in Ghana, witchcra discourses have now 
made their way into the public sphere of the modern state. e subject is 
now much more visible than it was, for example, in the mid-1990s, when 
I encountered it for the rst time in my eld research, something which has 
much to do with the liing of state censorship and increasing privatization 
of media brought about by the democratization process of the 1990s (see, 
e.g., Meyer 1998b; 2004b). Free and commercial media has truly become 
the playground of the occult. Nowadays, both tabloid and mainstream 
newspapers regularly report on witchcra accusations, confessions, and 
violent attacks on suspected witches. Witchcra themes suuse Ghanaian 
and Nigerian-made movies, which are shown by commercial TV stations 
and distributed on video cassettes and DVDs. Ordinary people write letters 
to daily newspapers and call in to live radio shows to complain about 
problems caused by witches. e ubiquity and hugely increased visibility of 
witchcra themes must pose a serious problem for the modernist legislators 
and educators; aer all, as will become evident below, their core message has 
been that witchcra is not real, yet the pressure to deal with anti-witchcra 
activities through ocial means is probably bigger than it has ever been.  
Witchcra as a human rights issue
e post-colonial government’s position on witchcra is in a very important 
way connected to the redenition of the society that it rules. While the 
colonial government ruled ‘natives’ who were considered ‘traditional’ in 
essence (that is to say, for example, members of their ‘tribe’, subjects of their 
chiefs), post-colonial society is thought to consist of individual citizens who 
have systematically dened rights and duties, and the idea of a fundamental 
dierence between rulers and ruled has been dispelled: the British colonial 
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lawmaker and the African subject were thought to live in completely 
separate normative realities, the African legislator and the villager share 
the same status of citizen. In this construction ‘traditionalism’ appears as an 
aspect of citizenship in a modern state. e democratic constitution in 1992, 
aer two decades of military rule, secured the “fundamental human right 
and freedoms” for every person in Ghana, including the freedom “to enjoy, 
practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or 
religion subject to the provisions of this Constitution”. As a provision, it was 
added that “all customary practices which dehumanize or are injurious to the 
physical and mental well-being of a person are prohibited” (CRG, Chapter 5, 
Article 26, paras 1–2). is view relies on an ideology wherein a social whole, 
in this case the nation state of Ghana, is constructed of individuals; thus the 
main concern is the integrity and autonomy of individuals and their capacity 
to act freely. Consequently, public discussion of anti-witchcra activities 
revolves around their supposed nature as a ‘dehumanizing customary 
practice’ that violates the rights of its victims. Hence the problematic aspects 
of witchcra beliefs have been reduced to a conict between individual 
freedom and public good. As a Ghanaian journalist summarized it: “freedom 
of conscience is enshrined in the constitution, therefore no one will have any 
qualms about whether anyone believes in witchcra”, but it is “disgusting to 
allow someone to suer because another person thinks he or she is a witch 
or a wizard” (Vanderpuye 2004). For a person who ‘believes’ in witchcra 
such a statement has to sound absurd: one is free to believe that someone is 
out there killing others through spiritual means, but strongly prohibited to 
do anything to stop it.
Since anti-witchcra activities are now seen mostly as a human rights 
issue, they are, as a result, also a global issue because Ghana’s human rights 
situation is constantly monitored from the outside. NGOs like Amnesty 
International and government bodies like the U.S. State Department 
publish annual country reports on Ghana (and other countries) where they 
list major human rights violations and evaluate the situation in general; 
attacks on suspected witches are frequently mentioned in the reports. 
(e.g. U.S. Department of State 2005). Western governments also produce 
these reports for the use of those of their ocials who are involved with 
asylum cases. “Traditional practices”, a category that includes witch-nding 
and suppression activities, are nowadays also raised in asylum claims (see 
UK Home Oce 2002). All this understandably makes the Ghanaian 
government even more concerned about the country’s human rights record 
since promotion of human rights is high on the agenda of those donor 
organizations and Western governments that are the major source of Ghana’s 
development aid (e.g. World Bank 1998). 
In 1993 the Ghanaian parliament established a government agency titled 
the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
which is charged with investigating alleged violations of human rights and 
taking action to remedy proven violations. e Commission also holds 
workshops to educate the public, traditional leaders, the police, and the 
military on human rights issues (see CHRAJ 2003), and investigates anti-
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witchcra activities. Probably the most well-known case of the latter has 
been that of the witch camps of northern Ghana which have received 
considerable publicity in the country and elsewhere, even making their way 
into the pages of Western travel guidebooks (e.g. Briggs 2004, 374–375). 
e camps are basically asylums for women who have been banished from 
their home villages by traditional authorities or by their own relatives for 
suspected witchcra. Most of the accused are older women and they fear 
that they may be beaten up or lynched if they try to return to their homes; 
meanwhile the camps are led by local headmen or ritual specialists who 
claim they are able to “cure” witchcra (CHRAJ 2003). Estimates concerning 
camp populations vary from source to source, though it is suggested that it 
might have grown from 850 in 2002 to 3,000 in 2006 (see UK Home Oce 
2002; U.S. Department of State 2006), while the most recent reports indicate 
that the numbers are currently decreasing slowly (UK Home Oce 2013). 
e Commission has sent its eld agents to inspect the camps and concluded 
that closing them down and repatriating the residents would not be a viable 
option. In the CHRAJ Annual Report released aer the camp inspections it 
was stated that
[the women] share the same view with their caretakers that the camp is not 
a prison for witches but a safe haven. It is a refuge centre where women whose 
lives are threatened come for protection aer going through a “dewitching” 
exercise. ey see the Tindana or the Tilana [i.e., the ritual specialist] […] as 
a protector. In fact none of the “witches” interviewed was prepared to return 
to their communities even if the Commission guaranteed their safety. ey do 
not believe they will be accepted back and are convinced they will be lynched to 
death. (CHRAJ 2003, 28)
e main stress has now been laid on the eradication of anti-witchcra 
activities through education. e Commission, together with some local 
NGOs, has launched campaigns to educate the Ghanaian public about the 
destructive consequences of witchcra accusations and the human rights 
of the accused, handing out leaets and getting air time with local radio 
stations. e focus of the campaigns has been on rural people “who nd 
themselves prone to such [anti-witchcra] practices” as one campaigner put 
it (Orhin 2003). e educational content is based on the modernist agenda 
of the state and is in accordance with knowledge hierarchies that do not 
dier greatly from those of the colonial rule: witchcra beliefs are said to be 
damaging, not only because they engender conicts and violence, but also 
because they are fallacious and traditional in an undesired way; in addition 
to emphasizing the falsehood and irrationality of witchcra beliefs by 
categorizing them a superstition, it is also reiterated that they have no place 
in the modern legal system. When speaking to the press in connection with 
the campaigns, the head of CHRAJ stressed that “witchcra is not a crime 
known to our law and no person has the right to take punitive action against 
anyone suspected of being a witch” (Vanderpuye 2004). 
Furthermore, because the majority of the accused are women, anti-
witchcra activities are oen currently discussed as a form of gender abuse 
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(see Osam 2004). For instance, a Deputy Minister of Employment and 
Social Welfare described witch suppression as a “discriminatory practice”, 
which is “bad, obnoxious, and a violation of the rights of the women” 
(Vanderpuye 2004). e redenition of anti-witchcra activities as “gender 
based violence” has also captured the attention of organizations such as 
International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW), which has insisted 
that the Government of Ghana should “enact legislation that criminalizes 
banishment of old women from their homes on allegations of witchcra”. 
ese organizations compare anti-witchcra activities with female genital 
mutilation and other practices that are perceived as violations of the human 
rights of girls and women (IWRAW 2006).78
In addition to the CHRAJ and some other government agencies, several 
Ghanaian NGOs are trying to improve the living conditions of the witch 
camps. Various organizations have provided food, medical care, and other 
forms of support to the residents of the camps (CHRAJ 2003, 27–28) and 
the NGOs and their donors seem to share the modernist views of state 
ocials. One example is the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), 
an organization that raises money for NGOs that promote women’s rights in 
Africa – including a local NGO called Timari-Tama Rural Women, which 
is, among other things, “embarking on sensitization, awareness campaigns 
through workshops, media publications, traditional rulers, opinion leaders, 
religious bodies and the health sector” (AWDF 2005). In their campaign 
letter they describe their strategy to eradicate witchcra beliefs as follows: 
Research has proven that in communities where poverty is rife and illiteracy is 
high, people tend to be superstitious. It is, therefore, not surprising that they 
attribute their misfortunes to witchcra and sorcery. Superstitious beliefs are 
so intricate and dicult to eradicate because they are deeply rooted in the 
people’s traditional beliefs. However, when people are educated, rather than 
attributing their problems to superstitious beliefs, they are armed with the 
information to explain issues normally regarded with superstitious eyes. Perhaps 
further research could be undertaken to ascertain that poverty is indeed the 
driving force, which causes people to accuse old women of witchcra and their 
consequence incarceration to witches camps. (Ibid.)
e quote exemplies the modernist view that sees purication as a moral 
necessity and a requirement for the full attainment of citizenship. For 
persons to act as free autonomous individuals in an ordered community, 
they need to share an understanding about the possibilities of agency 
(see Keane 2007, 55, 77). If we agree with Latour’s (1993, 10) suggestion 
that modernity implies a break in time between a stable archaic past and 
78 Female genital mutilation was criminalized in Ghana in 1994. In 1998 the 
parliament passed legislation that amended the 1960 Criminal Code to provide 
additional protection for women and children. is legislation also banned the 
practice of “female customary servitude” known as trokosi (UK Home Oce 2002). 
Prior to that, the international public was informed about trokosi by the American 
investigative television program 60 minutes. 
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progressive revolution, and similarly a battle whose outcome separates 
winners and losers, then one rarely sees these ideas anywhere articulated as 
forcefully as in the modernist discourses about witchcra, which rest largely 
on claims of the failure of those people who believe in witchcra, and the 
necessity to obliterate their beliefs.79
e way of conceptualizing witchcra by government agencies and 
NGOs reproduces the epistemological order established in the colonial 
era. Witch suppression is dened as a problem of people who are poor, 
rural, traditional, and uneducated and consequently their beliefs and 
worldview become graded as the lesser knowledge of lesser people. Similar 
denitions could not be used in explaining the witchcra beliefs of the 
wealthy business elite (see Parish 2000) or the higher ranks of academia 
(see Onyinah 2001). One does not oen hear about businessmen or 
university professors beating up or lynching their ’spiritual adversaries’, but 
then again they are the people who can aord the best protective charms 
and medicines money can buy.
Hybrid laws
e problems that states have with witchcra tell us about the failures of 
authoritarian modernism. As James Scott (1998, 89-94) argues, the point 
of “the Enlightenment view of legal codes” was not so much to reect the 
distinctive customs and practices of a people but rather to create a new 
community by rening, amending, and codifying the most rational of 
their customs and suppressing the more “uncivilized” ones. To put this in 
Latour’s terms, the modernization of a state’s legal order meant that it was 
puried from superstitions like witchcra. However, when witchcra beliefs 
and anti-witchcra activities remain prevalent and persistent, and will not 
disappear through education or ‘raising awareness’, the purication process 
starts to turn against the objectives of political projects. e administrative 
and legal apparatuses that refuse to engage, or are incapable of dealing, with 
local knowledge fail in their function of regulating society. e alternative 
79 Academic literature on witchcra has faced accusations of neglecting the human 
suering connected to it (see Schnoebelen 2009, 2). Accordingly, it should be 
emphasized that the goal of this chapter has not in any way been to oer justication 
for violence or trivialize the hardships of those charged and punished for witchcra. 
On the other hand, this is an accusation that in its own way reproduces the 
epistemological hierarchies that are under scrutiny here. In Western culture one 
is still relatively free to discuss science without making apologetic references to 
the millions who have suered and lost their lives as a result of projects relying 
on science. is is made possible through processes of separation, where certain 
parts of science, like racial theories, have been bracketed o as distortions or 
contaminations of ‘real’ science (Visvanathan 1988). Obviously, witchcra does 
not enjoy that same privilege. Nothing redeemable is seen in it and every victim of 
every ‘witch-hunt’ is considered to have suered in vain. 
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is to introduce legislation that prohibits both witchcra and anti-witchcra 
activities.80 
e colonial precedents and experiences from sub-Saharan Africa are 
not encouraging. In Tanzania both witchcra accusations and practicing 
witchcra have been illegal since the colonial period. However, in some 
areas government ocials are reluctant to take cases to the magistrates and 
rather try to persuade the accused to undergo the rituals that are needed 
to “cure” witches. Moreover, ocials openly support witchcra-suppression 
institutions and consider them invaluable for the maintenance of peace. In 
localities where ocials have adopted a more assertive stance, court cases 
have dealt mostly with witchcra accusations and not with practicing 
witchcra. Although the latter is regarded as equally illegal, evidence tting 
the court requirements is virtually impossible to obtain (Green 2005, 12–
15, 19). In parts of Cameroon since the end of the 1970s, state courts have 
convicted witch suspects on the basis of the knowledge of traditional healers 
who have assumed the role of expert witnesses, becoming less concerned 
about healing the accused who, in turn, may then be condemned to long 
prison sentences. Since the proof in these cases depends on the expert 
opinion of the healers, they have become feared disciplinary gures in their 
communities – a situation they have been ready to exploit. Indeed, the state’s 
involvement in these activities has further reinforced faith in the power of 
witchcra in general (Geschiere 1997, 169–197). In post-Apartheid South 
Africa, where only witchcra accusations are illegal, the state has been under 
growing popular pressure to intervene in the practice of witchcra itself to 
avoid being perceived as a protector of witches (Ashforth 1998, 525–531).
e admission of so-called superstition into legal rationality compromises 
the power of the state. e modern institutions are formally in charge of 
controlling witchcra, but in practice they have been forced to delegate this 
function to traditional institutions and specialists or, alternatively, to leave 
some aspects of it outside the ocial process. In a way, the witchcra laws 
are an example of a hybrid in the Latourian sense. As a colonial category 
witchcra is the residue that was le when the category of tribal religion 
was created. Since witchcra has no place in the order of modern society it 
is constantly an object of purication: it needs to be removed from contact 
with some ‘pure category’ that it stains – be it religion, culture, kinship, 
or whatever. When states decree laws that prohibit witchcra and require 
investigations, examinations, and judgments according to the premises of 
legal rationality, they produce hybrids that will inevitably create the need for 
further purication.
80 In Ghana there is currently no specic legislation concerning witchcra. In its 
absence the courts have in recent years started to set warning examples. For 
instance, in 2003 Tamale High Court in northern Ghana sentenced a 28-year-old 
man to death aer he and his father had clubbed a witch suspect to death in their 
home village. e harsh sentence was meant to be a message to the public. e 
judge presiding over the trial said aerwards: “e court will not spare anybody 
caught taking the law into their own hands to mete out instant justice to people 
especially women perceived as witches” (Orhin 2003).  
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T he permeating character of magic and witchcra in the politics of post-  colonial Africa has received a great deal of scholarly attention over the 
last two decades. Some authors connect such phenomena to a continent-
wide resurgence of religion in which the political is becoming inseparable 
from the religious, claiming, therefore, that what is happening on the African 
political scene nowadays cannot be explained by reference to conventional 
political theory. Furthermore, African politicians are assuming roles that 
do not t the secular oces they occupy and increasingly operating in 
spiritual arenas (Ellis and ter Haar 2004; 2007). Such observations seem 
to deal the nal blow to grand narratives about secularization, relegating 
them to the class of “myths about modernity” (see Cannell 2006, 31–32). 
Whether we have been living in an era of re-enchantment or not, I do believe 
that studying the relationship between the ‘occult’ and politics helps us to 
understand the reality of secularization in Africa. 
In this chapter I discuss the limits of secularization by analyzing two sets 
of perceptions of the violent aermaths of military takeovers in 1979 and 
1981 perpetrated by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who set his regime a 
major goal: promoting a “people’s democracy” of mass participation which 
would overcome the limitations of the older “bourgeois democracy”, and 
changing the class structure of the country. e implementation of these 
reforms resulted in authoritarian rule, political violence, and the seizure 
and nationalization of private property (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 257–263). I 
will show how two groups of people – the traditionalists of the rural town 
of Nkoranza, and groups from Ghanaian Pentecostal-Charismatic churches 
– have interpreted these events in terms of religion and ritual. In terms of 
religious factionalism in contemporary Ghana, these could be seen as two 
opposed camps; however, what both interpretations have in common, in 
deep contrast to the secularist agenda of the modernist le-wing revolution, 
is that they see the spirit world as the origin of all power, which may be 
controlled through ritual. is discussion provides a tting nale to the 
book because, by using ethnographic material, it shows how the ‘religious 
successors’ of the two groups that were opposed a hundred years ago view the 
secular project now. us both the method and the goal are representative 
of the study as a whole, which, in its own way, is a response to the need 
to study the “actual, lived situations [...] in which local peoples enact their 
understandings of, interest in, or perhaps total indierence to the secular 
and the religious” (Cannell 2010, 97).
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Ritual and politics in post-colonial society
e recent Africanist literature on ritual and politics in post-colonial Africa 
oers two main perspectives which could be seen as complementary. e 
rst discusses the part played by ritual symbolism in the manipulation of 
identities, an approach that draws on the claim that post-colonial societies 
are not made up of one coherent public space, organized according to a 
single principle, but rather comprise a plurality of spheres, each having its 
own logic. erefore, post-colonial rulers as well as their subjects mobilize 
several identities in order to achieve maximum instrumentality and 
eectiveness (Mbembe 1992; Werbner 1996). Identity is thus understood 
as a situational or contextual product of various competing discourses, 
and it is invoked to highlight the unstable and fragmented nature of 
post-colonial societies (Cooper and Brubaker 2000, 8). Scholars using 
this approach have discussed how post-colonial rulers have selectively 
employed and transformed traditional symbols and values related to ritual 
rulers in order to give form to their aims and legitimize their status. For 
instance, in some cases the ritual secrecy that surrounds the divine king is 
assumed and used by the post-colonial rulers to cover up political violence 
and other unlawful activities. Or, more openly, cases of the, corruption, 
extortion, and misappropriation of funds are represented under the guise of 
a gi economy, in which the politician-cum-chief receives tribute from his 
subordinates as well as redistributes wealth to his allies in public rituals (De 
Boeck 1996, 80–81). Correspondingly, traditional rulers seek to integrate 
symbols of the modern state into the traditional discourse and practice of 
power and authority. On the one hand, the traditional and modern leaders 
compete and intrude on each others’ political spaces, but, on the other, there 
seems to be a silent mutual agreement on the rules of the game they are 
playing (Werbner 1996, 13–17). For example, to quote Richard Werbner: 
On one side, the kings are own to the presidential palace, invited to party 
congresses and rallies, and given cars and residences at the capital. People’s 
representatives, party functionaries and high ocials of state attend upon king’s 
shrines, their enthronements and other meetings at court, on the other side. 
Neither side can or does any longer monopolize access to the space of the state or 
of the kingdom; each side is on the move, not settled down for the convenience 
or stability of the other. (Ibid., 17)  
Here, it is claimed that the links between established signiers and what 
they stand for are cut o and reconnected to dierent meanings. Taken to 
the extreme, this “perversion of tradition”, accompanied by dysfunctional 
state institutions, leads to a reality marked by a “crisis of meaningfulness”, 
in which the meanings of the everyday political lexicon are continuously 
shiing or become totally void (De Boeck 1996, 91–93).  
e second approach is provided by those anthropologists who stress 
the importance of theorizing enchanted perceptions of politics in order to 
understand modernity (Pels 2003, 15–16). Some of their studies discuss 
the ways in which ritual activities and witchcra discourses have been 
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creatively used to evaluate the morality of politics and the persona of 
the politicians. ese studies have analyzed, for instance, the widespread 
idiom in contemporary Africa in which poverty, corruption, injustice, and 
domination are represented as ‘forms of terrible enchantment’. In popular 
political discourse this idiom takes the form of rumours about evil spiritual 
arrangements between ritual specialists and politicians (or other powerful 
persons), which transform the latter into highly potent practitioners of 
malevolent magic or witchcra (Shaw 1996, 30). According to some, 
such rumours may be grounded in the reality of post-colonial politics. 
Specically, it is claimed that many African governments are characterized 
by the existence of a ‘shadow structure of power’ which surrounds the 
ocial occupants of state power and consists of people who are relatively 
unknown, oen with no ocial title or position, but who are able to exercise 
signicant political inuence and whose operations lie behind and beyond 
the legal edice of the state, thereby eectively undermining the autonomy 
of established political institutions. ese hidden power-brokers include, 
for example, leaders of paramilitary organizations, crime gang bosses, and 
smugglers, but also very oen practitioners in spiritual matters (Bayart et 
al. 1999, 20–23). Hence the discourses on evil magic as well as the ritual 
practices required to counter it are seen as local attempts to recognize and 
confront the power of the shadow structures (West 2005, 265–266). More 
generally, it is maintained that ritual, as “an experimental technology 
intended to aect the ow of power in the universe”, is a predictable reaction 
to problems brought about by processes of change. erefore, it is precisely 
the language of ritual through which the promises and disappointments 
concerning modernization, development, and such projects are evaluated 
(Comaro and Comaro 1993, xxx). 
In addition to their references to modernist projects, these situations are 
post-colonial in the sense that a certain parallelism is understood to exist 
between traditional rulers on the one side and modern politicians on the 
other. Kings and presidents are perceived as political gures, although in 
diering ways, and it is possible for them to visit, or intrude upon, each 
others’ ‘spaces’, and for the people to evaluate their actions and movements 
according to both registers. us, the modern politicians are not like the 
colonial administrators who were banned from the “sacred precincts”. 
e two approaches discussed above concentrate on dierent ends of the 
power structure: the rst on the way that post-colonial rulers manipulate 
identities in order to expand their power, while the second examines how 
these manipulations are dismissed or re-manipulated by their subjects – 
operations that take place simultaneously and are reectively linked (see, e.g., 
Taylor 2004). In what follows, this is discussed as a problem for purication 
in that a political leader who explicitly separated and hierarchized religion 
and politics was persistently viewed as a ritualistic gure. e objective is 
to demonstrate that modernist ideas of a transcendent God and the ‘proper 
place’ of religion in society are not relevant to people who see politics as 
a eld occupied not only by humans but also spirits.    
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As pointed out earlier, the Akan cosmology sees Onyame, the creator, as the 
source of all power.  us the power that animates the bodies of humans, 
animals, and plants is derived from this superior being, while the powers of 
spiritual beings, objects, and substances stem directly or indirectly from the 
same source. Although the human faculties are restricted both by Onyame’s 
creation and the physical and spiritual characteristics individuals have 
inherited from their predecessors, there are ways to obtain ‘extra-human’ 
abilities. A human being can acquire the qualities of other living beings 
(e.g. ‘the strength of a lion’, ‘the dexterity of a cat’) by studying the ways of 
the animals or by appropriating animal body parts for the preparation of 
medicines and charms. But more importantly, humans are considered to be 
able to acquire and / or make use of the powers of the spirits (asunsum, sing. 
sunsum). People who are perceived as ‘powerful’ (wo tumi or wo sunsum) 
are thought to have established a close relationship with the spirits, and 
their success and accomplishments are integrally linked to that connection, 
a relationship takes the form of exchange in sacrice. 
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, spiritual powers have a 
central role in many oral traditions concerning the foundations of Akan 
settlements, in which the present-day home is depicted as a place where 
the ancestors rst met the spirits or where they had been led by them. 
Correspondingly, traditional accounts about the creation of the greatest of 
all Akan polities, the Asante Kingdom, describe massive chiey sacrices to 
the ‘state gods’ in order to obtain the power needed to overthrow the overlord 
at the time. e oce of the chief is always backed by spiritual powers, and 
one of his principal duties is to make oerings to the spirits on behalf of his 
community, whose present well-being and future success is considered to 
depend on the spirits as they have the power to make the farmland fertile, ll 
the forest with animals for the hunters, and help people to give birth to new 
generations. erefore chiefs, together with priests and other oceholders 
of the community, are seen as responsible for establishing and maintaining 
good relations with the spirit world. An elderly queen mother described the 
relationship between the traditional oceholders and the local deities in 
a following way:  
e gods are here to protect us. at is why we entertain them. e chief and 
the queen mother are like father and mother to the people and that is why they 
always have to be present when any customs for the gods are performed. is is 
so even if there is nothing special for them to do. Whenever there is a custom 
for a god, we consult them. at is our tradition. Everybody has a chance of 
consulting them, but the chief and the queen mother have to do it rst, because 
those messages that concern the whole town are directed particularly to them. 
Sometimes the gods even ask specically for them. For example, Ntoa [the main 
god of her town] calls me his wife. Hence, he oen asks: “Where is my wife?” 
Sometimes the gods already have a message for you. Sometimes you might have 
a question for them, even something personal. For example, the gods may tell 
you that there is an epidemic coming and you must do such-and-such things to 
protect your people. Or, on the other hand, if you are feeling sick, you might ask 
the gods about the cause of the sickness.
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Although the traditional oceholders are seen to hold a privileged position 
in relations with dierent kinds of spirits and their powers, it is well 
understood that anybody with the correct knowledge about the means of 
access can obtain some of that power. Consequently, people from all walks 
of life consult the shrines of the spirits on all matters imaginable. Meanwhile, 
the idea of the chief as a divine ruler is again extended to modern politicians, 
as they too are considered to have greater spiritual backing, resulting in 
numerous stories about politicians obtaining ‘jujus’ that make them bullet-
proof, knife-proof, immune to trac accidents and wealthy, among other 
attributes. Similarly, their relationships with certain traditional priests, 
pastors, herbalists, and so forth are a popular topic of gossip, while murders, 
suicides, mutilations, and other violent crimes are frequently associated 
with human sacrices in the popular press and oen a connection is made 
to politics. Of course, one can argue that much of this is just gossip and 
sensationalism, and hence mostly a product of the imagination, but what is 
important is that these stories are signicant and understandable – by virtue 
of cosmological ideas that link power, leadership, and the spirit world – to 
the people who share them through numerous re-tellings. In Ghana popular 
rumours have associated all political leaders with spiritual arrangements, 
regardless of their own publicly voiced religious and ideological convictions. 
For instance, Ghana’s rst president, Kwame Nkrumah, and his Convention 
People’s Party used Christianity to popularize and legitimate their anti-
colonial ideology by portraying Nkrumah as an African Messiah and the 
organization as the Party of God (Simms 2003). e president described 
himself “a Marxist-Leninist and a non-denominational Christian” but, in 
contrast, he also assumed titles normally reserved for chiefs, traditional 
priests, and indigenous gods (Giord 1999, 496). Accordingly, his alleged 
dealings with the spirit world were a constant subject of speculation in 
people’s informal conversations as well as in opposition propaganda, and 
rumours even circulated about the magical powers contained in the walking 
stick and white handkerchief that he carried with him. Popular sources also 
claimed that Nkrumah had a secret chamber in his residence where he kept 
his ‘juju’, Kankan Nyame, which was said to be the dead body of a pregnant 
woman. Similarly, the military coups of 1979 and 1981 masterminded 
by Rawlings were shrouded in mystery. However, before describing the 
‘spiritual warfare’ associated with the early Rawlings era, I will briey outline 
what conventional political history has to say about the events that made an 
unknown junior ocer the longest-serving head of state in Ghana to date. 
Revolutionary violence
In 1979 Ghana was ruled by a group of military ocers known as the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC). At the time, the country was spiralling into poverty: 
its institutions were rapidly declining through neglect and corruption; 
people did not have enough to eat; and the value of money was being eroded 
by ination (Jeries 1989, 77–78). Strikes were widespread and the SMC 
had declared a State of Emergency. is was the context in which Flight-
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Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings, together with six other soldiers, planned a military 
takeover that was supposed to ‘cleanse’ the armed forces of corruption. 
e plan was put into action in May 1979, but it proved unsuccessful and 
Rawlings was arrested and charged with mutiny. Surprisingly, the young pilot 
was given a public trial, during which his oratorical skills and fearlessness 
in challenging his accusers made a great impact on his audience. Before he 
could be sentenced, on 4th June 1979, a group of soldiers forcibly released 
Rawlings from custody, reorganized the aborted coup, and made him the 
chairman of the emergent Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
(ibid., 83–84), which spent only four months in power before handing 
over to a short-lived civilian regime led by President Hilla Limann (ibid., 
88–89). Tensions soon developed between the Limann administration and 
Rawlings. As the Ghanaian economy continued to deteriorate, Rawilings 
reassumed power on 31st December 1981, now supported by a group of 
young Marxist intellectuals, mostly students and academics, but also some 
junior army ocers and activists in the labour movement. e Marxists’ aim 
was to achieve a socialist Ghana, but they failed to create any constructive or 
realistic economic plan and, when support was not forthcoming from any of 
the Soviet bloc countries, Rawlings nally abandoned the leists and turned 
to the IMF and World Bank for an economic recovery program (ibid., 92–
95). Subsequently, the conditions imposed by Western donors, along with 
growing internal opposition, made Rawlings agree to a return to civilian 
rule in the 1990s (Oquaey 1995). 
e 1979 coup was by no means bloodless, as the AFRC carried 
out a ‘house cleaning’ exercise aimed at purging the Ghanaian army of 
corruption. During the rst weeks of military leadership, three former coup 
makers-cum-heads of state, Generals Akwasi Afrifa, I. K. Acheampong, and 
Frederick Akuo, were executed together with ve other senior ocers. 
Several ocers were taken into custody and those who had held political 
oces were later put before the newly established People’s Courts and 
imprisoned aer conviction. e ‘house cleaning’ was also extended to other 
public institutions. Many high-ranking civil servants were dismissed and 
their property and assets conscated by the state. Some of them were also 
sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by the People’s Courts. In the 
general civilian population, wealthy traders and market women suspected of 
collaborating with the former military rulers, or even persons who merely 
appeared to be auent or ‘bourgeois’, were attacked on the grounds of their 
being the cause of Ghana’s economic hardships (NRCR, Vol. 4, Chapter 1, 
47–50). Rawlings’ so-called second coming was also marked by violence. 
In June 1982, three high court judges and a retired army major were 
abducted from their homes. eir half-burned bodies were later found near 
the country’s capital, Accra. e new government, titled the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC), announced that the murders had been 
orchestrated by ‘enemies of the revolution’ and the killers were caught 
and swily convicted, but many details of the case suggested top-level 
political involvement. e abuses did not only target the rich and powerful: 
soldiers harassed ordinary people, seizing goods in the markets and shops, 
and at road blocks; private vehicles were also conscated, allegedly for 
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“operations”; some soldiers entered homes by force to extort money or to 
search and seize personal goods; killings were rampant and mostly carried 
out by trigger-happy men in uniform (NRCR, Vol. 4, Chapter 1, 55–63). 
During my eldwork in Kumasi in 2000–2001 I lived with a shop-keeping 
family whose properties had been seized in the ‘house cleaning’, while some 
of their close relatives had been arrested and imprisoned by the military 
government. One of the latter, an elderly trader, had died in prison, while 
another was released only when Rawlings was stepping down in 2001. eir 
view was that the Asante people in particular had been targeted by the 
violent measures, because they were ‘business-minded’ or ‘industrious’ and 
thus generally better o; indeed, antipathy to Rawlings and what was seen 
as his ‘tribalist’ government remained intense on the part of most Asante 
people to whom I talked (see also Jeries 1992, 222). ey recollected the 
public humiliations, seizures, and killings of the coup days with dread, but 
also with a certain irony when referring to the military regimes’ arbitrary 
anti-corruption and anti-hoarding measures that sometimes bordered on 
absurdity.81
Rawlings himself has always refused to be characterized as a coup-
maker or leader of a military junta. On the contrary, he insists that both of 
his coups were popular revolutions and consequently the ‘house cleaning’, 
political executions, and other high-handed measures of the AFRC and 
early PNDC eras should be seen as “excesses of revolution”, which were 
ultimately outweighed by the positive aspects of the revolutionary process 
(e.g. Shillington 1992, 89–97). In 2000, aer Rawlings had been voted out 
of power, the newly elected President John Kufuor of the former opposition 
group, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), faced widespread demands that 
the government address the injustices of the past. e 1992 republican 
constitution prepared under the supervision of Rawlings’ government 
had indemnied all military personnel from judicial scrutiny, making it 
unfeasible for those wronged to seek legal redress. To get around this, the 
new regime established the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to 
compile historical records of all past human-rights violations by providing 
a formal forum in which victims could tell their stories. During his brief 
appearance in front of the commission in 2004, which lasted thirty minutes 
and was broadcast live on national radio and television, Rawlings was 
questioned about the political executions. His testimony did not reveal any 
new evidence and, aerwards, his interrogation was characterized mainly as 
a “symbolic victory” (Valji 2006, 12–16, 31–35). 
81 For example, a close friend of mine, who was a secondary school student at the 
time, oen tells a story about how he was stopped on the street and questioned 
by the military because he had an egg in his lunch box. According to the logic of 
his interrogators, possession of a single egg could indicate that he or someone else 
was hoarding them in bulk somewhere. Incidents similar to this fuelled strange 
rumours about the goals of the ‘house cleaning’ operations. One popular story 
in Nkoranza describes how people were burying empty glass bottles in their 
backyards because the rumours preceding the soldier raids claimed that “this is 
what they are looking for”.
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Although Rawlings’ governments resorted to religious rhetoric from time to 
time and the preservation of traditional culture had a central place in their 
propaganda (Meyer 1998b, 27), Rawlings himself did not try to manipulate 
traditional or religious symbolism as extensively as some of his predecessors. 
He likened himself to such contemporary revolutionaries as Fidel Castro 
and Muammar Gadda, and not to great chiefs or religious leaders, a stance 
which was further accentuated by his appearance in the simple service 
uniform of the Ghana Air Force with scruy beard and mirrored sunglasses. 
He preferred to represent himself as a “man of the people” or “pragmatist”, 
who thought that theories and ideologies were better le to the Western 
intellectuals who could aord them (e.g. Jeries 1989, 87).82 Furthermore, 
revolution implied a fundamental reorganization of society and eradication 
of the old order (see West 2005, 151–152), something highlighted in the 
propaganda of the military junta, and sometimes in radically anti-social 
tones.83  In this context, all resistance against the revolution, no matter from 
what sector of society it arose, was aggressively suppressed. 
One incident oen recalled, and referred to by some as evidence of the 
military regime’s disregard for everything sacred, was the murder of Prophet 
Asare, the founder of e Lord is My Shepherd Church in Kumasi. e church 
members had come into conict with an army ocer who had interrupted 
their Sunday service and ordered them to participate in road construction 
work. In the scue that followed the ocer’s gun went o, wounding one of 
the church members, and the ocer himself was then attacked by the angry 
congregation and beaten to death. His military comrades then retaliated by 
burning down the church building and the houses of several known church 
members. Four people were killed, including Asare himself; ten others were 
detained and tortured or beaten up; and Asare’s body was later burned at 
the Kejetia lorry park in central Kumasi (NRCR, Vol. 2, Chapter 8, 1–5). 
Although Asare was only one among many victims of coup-era violence, 
it is very oen the image of his burning body that is summoned up when 
these events are discussed: “Imagine, they burned a Christian pastor to 
death,” as one person, who was convinced the prophet was still alive when 
brought to the lorry park, ended his recollection to me. Asare’s murder took 
place in February 1982 and immediately aerwards mainstream Christian 
82 However, as both Birgit Meyer (1998b, 27–32) and Paul Giord (2004, 40), have 
shown, Rawlings’ attitude toward Christianity, especially Pentecostalism, changed 
dramatically in the 1990s. Recently Rawlings has even described the 1979 coup as 
a “divine intervention” and compared it with “what Jesus Christ did in the temple 
when people were gambling and selling in the church” (Modern Ghana, 5th June 
2010).
83 According to the reports of the NRC, copies of Sergey Nechayev’s Catechism 
of a Revolutionary were distributed in the barracks during the AFRC era. is 
manifesto characterized the revolutionary as a man who “has broken all the bonds 
which tie him to the social order” and whose object is to destroy “the whole lthy 
order” (NRCR, Vol. 4, Chapter 1, 70–74).
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groups started to openly protest against PNDC rule. Both the Christian 
Council of Ghana (a national organization of Protestant churches) and the 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued a number of statements in which they 
condemned all violence perpetrated by the security forces (NRCR, Vol. 4, 
Chapter 9, 440–441). 
e government reacted by warning the religious leaders to stay out of 
politics. In a rally widely reported in the national press a PNDC regional 
secretary stated that the “[f]reedom of worship will not be allowed to 
infringe upon the interests of the state … religious bodies, like other 
associations, [should] subordinate themselves to the state” (quoted in 
Haynes 1991, 417). Finally, in 1989, the Rawlings regime promulgated a law 
that required all religious bodies in Ghana to be registered, and in the same 
year four religious groups, including e Lord is My Shepherd Church, 
were prohibited. e Christian organizations considered the law a violation 
of human rights and boycotted it widely (NRCR, Vol. 4, Chapter 9, 442); 
meanwhile, demands from the same quarters for a return to multi party rule 
and elections escalated (Meyer 1998b, 27).   
Rawlings’ project was clearly founded on a modernist ideology with 
distinctions between public and private, and politics and religion. In 
revolutionary Ghana religion was supposed to be a private matter and 
thus not concern public politics. Overlap was not tolerated and those who 
were seen to muddle the categories were treated as transgressors. However, 
paradoxically, and regardless of Rawlings’ secularism, his name became 
connected with all sorts of ritual manoeuvrings, including human sacrices 
in order to attain power, from the very moment he took the political stage 
in Ghana.
Dreams of revolution
e town of Nkoranza, located in the Brong-Ahafo region of central Ghana, 
also received its share of revolutionary violence although what actually 
happened in the town during the coup days has not been recorded, apart 
from the few petitions that were made to the NRC (e.g. NRCR, Vol. 2, 
Chapter 9, 17, 19). erefore, what remain are mostly the memories of 
those people who lived through those perilous times. As can be expected, 
the exact dates and sequences of events are not fresh in remembrance aer 
three decades and, for example, the two coups with the short interregnum in 
between, are oen merged into a singular ‘coup time’ in people’s memories. 
However, most people seem to agree that “over here it wasn’t as bad as it 
was elsewhere, like in Kumasi”. Many people are also quick to point out that 
the soldiers did not kill anybody in Nkoranza as they did in some of the 
neighbouring towns. Nonetheless, soldiers and members of the so-called 
People’s Defence Committees (PDC) set up by the military government 
did seize property from homes and businesses in Nkoranza, and the fear 
of being looted, arrested, or beaten up by a bullying band of soldiers takes 
a central place in many people’s recollections. One o told story probably 
relates to PNDC’s eorts to “evacuate” cocoa, coee, and food stus from 
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the rural areas to the coastal ports, whence they could be exported in order 
to procure foreign currency for the empty coers of the government (see 
Shillington 1992, 85–86). is operation proved dicult to facilitate, and 
in some localities the soldiers used coercion to get the required vehicles 
and manpower (see, e.g., NRCR, Vol. 2, Chapter 9, 41–43). As one of my 
informants recalls, it had been planned that Nkoranza would become 
a source of the latter.
e soldiers had conscated the rich people’s cocoa farms in Sefwi-Wiaso [cocoa 
growing district in the Western Region]. Over there they are many, our family 
has some there too. ey needed men to carry the cocoa sacks. Nkoranza was the 
place where they thought they would get the carriers. at’s why they rounded 
up all the young men of the town to the lorry station. When they got them there 
they red their guns in the air and told everybody to shut up and sit down on 
the ground. en they started walking around and choosing the carriers. If you 
were small and skinny, then they just passed you, but if you looked strong then 
they picked you and told you to go to the back of the truck. Agyengo [a mutual 
friend] was one of them. You see, they wanted strong men who would be able to 
load the trucks with cocoa.
Here the townspeople were powerless in front of the soldiers and their guns. 
However, as the story continues, the captured young men of Nkoranza were 
saved by an intervention from the spirit world. My informant continues:
ey never got to Sefwi-Wiaso. e whole operation was led by two soldiers who 
died in a car crash on their way there. In that same car there was a third passenger 
who had nothing to do with the operation and he survived the crash. He was then 
able to report exactly what had happened. He said that they were driving along 
a straight road when suddenly, without any special reason, the car bounced o 
the road and landed on its roof. e two soldiers died instantly, but the third 
man didn’t have a scratch on him. When the commander of the army unit that 
had been sent to Nkoranza heard about this, he shot himself. You see, he was 
originally from Nkoranza, so he knew immediately what had really happened. 
ey had angered the spirits and they were now killing them. He knew that the 
same destiny was waiting for him too and decided to commit suicide.
According to this story, the town was eectively protected by its guardian 
spirits and the soldiers had been made aware of the town’s spiritual backing 
the hard way. Another story that I also collected during my eldwork in 
Nkoranza reveals the idea that the revolutionaries also had their own 
spiritual advisors and that they actively tried to cancel out the powers that 
were stopping them from completing their mission:
e soldiers had their own spiritual men. I don’t know who these men were, but 
I guess they were somebody from the south and the soldiers had talked to them 
before coming to Nkoranza. ese men had told the soldiers about a tree in the 
Nkoranza market, which was also a god that protected the town. e soldiers 
decided to burn the tree and so they gathered a lot of dry fallen branches around 
it. When one of the soldiers was about to set the branches on re, he suddenly 
started shitting uncontrollably. He was rst taken to the toilet, but it wouldn’t 
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stop. en he was taken to the hospital, but they couldn’t do anything to stop it 
there either. It didn’t stop until all the branches around the tree had been cleared. 
From that moment on, no soldier dared to go even close to that tree.84  
In all of the accounts above, it was concluded that these events were 
‘mysteries’ (sunsum mo asem) steered by the spirits. However, the human 
agency of the chiefs, traditional priests, and other oce-holders, who are 
normally considered the defenders of the community, both in the physical 
and spiritual sense, is missing, although the people who told these stories 
seemed not to know or were perhaps unwilling to comment on that aspect 
to an outsider. It was not until I talked to a senior traditional priest called 
Nana Duodu that I got to know about the ‘ritual resistance’ of Nkoranza. 
is topic came up by coincidence when Nana Duodu was telling me about 
the importance of monitoring one’s dreams (ndae) which, according to 
him, contain ‘omens’ (yikyerɛ) given by the spirits. Humans can provide 
only supercial interpretations of dreams: for example, by referring to 
a distinction between signs that are generally considered good, such as 
a clear path or a white dove, or bad like a palm tree or a snake.85 In order 
to nd out what the omens mean precisely and to whom they are actually 
directed, one has to consult the spirits (bisa abosom) (see also Rattray 1959 
[1927], 192–196). Nana Duodu stressed that one should never, under any 
circumstances, overlook the signs appearing in dreams because such neglect 
might have disastrous consequences. To emphasize his point he gave me an 
example that had to do with Rawlings’ rst coup: 
Just before the coup I had a dream with some bad signs in it. I asked the gods 
about it and they said that a great misfortune is ahead of us. ey said that this 
misfortune is so big that it doesn’t concern Nkoranza alone but the whole country. 
Aer hearing this I immediately contacted the chief and told him about it. I said 
to him that he has to perform some customs. Even if we can’t stop this misfortune 
completely, something has to be done so that at least Nkoranza could be saved. 
e soldiers killed a lot of people all around Ghana. Just here in Techiman [the 
neighbouring town] they killed somebody. But Nkoranza was protected by the 
gods and nobody was killed here. Exactly the same thing happened when the 
Ghanaians were deported from Nigeria.86 It was a dangerous journey and not 
everybody made it home alive. However, all the Nkoranza people there got home 
safely because of the gods.
Sometimes the chiefs have a hard time believing what they hear when the gods 
tell the future. What they are saying sounds so incredible. In such cases the gods 
just tell them: “Everything we say will come true. If it will not be so, you can take 
Nana Duodu and slit his throat.” I hate it when they say that [laughter].
84 In the town of Nkoranza there are several trees that are considered to be deities. e 
story told here is also linked to a larger body of narratives about the ‘evil fortune’ of 
those people who have violated the sanctity of the trees.
85 Apparently, the dream symbolism has been inuenced by Christian imagery.
86 is must refer to the mass expulsion of Ghanaian citizens from Nigeria in 1983 
(see, e.g., Brydon 1985).
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Just as in the case of the divine tree, Nana Duodu’s reputation had also 
spread all the way to the capital and he too had to face the counter-measures 
of the coup-makers. He continued his recollections: 
e soldiers had heard about me. One morning when I was just about to leave my 
house two soldiers arrived on a motorcycle. I welcomed them rst and then told 
them that I didn’t have much time, because I had to go to a meeting. However, 
I invited them to have a drink with me before leaving. e soldiers just looked at 
me and said: “So, you are the man who has made this juju. We are not going to 
drink with you. We have our orders to take you to Accra.” I told them that in that 
case they should at least permit me to pour libation to the spirits before leaving. 
ey allowed me to do that. When I was pouring the libation the gods suddenly 
took me. I turned to the rst soldier and said: “You are called so-and-so, an Asene 
man from Antoa”. en I revealed the name and village of the other soldier. Aer 
that I continued revealing the names and villages of their superiors, including 
that ocer in Accra who had ordered my arrest. e gods spoke through me and 
explained to the soldiers that this priest in front of you has never met you before 
or heard about you, but we know who you are. ey said: “is is a warning to 
you. If you take this man with you, all of you whose names we have mentioned 
will surely have to pay for it later.” e soldiers got frightened and said that they 
are not going to take me anywhere. ey then apologized and asked for my 
protection. I said that I could pour libation on their behalf.
When putting all of these narratives together, a very familiar theme emerges. 
e traditional histories of the Nkoranza chiefdom are lled with accounts 
of how one chief aer another was able to overpower his enemies with 
the help of their war gods; in consequence, the subdued chiefdoms were 
incorporated into Nkoranza as tributaries and, in the same way, their gods 
and their powers became associated with the new overlords. Nowadays, 
these wars are remembered and also partially re-enacted during annual 
thanksgiving rituals to the gods; similarly, the oral traditions mention several 
occasions where the enemies of Nkoranza were getting the upper hand 
and the chiefdom was saved in the last moment from total destruction by 
a miraculous intervention of the gods. e ocers’ car crash, the unsuccessful 
tree burning, the dream of the priest, the ritual performed by the chief, and 
The late Nana Duodu 
photographed in front of 
his shrine house in April 
2006. I was told that the 
car behind him on the right 
was a thank you gift from a 
Christian pastor whom “he 
had made great”.
166
8. Gods and Coup D’États
nally the surrender of the two soldiers can be, and actually were, tted into 
that same context by the narrators, thereby conveying a renewed continuity 
with the time of the ancestors and the history of the chiefdom.
Christian soldier
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Pentecostal and Charismatic varieties of 
Christianity became increasingly popular in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 
last two decades of the twentieth century. us in Ghana it was during the 
Rawlings era that this now very powerful movement started to challenge the 
mainstream churches (Giord 2004, 23). e various Pentecostal churches 
in Ghana relate to political matters dierently, but what all of them seem to 
have in common is that they tend to think and talk about politics in terms 
of “spiritual causality” that posits a powerful agency for God and Satan in 
the aairs of the state (ibid., 161). at is to say, the political situation is 
invariably a consequence of people’s relationships to divinity, and not of 
relationships between people. Some churches claim that phenomena like 
political violence, impoverishment, and ‘under-development’ are caused by 
demons, evil spirits, or curses, which are very oen depicted by using the 
imagery of traditional religion. According to this line of thinking, the people 
responsible for the suering of Ghanaians are both the ‘pagan ancestors’ 
and contemporary traditionalists who have summoned the evil spirits to the 
African continent and entertained them through heathen worship. Another 
understanding is that Ghana’s political diculties are a divine punishment 
for Ghanaian leaders’ failure to obey God. Here God is seen as the source 
of powers that could heal the country and free the people, but these powers 
cannot be released before the people’s representatives devote themselves to 
him. erefore, Ghana will not be able to solve its political problems unless 
the country is ruled by born-again Christians, whose spiritual backing is 
provided by the Almighty. Conversely, a nal downfall is imminent under 
a leader who relies on occult forces (ibid., 161–164). is discourse also 
entails a critique of Western secular society, considering, for example, that 
recent trends such as the public acceptance of same-sex unions in the West 
are dangerous aberrations (Essien and Aderinto 2009). In some respects this 
situation resembles the anti-secularism of North American fundamentalist 
Christianity (see, e.g., Harding 2000, 153–181), but the perceived threats 
are demonic inuences and the divine punishments that follow rather than 
immanent moral decay resulting from irreligiosity. e following quote 
from a web column aptly summarizes the anxieties the Pentecostals have 
about the secular politics of the whole post-colonial period: 
Ghanaians need to speak out against these politicians who are seeking these 
voodoo interventions by following Kwame Nkrumah’s footsteps of killing human 
beings for evil powers. In addition, we all should believe that the Almighty God, 
who continued to serve us daily, has His hands upon his nation. So we should 
not allow the devil to take over our nation. If Gods anger comes upon our nation 
as He did against the Israelites, we all will suer as we did for the past 30 years. 
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Ghanaians should not suer due to these sycophants’ criminals politician self-
interests [sic]. (Amankwah 2009)
As Meyer (2004b, 97) has put it, Pentecostal Christianity has not entered 
the public debate as one kind of ‘opinion’ about politics, but, rather, it has 
“rearticulated the terms of political debate in a new manner: casting Ghana 
as in dire need of purication through the Christian God”. us it is not 
merely traditional chieaincy with its links to fetishes that is evil – the same 
risk is present in modern representative politics as well.
All through the 1980s, the relationship between the Christian churches 
and Rawlings’ PNDC government was tense. As discussed above, the 
mainstream churches had publically criticized the revolution and thus 
stood in opposition to the government. At this point, the newly introduced 
Pentecostal groups stayed out of politics and concentrated on preaching 
their message of individual salvation and success, yet the government was 
still suspicious of them, particularly because of their unsympathetic attitude 
towards Ghanaian traditional culture, which the PNDC claimed to promote. 
It was only in the 1990s, aer the transition to multiparty democracy and the 
liing of state censorship of media, that the Pentecostals’ ‘dualistic political 
theology’ was voiced publicly. Although Rawlings later tried to get closer 
to Pentecostal churches and was accepted by some, many of them opposed 
him throughout his tenure of oce. Popular stories about Rawlings’ ritual 
activities during the coup time and thereaer travelled fast in Christian 
circles and easily connected with their discourses as instances of fetish 
worship and demonic inuences (Meyer 1998b, 26–32; Giord 2004, 163). 
For example, around the elections of 2000, one inuential Charismatic leader 
interviewed by the opposition press described the Rawlings government as, 
among other things, an order of Satanism, idolatry and bloodshed (Giord 
2004, 164–165). 
According to Meyer (2004b; 2006), one very signicant development 
in contemporary Ghanaian society is the formation of a “pentecostally 
infused public culture”; that is, that Pentecostal expressive forms, themes, 
and narrative structures have diused to the larger society through modern 
mass media. is has been made possible by the churches’ heavy economic 
investments in TV and radio of money derived from members and overseas 
sponsors (see De Witte 2003; 2005). Individual Christians ‘coming out’ in 
public with personal accounts of past involvements with the spirit world 
and politics, thereby revealing the occult behind the curtain of secular 
government, forms a part of this phenomenon (Meyer 1998b, 29). Such 
stories, taking the form of a confession, underline the “inner change” of a 
born-again Christian as well as the public revelation of truth (Meyer 2004b, 
94; 2006, 439). For instance, in 2003, during the hearings of the National 
Reconciliation Commission, a former close ally of Rawlings made shocking 
disclosures concerning the rituals accompanying both the 1979 and 1981 
coups. Warrant Ocer Joseph Adjei-Boadi had been a security coordinator 
of the AFRC and a member of the PNDC, but had resigned because he had 
received a “spiritual message”. He had initially been invited to the hearings 
to respond to allegations that he had harassed and terrorized members of 
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a particular healing church during the PNDC era which he denied, referring 
to the break he had made with the military government. But what really 
caught the attention of the press was his statement to the Commission that 
Rawlings and his comrades had resorted to “adult and child sacrices” 
to sustain the coups. When he was pressed to cite instances of rituals 
performed by the coup-makers, he claimed that the murders of the three 
high court judges and retired army major in 1982 were committed for ritual 
purposes, information that had supposedly been conveyed to him by one of 
the killers. As a staunch believer in God, he had no other alternative than 
to abandon his life in the military, taking up farming as his new source of 
livelihood (GhanaWeb, 5th March 2003). At that time, he also became deeply 
involved with a religious group called the Nyamesompa Healing Church, 
whose leader, Pastor Olormey Stephen Safo, was responsible for submitting 
the current harassment charges to the truth commission. According to 
Pastor Olormey, Adjei-Boadi was a former member of the church who 
had turned against it aer the church leadership had refused to assist him 
spiritually in his plans to stage a coup against his ex-comrade Rawlings in 
the late 1980s (GhanaWeb, 3rd March 2003). e church in question had also 
been on the list of religious groups prohibited by the PNDC government 
in 1989 (NRCR, Vol. 4, Chapter 9, 440). Adjei-Boadi himself denied the 
pastor’s testimony and summed up his position by stating: “It is never true; 
throughout my military life, I never knew any juju man, prophet or Malam 
[Islamic ritual specialist]. I believe in my own capabilities. All those stories 
are lies to destroy my reputation” (GhanaWeb, 5th March 2003).87 
e ex-warrant ocer’s story is highly illuminating in terms of Ghanaian 
Christian views of politics. e sources available do not directly suggest 
that Adjei-Boadi himself is a follower of any specic Pentecostal group, but 
his testimony follows the Pentecostal ‘cultural style’ common in Ghanaian 
public debates. It directly refers to the dualistic spiritual nature of politics by 
oering rst-hand evidence of its evil and godless nature, and of Rawlings in 
particular, but it also highlights the necessity of confessing one’s sins, being 
spiritually reformed, and, in this way, making a total break with the past.  
e traditionalists of Nkoranza perceived the coup-makers as ‘enemy 
chiefs’ assisted by spirits, which then could be warded o by ritual means by 
the traditional oceholders of the community. e political violence was thus 
situated in long-established indigenous categories which were indierent 
to the modernist discourse of revolution. us the disturbing events could 
87 is was not the only time the NRC had to deal with questions about the ritual 
arrangements of Rawlings’ coups. One enquiry took up the killing of three 
traditional priests belonging to the Ewe ethnic group in 1982 (NRCR, Vol. 2, 
Chapter 8, 15–18). Outside the chambers popular rumours claimed that the priests 
had been Rawlings’ “spiritual advisors” who had to be killed because “they knew 
his secrets”, and similar speculations were also heard in the commission hearings 
(NRCR, Vol. 4, Chapter 9, 413–414). In 2006 Rawlings himself stated, in what one 
might call a Pentecostal tenor, that the priests had been killed because they were 
suspected of committing ritual murders and “to let the people know that there was 
no salvation in juju” (Modern Ghana, 4th November 2006).
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be incorporated into the local body of history in which disasters were 
always followed by spiritual intervention and restorations. e Pentecostal 
Christians, on the other hand, had explicitly renounced both the traditional 
religion as well as the idea of secular politics by placing them in the demonic 
sphere in their dualistic worldview. However, through their recognition of 
the existence of the spirit world and its multiple connections to human rulers, 
they too saw the coup-makers as people with spiritual powers, although these 
were fundamentally evil. erefore, notwithstanding the changed value, 
they too have subscribed to the fundamental idea that power transcends 
human agency. Here I am not trying to postulate a cultural continuity by 
claiming that, deep down, the Pentecostals are really traditionalists. I am 
rather arguing that the ontological notions and ideas about agency of both 
groups are in a certain sense similar and, most importantly, that they are 
both indierent to modernist notions about a transcendental God who 
works only in the hearts and minds of people. 
Pentecostal Christianity has been labelled a “rebellion” against a modern 
Christianity that has accepted the assumptions of secularism (Taylor 2007, 
554). However, in places like contemporary Ghana it cannot be treated 
as a marginal phenomenon or an exception to the rule; on the contrary, 
Pentecostalism and pentecostally-oriented discourses have substantial 
public visibility and have also inuenced other Christian churches. An 
interesting correlative phenomenon, however, is that some aspects of 
traditional cosmologies have experienced a resurrection of a sort as they are 
now publicly attacked as the nemesis of Pentecostalism. us for Ghanaian 
Pentecostals the ‘other’ is not a secular, non-religious society, as would be 
the case for many Western Christians (see Cannell 2006, 31–32), but rather 
the demonic spiritual sphere that is represented by, among other things, 
traditional society. In these discussions, the modern secularists oen realize 
that they are a third party.
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T his book has demonstrated how the separate categories of religion  and politics emerged in Asante society as the colonial administration 
sought to facilitate missionary work and conversion while also supporting 
the chiefs as the secular rulers of the country. Concurrently, a modern 
notion of citizenship was planted. It has been maintained that individual 
conversion had certain very powerful social consequences which the colonial 
ocials and missionaries sought to control; in so doing, they relied on the 
categories of their own culture. During the early days of the colonial era 
the number of Christian converts was very low, but it was their radically 
uncompromising and direct adoption and adaptation of Christian teachings 
that set the transformative processes in motion. e encounter between 
the all-encompassing nature of fetishism and rupturally-oriented Christian 
individualism was of decisive importance. For the Asante, coming to terms 
with these processes meant a total redenition of their society in terms 
of secular and religious spheres, freedom of conscience, citizenship, and 
the like. e two chapters of the rst part of the book, which posited the 
exchanges between the chiefs and the spirit world in the nucleus of the pre-
colonial ‘political’ structure, provide the template against which one is able 
to assess the extreme nature of this transformation: a comparative angle 
adopted from Dumont’s project. e community of people that existed 
to communicate with the spirits of the dead and the gods became a self-
contained system: the chief priest and sacrier was transformed into an 
‘earthly ruler’, a union of lineages following an ancestral chief became a 
gathering of individual citizens, and so on. At the same time, when the 
missionaries were envisioning their models, grand theories about Asante 
as a state based on political contract and representation were produced by 
African intellectuals and colonial ethnographers. Secularism was also a part 
of colonial statecra: it was politically expedient to promote an ideology, in 
which a person’s ‘real’ identity was permanently tied to the ‘native state’ to 
which he / she belonged, while ‘religion’ was a matter of private belief and 
thus liable to change and reconsideration.  
Ever since the colonial-era transformation, the mainstream of discussions 
about chieaincy in Asante, and Ghana in general, has revolved around 
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political concepts. Accordingly, the chapters of the second part of the book 
have outlined a biography of the institution, tracing the political career 
of the ‘native ruler’ from a purported people’s representative to a client of 
the state, a nationalist symbol, and a businessman. Still today politicians, 
civil servants, development analysts, journalists, and of course the chiefs 
themselves argue whether chieaincy is fundamentally democratic or 
aristocratic, whether the chiefs should function as local agents of the state 
or rather as representatives of civil society, whether their role is damaging 
or benecial for ‘development’, and whether chieaincy should be invested 
with decision-making powers or oce-holders should remain as ‘cultural 
gureheads’. e proponents of chieaincy tend to subscribe to the ‘liberal 
models’ that originated in the colonial era, whereas opponents of the 
institution usually refer to modernization theories that are oen associated 
with the intellectual climate of the decolonization period. ese debates are 
also carried on in the various social sciences which apply the concepts and 
theories formulated for the analysis of Western politics. Moreover, the history 
of chieaincy from the pre-colonial period to the present is discussed in 
similar terms. It is either insisted that an originally democratic institution 
based on consensus was distorted and instrumentalized by the colonial and 
post-colonial sovereignties, or it is accepted that the chieaincy institution 
has been ‘modernized’ or adapted to meet the needs of the contemporary age. 
e contention of this book is that none of these debates would have 
been possible without chieaincy, or the traditional polity as a whole, rst 
being secularized, and that is also the most important development in the 
institution in the twentieth century. Although it has also been established 
that the secularization process is in many ways highly problematic and 
incomplete, there is no doubt that a major ideological change has transpired. 
erefore, it is more pertinent to discuss rupture than resilience. In this 
context, the major ‘colonial inventions’ are the domains of religion and 
politics. is was by no means an inevitable evolution. e secular is, aer 
all, a historically produced idea and this book has sought to demonstrate 
how it came into being in one particular setting. In fact, when it comes 
to chieaincy itself, we might even entertain the idea that in dierent 
historical circumstances it might have been dened a ‘religious institution’ 
in a colonial society and thus would have had a very dierent trajectory. 
erefore I see it as vital to study the history of ‘traditional institutions’ 
from this perspective everywhere in Africa. is would not only ll in some 
gaps in our understanding of the impacts of colonialism, but it would also 
help us to comprehend better the complexities of current politics in Sub-
Saharan Africa. For instance, when discussing the cooperation or non-
cooperation between chiefs and nation-states or chiefs and global horizontal 
institutions elsewhere in Africa, it would be essential to examine in detail 
the sort of ideological discourses about chieaincy on which such policies 
rely, and their histories. In Asante, for instance, the colonial era engendered 
an ideology about democratic chieaincy which was rejected by the leist 
decolonization movement and ‘revolutionary’ military governments, but 
which has since found its way into World Bank research reports, academic 
monographs, and conference speeches by kings. 
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e nal part of the book dealt with the problems that the secularization 
project has encountered. Modern religions in general accept the sovereignty 
of the nation-state and hence religious groups can uently assume national 
identities. Modern religion may also publicly oppose the state, as was the 
case when the mainstream churches criticized the policies of the Rawlings’ 
military government as violations of human rights. us religion can have 
a public role in modern society if it agrees with the assumptions of a certain 
kind of secular political discourse. It might even be welcomed to ‘enrich’ 
debates, oer new perspectives, and so on, but it cannot be tolerated as 
a political authority. e crucial question then is not whether religion 
should be kept separate from politics or not, but rather what kind of religion 
is acceptable for modern society (see Asad 2003, 181–187; Casanova 1994). 
In this book I have particularly connected this issue to questions of 
recognized notions of agency. Based on the ideas of Latour and Keane, I have 
described modern religion as a system with a god who does not inuence 
‘real-life’ social relationships or the laws of nature, but instead resides in the 
hearts of human beings. Hence, for the modernists the only real agent in 
political aairs is the autonomous human individual. From this point of view, 
it is up to individuals themselves to decide whether they want to ‘bring’ god 
and religion into public arenas where political matters are discussed. is 
can then be approved or rejected by others. My argument is that for people 
like Ghanaian traditionalists and Pentecostal Christians such limitations 
of agency are not pertinent. Consequently, although in present-day Ghana 
the institutional separation between religion and politics has been set up 
as part of the construction of the modern secular state, not everyone sees 
this as a meaningful way to approach spiritual matters. is highlights that 
secularism is not only about church and state, rights of citizens, legality, and 
such things. It is also about the acceptance and assumption of a modern 
worldview and the moral concerns that come with it (see Keane 2013).
e problems that the colonial and post-colonial governments have had 
in their dealings with anti-witchcra movements, as discussed in Chapter 
7, constitute an extreme example of a situation where the modernist non-
recognition of dierent kind of ideas about agency leads to a complete 
stalemate. Moreover, in the cases described in the nal chapter of the 
book, it became evident that in the eyes of the Nkoranza traditionalists, 
the existence of their community rested on the oceholders’ ability make 
sacrices to the spirits and hence ‘political’ threats from the outside were also 
fought spiritually through ritual. For the present-day Pentecostals this spirit 
world is diabolical, but it is nevertheless seen to work behind the veneer 
of politics, as immoral politicians turn to ‘juju’ in order to gain access to 
power and riches. If the ideas of the Nkoranza traditionalists remain local, 
or maybe even marginal, and one might even say that they have, to a certain 
extent, resisted secularization, Pentecostal political theology has managed 
to challenge it. rough the Christians’ substantial inuence in privatized 
mass media, the idea of a state or a nation as something that exists for 
a purpose outside itself disseminates into the broader society in opposition to 
the modern nationalistic projects promoted by the state. A wholly individual 
and transcendent religion has not been realized. For the secularists the 
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chiey sacrice to ancestors and gods is understandable and perhaps even 
acceptable when it is conceived as a symbolic act directed at other people in 
order to create a sense of unity, enthusiasm, or other human emotions. In 
the thinking of both the traditionalists and Pentecostals, however, rituals are 
not perceived primarily as symbolic activities. 
My assertion is that the type of religiosity the traditionalists and 
Pentecostals represent is not compatible with the blueprint of modern 
religion and hence modernist commentaries on them oen fail to grasp 
their essence. e ongoing disputes in Ghanaian media about the proper 
place of the pouring of libation are a case in point. For the traditionalists 
it is a sacricial exchange in which the agency of the spirits is invoked 
(see the oration quoted in Chapter 2, pp. 63–64); meanwhile, it is deemed 
repugnant by the Pentecostals who see such spirits as “the accomplices of 
the Devil” (Van Dijk 2001, 50). However, when it is debated whether the 
pouring of libation should be a part of ocial state functions, it takes place 
in a political register, where the question is reduced to relationships between 
religious groups (that is, the accepted political agents). For instance, during 
the government of the late President John Atta Mills, who in his later 
years became known for his close relationship with a certain Pentecostal 
prophet, libation pouring was excluded from the ocial program of the 
Independence Day celebrations. Some members of the secularist press 
attacked this decision sternly. According to one commentator, the disregard 
for the religious sensibilities of others shown by the Christians in this case 
should be compared with Islamist extremism:
“is is a complete case of Taliban Mentality, complete Taliban…I don’t think 
that it is an oversight. It is a clear case of religious intolerance. Once you become 
a President or whichever position you nd yourself, you don’t have to impose 
your religion on others. It should not be tolerated,” he [journalist Kwesi Pratt] 
fumed. Clearly livid, the outspoken Nkrumaist failed to understand why a 
country which claims to espouse national culture and freedom of worship, is 
opposed to the pouring of libation at state functions […] “Ghana is a secular 
state and so we want to see libation being poured. Libation pouring is part of our 
national heritage. How can you promote culture, leaving out libation?” he asked 
rather furiously. (CitiFM Online, 9th March 2011)
It is, of course, curious that a ‘pagan ritual’ that in the colonial era presented 
a dilemma which was to be solved by secularization, is now a symbol of 
a secular state and religious freedom. However, I am interested primarily 
in the question of why statements like these are not signicant to certain 
audiences. Here the problem in performing ‘traditional rituals’ is seen as 
a problem between people, while for the Pentecostals and the traditionalists 
alike, it is a question about relations between people and spirits. Of course, 
both the present-day Christians and the traditionalists are able and prepared 
to defend their cases within the connes of the secular discourses by referring 
to their right to freedom of religion or right to practice and maintain culture 
(see Atiemo 2006, 378–379), but the core question for them is not about 
peoples’ rights in relation to each other or the state. To them the question is 
what kind of real consequences will follow from ritual exchanges with spirits. 
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is has been also evident in my own discussions with both traditionalists 
and Christians about these matters. When I have asked traditional priests 
their opinion about Christian pastors who preach against them, they do not 
usually refer to notions of religious rights or tolerance, but rather emphasize 
that “they [Christians] should understand that the abosom are also children 
of God”. On the other hand, the Christian response to such a statement is 
that “these spirits are not from God”. 
Obviously, the stance of Pentecostalism toward chiefs and traditionalism 
shares much with those of early missionary Christianity, but the present-
day born-again Christians have a very dierent stature in society. e 
early converts seem to have been content to have become recognized 
as individual citizens with a Christian conscience in a political system 
administered according to secular principles, whereas the contemporary 
born-again Christians are entertaining the idea of Christian politics. Not 
only is chieaincy rejected as an idolatrous institution, but representative 
government without a born-again Christian leader and God’s guidance 
is also seen as a threat to the nation. However, it is notable that the idea 
of Christian politics does not entail the overthrow of the institutional 
order of the secular state in order to replace it with some sort of Christian 
theocracy. As Ruth Marshall (2009, 204–205) writes about “Born-Again 
political theology” in Nigeria, the political project of Pentecostal churches 
“represents itself as providing the conditions for the redemption of the 
religious and political traditions which were both promised in colonial and 
post-colonial rule, and ruined through it”. us the problems and failures 
of secular politics are not to be remedied by abolishing political institutions 
and structures, but rather by occupying them with born-again Christians. 
From this perspective, traditional chieaincy diers from modern 
state institutions in the sense that it has not been fully secularized and 
consequently it cannot be Christianized. Since the oces of the chiefs are 
still by denition related to the spirit world, it is dicult to ‘redeem’ them by 
occupying them with born-again Christians. Even many of those Christians 
who would not personally accept a traditional oce for religious reasons, 
acknowledge that a chief has to be able to perform all of his ritual duties. 
I have talked to members of royal lineages who are born-again Christians 
and who therefore rmly refuse to become chiefs. e main obstacle is that 
they are not prepared to oer sacrices to the ancestors and gods, because 
they see this as involving them with a spirit world that is ungodly. However, 
as persons who have been brought up as royals they do not consider ideas 
about ‘subtracting’ religion and ritual from chieaincy relevant. On the one 
hand, they consider sacrice a ‘fetish practice’, but on the other, they cannot 
imagine a chief who avoids the duty. Once I asked such a person whether 
he would like to become a chief if he did not have to perform sacrices; he 
thought about it for a moment and then replied: “It wouldn’t be chieaincy 
anymore. It would be something new, something else.”
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a. A Note on Sororate, Stool Wives and Child Marriage, with reference to two 
declarations made by the Confederacy Council in 1946.
b. Atipinhene Boakye Dankwa to Asantehene Osei Agyeman Prempe II, 16th February 
1946. 
ARG 2/2/68 Position of Chiefs under New Constitution
a. Memorandum from the Asanteman Council to the Governor in Council, 18th 
December 1953.
ARG 2/2/105 Creation of New States in Ashanti 1962–1965
a. Kwaso Stool.
b. Secretary to Regional Commissioner to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Justice, 2rd 
October 1963.
ARG 2/2/114 Constitutional Proposals (Statements by the Chiefs of Ahafo etc.)
a. e Proposed Constitution of Ghana.
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ARG 2/2/115 Constitutional Disputes – General
a. Regional Commissioner/Ashanti to the Minister of Interior, 12th February 1962.
ARG 3/2/38 Divisional Constitutions (Including the history of Bantama Stool and 
Constitution of Berekum)
a. e History of Bantama Stool.
ARG 3/2/64 Traditional Histories of Divisions (Techiman, Atebubu & Wiase / Adanse 
Fomena etc.)
a. Kuntanase.
ARG 6/2/28 Enstoolment Palaver
a. Election and Installation of Amanhene & Chiefs, and Who Have Right to Elect.
Brong-Ahafo Regional Archives, Sunyani
BRG 3/1/1 Oaths and Fetishes
a. Superintendent of Methodist Mission, Wenchi to District Commissioner, Sunyani, 
4th April 1934.
b. Order No. 12 of 1934: e Native Customs (Witch and Wizard Finding) Order, 1934.
c. Acting Chief Commissioner, Kumasi to District Commissioner, Sunyani, 8th June 
1938.
BRG 28/2/7 Native Aairs – Fetishes
a. Kukuro Fetish. Answers to Mr. De Gra Johnson’s Questionnaire, 18th August 1931.
b. Kukuro, 14th August 1928.
c. Father A. Meuwsen to Provincial Commissioner, 24th April 1928.
d. Acting Commissioner, Eastern Province to Acting Commissioner, Western Province, 
11th June 1928.
e. District Commissioner, Wenchi to Acting Commissioner, Western Province, 26th 
June 1928.
RAI. Royal Anthropological Institute, London, UK
MS 101–109 Rattray, Robert Sutherland, collection.
TNA. e National Archives (formerly PRO, Public Record Oce), London, UK
CO 96/624 Despatches Apl – 14 May
a. Governor Guggisberg to Colonial Secretary Churchill, 10th May 1921.
CO 96/662 1926 Mr. Ormsby Gore’s visit (Parliamentary under secretary for the 
Colonies)
a. Notes on the Native Constitution of Ashanti by RSR.
CO 96/667/2 J. C. Maxwell, Secret Memorandum to the Governor
a. Enclosure 6 in Gold Coast Conf. of 15 July 1926.
CO 96/688/11 Anthropological Research Work
a. Rattray to the Colonial Secretary (Gold Coast), 18th February 1929.
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CO 96/700/14 Indirect Rule: Direct Taxation. Proposed Native Revenue Ordinance 
1931
a. Governor to Colonial Secretary J. H. omas, 31st October 1931.
CO 96/702/3 1932 Financial Crisis in the U. K. 
CO 96/706/7 Administration of Ashanti. Vacancy for Chief Commissioner.
a. Chief Commissioner Newlands to Colonial Secretary (Gold Coast), 27th September 
1932.
CO 96/711/16 Nsuta Riot, Mampong District Ashanti
a. Governor omas to Cunlie-Lister, 19th August 1933.
CO 96/715/3 Proposed Restoration of the old Ashanti Confederacy
a. Memorandum by A. Fiddian.
b. Memorandum by J. H. Wallace.
c. Restoration of the Ashanti Confederacy (speech by His Excellency the Governor).
d. Governor Hodson to Cunlie-Lister, 11th April 1935.
CO 96/715/4 Ditto: Protests
CO 96/715/17 1932 Report of Ceremonies held in connection with the death of the 
Kumasihene
a Chief Commissioner Newlands to Colonial Secretary (Gold Coast), 30th June 1932.
CO 96/718/4 1934 Annual Administrative Report. Ashanti.
CO 96/721/1 1936 Ashanti Native Authority Ordinance; Native Courts Ordinance
a. e Native Authority Ordinance, 1935.
CO 96/724/9 Native Aairs. Aairs in Kumasi, Ashanti.
a. Acting Governor to Malcolm McDonald, 9th November 1935.
CO 96/728/18 1936 Native Aairs. Aairs in Kumasi, Ashanti.
a. Otumfuo Nana Osei Agyeman Prempeh II versus O. S. Agyeman, E, C, Bobieh-
Ansah, Akuo-Dompare, Atta Kwadjo alias Atta Boaman, Kojo Ansah alias F. H. 
Cobbina.
CO 96/741/7 1937 Aairs in Ejisu. Ashanti.
a. Note on the Powers of the Asantehene as head of the Ashanti Confederacy in relation 
to the De-stoolment of Kobina Wusu, Ejisuhene.
CO 96/753/15a 1939 Ashanti Native Authority Legislation
a. e Native Law and Custom (Ashanti Confederacy Council) Ordinance, 1939. 
CO 96/785/3 Petition.  Paramount Chiefs of Techiman. For return of villages.
a. R. E. Robinson to J. K. ompson, 18th October 1948.
CO 96/791/2 Native Aairs. Ashanti Confederacy Council.
a. Minutes of Emergency meeting of the Ashanti Confederacy Council executive 
committee held on Monday 3rd January, 1949, on occasion of the visit of Mr. A. B. 
Cohen, C. M. G., e Asst. Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Gold Coast.
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CO 96 813/12 Petition. Paramount Chiefs of Techiman. For return of villages.
CO 1069/31 GHANA 3. Album of 40 photographs entitled ‘Gold Coast Views in 
Kumasi; Kwaku Dua and His Court 1887’.
CO 1069/33 GHANA 5. 31 photographs in a box entitled ‘Views from the Gold Coast’.
CO 1069/44 GHANA 17. Album of 11 photographs and 2 papers depicting the 
Restoration of the Ashanti Confederacy, Ghana, 31 January 1935.
II. Newspapers and magazines
Asante Tribune
Ghana Review International
Kumasi Mail
III. Web portals
CitiFM Online
9th March 2011: Ban on pouring of libation at state functions is Taliban mentality – 
Pratt, http://www.citifmonline.com/index.php?id=1.319221
Ghana Business News
10th June 2010: Asantehene urges Diasporans to support Africa’s ght against poverty, 
http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2010/06/10/asantehene-urges-diasporans-to-
support-africas-ght-against-poverty/
Ghana Government Ocial Portal
Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture, http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=339:ministry-of-culture-a-chieaincy&catid
=74:ministries&Itemid=224
Ghana Leadership Forum
20th August 2011: Re: Idol Worshipping and Animal sacrice, https://groups.google.com/
forum/?fromgroups=#!msg/GhanaLeadershipForum/3F5BMr6BW7Q/8fOEYtyka5sJ
GhanaWeb
3rd March 2003: Church failed to give spiritual protection to coup maker, http://www.
ghanaweb.net/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=33545
179
Sources
5th March 2003: PNDC Killings: For Ritual Purposes - Ex-WO Adjei-Boadi, http://
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=33624
Modern Ghana 
21st October 2001: Asantehene inaugurates Golden Development Company Board,  
http://www.modernghana.com/news/17645/1/asantehene-inaugurates-golden-
development-company-.html
4th November 2006: WHY I KILLED ‘YEYE BOY’ – Rawlings confesses, http://www.
modernghana.com/news/119652/1/why-i-killed-yeye-boy-rawlings-confesses.html
5th June 2010: Rawlings: June 4 was a justiable divine intervention, http://www.
modernghana.com/news/278847/1/rawlings-june-4-was-a-justifiable-divine-
intervent.html
10th March 2011: Don’t downplay libation at state functions – Archbishop Sarpong, 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/319722/1/dont-downplay-libation-at-state-
functions-archbish.html
15th September 2013: Mahama denies bribing judges through Asantehene, http://
www.modernghana.com/news/489895/1/mahama-denies-bribing-judges-through-
asantehene.html 
State House – e Republic of Sierra Leone
28th April 2005: Asantehene Ends Visit to Sierra Leone, http://www.statehouse-sl.org/
asanti-visit-apr28.html
theodikro.blogspot.com 
23rd March 2010: Kwesi Pratt, Jnr., And e Asanteman Council, What Did He Say 
Wrong?, http://theodikro.blogspot./2010/03/we-are-fed-up-with-our-chiefs-kwesi.
html
IV. Missionary magazines
e Baptist Missionary Magazine
e Friend of Africa
e Missionary Chronicle
e Wesleyan Missionary Notices 
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Abstract
Timo Kallinen
Divine Rulers in a Secular State
e divine kingship and chiefship of the Asante people of central Ghana 
have been undergoing a shi towards secularization since the start of the 
colonial era. Timo Kallinen maintains that a close examination of this 
transformation provides us with a better understanding of secularization 
processes in Ghana more broadly, and in other post-colonial societies whose 
historical development likewise diers from that of the modern West, and 
which have largely confronted secular modernity through encounters with 
European colonialism. roughout the volume secularization is understood 
as a process in modern society whereby divinity is separated from the ways 
in which both human society is regulated and physical nature is understood 
to function. 
Divine Rulers in a Secular State has been divided into three thematic 
parts, each with a short theoretical introduction. In the rst two, analysis 
is primarily inspired by the work of Louis Dumont, while in the third the 
theoretical ideas of Webb Keane and Bruno Latour are of central importance. 
e undierentiated order of the pre-colonial Asante kingdom, in which the 
chiey and priestly functions of the rulers were not separated, comprises the 
initial focus. Sacrices and marriage exchanges, both of which were directed 
at establishing and perpetuating relations between the living and the spirits 
of the dead ancestors, are posited as the most important responsibilities of 
the chief. Also explored are perceptions that the founding of the kingdom 
and its authority structure are the results of sacrices oered to various gods 
by the Asante king and his chiefs. 
e second part examines the dissolution of the traditional order since 
the onset of British colonial occupation. e secularization process was 
initiated by the aspirations of colonial administrators and missionary bodies 
who aimed to maintain Christian converts under the ‘political’ authority 
of their non-Christian chiefs, who were still important ritual leaders. 
Consequently, it was necessary to start dividing society along ‘political’ and 
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‘religious’ lines so that only the former was a mandatory concern for all. e 
kernel of modern citizenship was planted at the same time as the ‘religious’ 
conscience of individuals started to inuence their rights and duties towards 
their ‘political’ rulers. Furthermore, theories about Asante as a state based 
on contract and representation were proposed and developed. In the post-
colonial era chiefship has been put into the service of the independent 
nation state – both as an instrument of administration and a nationalistic 
symbol, while, most recently, chiefs have been depicted as leaders in civil 
society, even receiving support from global developmental organizations. 
Yet traditional chieaincy is strongly criticized by certain Christian groups 
belonging to the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement, which still see it as 
integrally linked to traditional cosmologies.  
e third part of the book takes the discussion beyond the separation 
of the categories of religion and politics. Secularization has also has also 
entailed the dematerialization of religion, establishing it as something that 
ought to be understood primarily as mental or spiritual; in a secular society 
‘things’ like deities, witchcra, or sacrices should not be recognized as 
proper agents and actions at the level of immanent relations. In Ghana such 
views are eectively contradicted by religious groups which see spiritual 
forces as the most powerful agents in social relations. e cases discussed 
deal with attempted state control of anti-witchcra activities, the eciency 
of protective magic during political upheavals, and Pentecostal notions 
of demonic inuences in secular politics. e Conclusions section brings 
the themes of the book together by discussing the large-scale eects of the 
secular project in contemporary Ghanaian society.
Research is based on anthropological eldwork conducted in Ghana 
in 2000–2001 and 2005–2006, data drawn from several archival sources 
located in Ghana and the United Kingdom, and the anthropological and 
historical literature on Ghana and the Asante.
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